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Abstract
Corporate social responsibility has evolved as a business strategy, but the business worth
of voluntary social conduct has not been well understood. The contradictory research
findings mean that social performance is not maximized, which constrains economic
growth and sustainable development. Grounded by stakeholder theory, this correlational
study was aimed at examining the effect of social responsibility factors on the marketbased Fama-French cost of capital. Within a sample of 71 United States banks, the
publicly available ethical ratings, financial data, and stock market data were analyzed
using multiple regression models. Contrary to the positive effect of social conduct on
financial performance common in the literature, this study revealed no significant effect
of social factors on the accounting returns, and, consequently, the shareholders perceived
the social activities as risky and therefore demanded higher returns. The study also
showed that governance, diversity, and employee relation were positively related to
accounting returns while product and community factors were negatively related to
profits. The implied higher cost of raising equity finance following engagement in social
activities is a lesson for corporate managers to exercise caution in their social conduct
and carry the investors along. Such inclusive policy could help to minimize investor bias
and moderate their consequential adverse reactions to well-intentioned corporate actions.
This research contributes to positive social change by assisting the bank managers,
directors, investors, regulators, and government in improving the discharge of their
respective roles to ensure optimal allocation of resources to competing social activities in
a manner that may maximize performance and improve the overall stakeholder wellbeing.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
The 21st century ushered in misfortune for investors, employees, consumers, and
other sympathizers of business corporations. This followed the collapse of many
corporate giants like Tyco, Enron, Adelphi, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and Merrill
Lynch, among others in the United States and Swissair, Metallgesellshaft, Parmalat, and
Vivendi in Europe, due to managerial opportunism and large scale accounting fraud
(Dinsmore, 2014). Similarly, the world economy is yet to recover fully from the ravaging
effects of the global economic crisis that occurred in 2008. To a large extent the social
consequences of these crises have reduced consumer confidence in business enterprises,
thus creating reputational issue for organizations and limiting their competitiveness and
prosperity. In addition, from the industrial age spanning the 18th to 19th century to the
turn of the 21st century, businesses showed a lack of social responsibility and
sustainability (Adeleke, 2014). They were portrayed as depleting natural resources, not
mindful of the footprint of their activities on the earth’s capacity, polluting the
environment and threatening the ozone layer (Stanley, 2011). These developments have
created a desire for increased oversight of corporate activities and have also attracted
public attention to the social conduct of business organizations (Idemudia, 2011). In
response to the challenging business environment arising from these developments,
business firms embarked on aggressive social responsibility activities and other strategies
that are capable of improving their reputation and restoring stakeholder confidence
(Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). Many of these acts have been perceived to be greenwashing,

2
a distorted marketing strategy (Sun & Cui, 2014). This creates a challenge for
understanding the motive behind corporate social conducts.
Recognizing the importance of sustainable business conduct, the European
Commission (EC) formed the Europe 2020 strategy with a commitment to promote
corporate social responsibility (CSR) by businesses in the region. In the Commission’s
view, CSR is a key source of competitive advantage and has potential to induce
innovation, capacity building, positive customer relationship, cost effectiveness, human
resource management, and effective risk management (EC, 2011). The Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) equally advocates for the observance
of social and environmental standards by business corporations. OECD (2008)
emphasized social responsibility as a central theme of good governance of enterprises,
acknowledging the importance of ensuring the cooperation of all stakeholders. Social
responsibility activities of individual corporations has been observed and documented in
the literature (Carol, 1991). These firms showcase in their websites and annual reports
their activities on and commitment to social responsibility (Adeleke, 2014). Regional and
national bodies have sprung up to monitor social responsibility of enterprises. One of
these is the Social Enterprise Report and Awards (SERA) that annually presents awards
to firms with distinguished and exemplary corporate social responsibility (CSR)
(Adeleke) practices. Firms regularly expend or invest money and other resources in CSR
(Sun & Cui, 2014). As a way of integrating CSR in their corporate strategies, some firms
now have a senior officer at the directorate level whose responsibility is to manage CSR
(Soana, 2011). The enormity of the resources firms expend in prosecuting CSR projects
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to improve their fortune therefore deserves critical scrutiny, which was undertaken in this
study.
In this chapter, I explored the background of the study with a definitive statement
of the problem and purpose of the study. The statements of the research questions and
hypotheses followed this exploration. The conceptual framework guiding the study was
presented, supported by the assumptions, scope, limitations and delimitations of the
study. The significance of the study was offered with insights on how the study could
lead to the creation of social change to specific segments of the society. The chapter was
then concluded with the definition of certain terms that have contextual meanings in the
study.
Background of the Study
Businesses seek to create wealth for their owners through product or service
offerings that satisfy effective demand (Fomukong, 2014). Since the 1950s, scholarly
efforts made to determine whether responsible business social conduct can significantly
induce profit have yielded unclear results till date (Orlitzky, 2013). The intensity of CSR
practices has been adequately captured in the empirical literature: growing evidence that
socially responsible investments outperform others (Nofsinger & Varma, 2014);
increasing consumer demand for green, organic products (Borgers & Pownall, 2014);
business risk being affected by various dimensions of CSR (Bouslah, Kryzanowski, &
M’Zali, 2013); and quality of financial reporting being dependent on the business CSR
attitude (Grougiou, Leventis, Dedoulis, & Owusu-Ansah, 2014). However, in their recent
and latest study, UN Global Impact and Accenture (2013) found that the interest in
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business sustainability practices, including CSR activities, is currently waning. The
observed subsidence is attributed to the twin factors of the obscure CSR-business value
link and the perceived incompatibility of the traditional measures of business
performance with socially responsible behavior (Orlitzky, 2013). It remains a challenge
for a business community to identify, quantify, and unlock the business value of
responsible social conduct, limiting effective allocation of corporate resources.
Studies that have attempted to find out if CSR helps in creating value or whether
it destroys business value can be categorized based on their outcomes – positive
relationship, negative relationship, or no significant relationship (Fomukong, 2014). The
studies in which positive relation between CSR and financial performance (FP) were
found dominate the empirical literature (Chen & Wang, 2011; Kasim, 2012; Lee, Faff, &
Langfield-Smith, 2009; Muise, 2009; Mustafa, Othman, & Perumal, 2012; Weshah,
Dahiyat, Awwad, & Hajjat, 2012). A negative CSR-FP relationship was found by
Becchetti & Ciciretti (2009), Lioui & Sharma (2012), Rahmawati & Dianita (2011), and
Yang, Lin, and Chang (2010) while it was in only very few studies that no significant
relation was found between CSR and FP (Chih, Chih, & Chen, 2010; Dinsmore, 2014;
Linthicum, Reitenga, & Sanchez, 2010; Soana, 2011). The divergence of findings creates
lacuna in the knowledge of the potential value of social conduct of business.
The inconsistent findings on the issue can be explained by the divergent
conceptual philosophies underlying the individual studies. First, CSR has been both
narrowly and broadly conceived by researchers, reflecting the essentially contested nature
of the construct (Okoye, 2009; Saeidi, Sofian, Saeidi, Saeidi, & Saeidi, 2014).
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Researchers have treated CSR in various ways: as the information disclosed to the
stakeholders on the business social conduct (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2014;
Rahmawati & Dianita, 2011; Sobhani, Amran, & Zainudden, 2012; Yang et al. 2010); as
the perception of the various stakeholders of the business social conduct (Akanbi &
Ofoegbu, 2012; Busch & Hoffmann, 2011; Chen & Wang, 2011; Christmann, 2000;
Mustafa et al. 2012; Oke, 2011); as corporate reputation (Laan, Ees, & Witteloostuijn,
2008; Linthicum et al. 2010; Maden, Arikan, Telci, & Kantur, 2012); as socially
responsible investment and charitable donations (Borgers & Pownall, 2014; Nofsinger &
Varma, 2014); and as independent multidimensional ethical rating of business (Baird,
Geylani, & Roberts, 2012; Callan & Thomas, 2009; Choi, Kwak, & Choe, 2010; Makni,
Francoeur, & Bellacance, 2009; Soana, 2011). While most researchers viewed CSR from
the perspective of ethical rating indices provided by various independent bodies such as
KLD and EIRIS, the CSR was also operationalized differently. A large number of studies
treated the CSR ethical ratings as aggregated measures (Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, &
Mishra, 2011; Goss & Roberts, 2011; Linthicum et al. 2010; Soana, 2011; Torres,
Bijmolt, Tribo, & Verhoef, 2012) while only a few examined the individual components
of social conduct (Baird et al.; Inoue & Lee, 2011; Lioui & Sharma, 2012; Makni et al.).
Second, financial performance was equally divergently treated by researchers, with scope
covering the traditional accounting measures, market based measures, and cost of capital.
The traditional accounting performance measures used included both absolute
returns/earnings/assets together with their growth (Arnold & Valentine, 2013; Becchetti,
Ciciretti, & Giovannelli, 2013; Ghoul et al. 2011; Wu & Shen, 2013) and constructed
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earnings based ratios such as return on asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE), return on
investment (ROI), and earnings per share (EPS) (Callan & Thomas, 2009; Makni et al.
2009; Yang at al. 2010). Other accounting measures found in the literature to address the
problem are loan contract terms (Goss & Roberts, 2011), brand equity (Torres et al.),
cost-to-income ratio (Soana, 2011), and absolute forecast error on EPS (Becchetti et al.).
The FP was also viewed from market perspectives such as stock price values and stock
price related ratios (Baird et al.; Busch & Hoffmann, 2011; Callan & Thomas, 2009; Choi
et al.; Deng, Kang, & Low, 2013; Inoue & Lee, 2011; Jo & Harjoto, 2011; Kang, Lee, &
Huh, 2010; Lioui & Sharma, 2012; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013; Soana, 2011). Cost of
capital was scantly treated by researchers as a measure of financial performance
(Campbell, Dhaliwal, & Schwartz, 2012; Ghoul et al.; Goss & Roberts, 2011). These
variations partly explain the inconsistent research outcome.
Apart from the divergent ways in which CSR and FP were treated by researchers,
the empirical literature also suffers from some fundamental shortcomings which further
contribute to the examination of CSR-financial performance relation. First, even though
most studies claimed to utilize stakeholder theory, they examined multiple industries
(Becchetti et al. 2013; Linthicum et al. 2010; Lioui & Sharma, 2012), multiple countries
(Busch & Hoffmann; 2011; Chih et al. 2010; Wu & Shen, 2013), and both multiple
industries and multiple countries (Becchetti, Ciciretti, Hassan, & Kobeissi, 2012; Jo &
Harjoto, 2011; Lee et al. 2009; Torres et al. 2012). Such studies ignored the fact that
stakeholders’ attributes such as composition, perceptions, interests, preferences are
contextually dependent with tendency to vary by industrial and national contexts (Baird
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et al. 2012; Soana, 2011) and are also dynamic with possibility of changing over time
(Chen & Delmas, 2011). The few studies that examined banking industry did not control
for unique banking risk like loan deposit ratio (LDR), on which Wu and Shen (2013)
emphasized. Second, most prior studies paid little attention to specificity consistent with
stakeholder theory, as many studies adopted aggregated/ omnibus CSR measures and
failed to decompose the measures into various components (Callan & Thomas, 2009;
Choi et al. 2010; Deng et al. 2013; Jo & Harjoto, 2011; Wu & Shen, 2013). This led to
the problem of likely imperfect correlation of the individual CSR components (MouraLeite, Padgett, & Galan, 2014; Scholtens, 2008) and inaccurate measures (Goss &
Roberts, 2011). Such studies failed to recognize the heterogeneous nature of
stakeholders’ objectives and expectations. Third, even though a handful of studies have
examined whether CSR is priced by capital market (Becchetti et al.; Ghoul et al. 2011),
the examination of the relationship between individual components of CSR and the
business cost of capital as a measure of market-based financial performance was seldom
examined. Fourth, a large number of studies on the subject are dated, which limits their
relevance to current practice. Finally, a number of studies that utilized ordinary least
squares did not attempt to test the time order preference by lagging the variables included
in the regression models, and as a result such studies did not provide explanation of the
causal influence between CSR and FP.
Consequent upon the above limitations corporate managers and decision makers
currently lack information that could guide them in the effective allocation of corporate
resources to social conduct. This lack of knowledge poses greater risk for corporations
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and explains the recent skepticism expressed by most of the world business leaders who
questioned the sustainability of their social strategies for business value creation (UN
Global Compact & Accenture, 2013). According to these authors, the lack of knowledge
of the business worth of CSR is beginning to dampen the motivation of business leaders.
It is also capable of undermining the global, regional and national efforts being made by
independent bodies to address social responsibility and irresponsibility issues in business
(Adeleke, 2014). The limited knowledge of CSR-business value linkage calls for studies
that address the deficiencies in the prior studies, with focus on areas that are currently
underexamined. Such studies will improve the understanding of the CSR and its strategic
value to the business community. It will also assist in improving risk management and
decision making by business managers as well as their oversight providers. In addressing
the CSR-business value linkage, a dominant issue relates to the definitional clarification
of the CSR concept as well as the tendency to manipulate financial performance
measures.
Defining the CSR concept has been difficult, and this partly accounts for the
divergence of its application in practice. Small and medium-sized firms adopt an informal
process of CSR while large firms adopt a more formalized approach to managing their
social conduct. EC (2011) provided an insight into what constitutes CSR by defining the
concept as the responsibility of business firms to account for their footprints in the
society. To effectively discharge this responsibility, the Commission averred that
enterprises must respect the applicable legislations, regulations and collective agreements

9
with their social partners (EC, 2011). By collaborating with their stakeholders, firms may
be able to create shared values and mitigate the impact of their footprints.
Although the financial performance suffers little or no definitional challenge, it is
prone to manipulation by business managers and their collaborators (Jiao, 2010; Jensen,
2010). This gives rise to such practices as window dressing of accounts, earnings
management, and financial engineering all of which are fraudulent acts (Bona, 2012).
The fact that financial reporting regulation and legislations made it mandatory to subject
accounting numbers to independent review provides little respite for preventing corporate
misdemeanor (Jensen, 2010). Studies that rely on the published accounting numbers have
limited practical use, as the integrity of the numbers remains an issue to contend with
(Soana, 2011). This explains why market-based financial performance measures are
considered to be more reliable than the accounting-based measures (Hajiha & Sarfaraz,
2013). It is important that a study of CSR-FP linkage should complement the traditional
accounting measures of performance with market-focused measures such as the marketdetermined cost of financing. In this study, I examined the impact of the CSR on both the
traditional accounting measures of performance and the market-determined cost of
financing in the context of banking business.
Statement of the Problem
Two in three global CEO’s believe that business sector is not doing enough to
address sustainability issues (UN Global Compact & Accenture, 2013). Though
businesses were pressured into improving their social performance (Montiel & DelgadoCeballos, 2014), still it is not clear whether business commitment to CSR creates or
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destroys value (Orlitzky, 2013). The problem under study was that the business worth of
voluntary social conduct has not been identified or understood. The specific problem
addressed was the lack of knowledge about whether CSR could enhance business
performance (Hajiha & Sarfaraz, 2013).
Due to methodological divergences (Gregory, Tharyan, & Whittaker, 2014), 6
decades of research into the business value of social conduct produced inconclusive
findings (Grougiou et al. 2014). This correlational study is focused on examining the
effects of the CSR factors of the US banks on their accounting returns and cost of capital
as a contribution to the ongoing efforts at bridging the inadequate knowledge. The
potential improvement in managerial understanding could aid sustainable resource
allocation and value optimization to stakeholders.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of my correlational study was to test the Freeman’s (1984)
stakeholder theory by relating the CSR components to the financial performance
measures for large banks in the United States. Guided by the rating methodology of
MSCI KLD Research and Analytics, CSR components of interest were community,
governance, diversity, product, and employee relations. Financial performance was
defined generally as the traditional accounting as well as the market based measures, and
the intervening variables comprising size, risk, growth, preceding year performance, and
management preference were statistically controlled in the study. Archival data on the
CSR ratings, the financial data, and the stock market data of the selected banks in the
United States were collected and analyzed using multiple regression models. The
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outcome of the study might help to improve the managerial understanding of how to
optimally allocate scarce corporate resources to those social activities with potential to
impact the bottom line.
Research Questions and Hypotheses

In this study, I examined if the CSR components could predict the accounting
performance and the market-determined cost of capital of banks in the United States. This
two-part study reflects the bidimensional nature of the FP measures comprising the
accounting measures and the market-focused measures. The goal of the study was to
answer the two research questions and to test the associated hypotheses. These questions
were necessitated partly by the empirical dominance of the aggregated CSR scores and
the inadequate focus on the individual CSR components. Aggregating the CSR scores is
at variance with the stakeholder theory and was inappropriate for this study. The theory is
that the views of the stakeholders are varied as well as their needs, aspirations, and
expectations. Compressing those needs in empirical studies is capable of inducing
misleading conclusion about the stakeholder behavior. The prevalent practice of
aggregating the CSR scores in the empirical literature partially explains the observed
inconsistent and inconclusive findings of the prior studies.

Research Question 1
To what extent can the individual CSR components predict the bank accounting
performance, controlling for the effects of the bank unique and management preference
factors? Empirically, such firm unique factors known to have significant influence on
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financial performance of firm are size, banking risk, growth, and prior financial
performance as well as management preference factor in the form of capital expenditure
(Chen & Wang, 2011). Controlling for these intervening variables is common in the
literature (Jo & Harjoto, 2011). The answer to this question would complement the prior
studies and provide more complete and more relevant knowledge of the social issue.

Research Question 2
To what extent can the individual CSR components of banks help in predicting
the banks’ cost of capital? The compelling need for this question was the observed gap in
the literature regarding the limited emphasis on the market-based cost of capital as a
measure of the business performance. Measuring business performance from the
financing cost perspective not only addresses the concerns expressed by the prior
researchers like Ghoul et al. (2011), Goss & Roberts (2011), and Hong & Kacperczyk
(2009), it also broadens the knowledge of the CSR-business value link.
Hypotheses
In order to study the two research questions proposed, I tested two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. The aim of the Hypothesis 1 was to examine the effect of
the individual CSR components on the accounting performance of banks while the
Hypothesis 2 was aimed at examining the impact of the individual CSR components on
the cost of capital of banks in the United States.

13
Hypotheses 1: CSR on accounting performance. The null hypothesis and the
alternative hypothesis on the extent of predictability of accounting financial performance
by the individual CSR factors were specified as:
H01: The individual CSR components of banks cannot predict the banks’
accounting performance after controlling for the effects of firm unique and
management preference factors.
Ha1: The individual CSR components of banks can predict the banks’ accounting
performance after controlling for the effects of firm unique and management
preference factors.
CSR has been operationalized in diverse ways in the literature, but the trend of the
current research suggests a bias toward the multidimensional ratings. Although many
prior studies have used the composite multidimensional rating scores of the CSR, such an
approach did not consider the possibility of correlation between the individual CSR
components. It was then expedient to adopt the individual CSR components in this study.
Many rating agencies do publish the qualitative scores on social responsibility of
different organizations including banks, one of which is Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini
Research and Analytics (KLD). As the most widely used in the current literature, KLD
measures each firm’s reputation using seven qualitative indicators: community, corporate
governance, diversity, employee relation, product, human right, and environment (Laan
et al. 2008). Though KLD provides rating on each of the 13 indicators of social
responsibility for over 3,000 large American companies, this study is focused on testing
only five (community, corporate governance, diversity, employee relation, and product),
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because KLD ratings were not available for the other factors on banks. The rating scores
for each of these components were included in the regression model to test the above
hypotheses. KLD provides the largest dataset for the CSR studies and has been found to
have passed several tests of construct validity (Laan et al.), though it is also considered to
be imperfect (Doh, Howton, Howton, & Siegel, 2010). The accounting performance
measures commonly used in the empirical literature revolve around ROA, ROE, and
ROI. However in view of the specialized setting of the study being banking, market-tobook (MTB) ratio and earnings before interest, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA)
margin were tested in the multivariate regression models designed for the hypotheses.
The relevant intervening variables were controlled in the model. The financial ratios and
other relevant information about each bank were obtained from Bankscope database.
Multivariate regression analysis was employed to test both hypotheses, using
ordinary least squares (OLS) model. For this purpose, the KLD multidimensional CSR
ratings of each bank on each component represented the independent variables while each
measure of accounting returns (MTB and EBITDA margin) represented the dependent
variable. KLD database provided the dimensional CSR measures for each CSR
component.
The control variables comprised the firm unique factors of size, banking risk,
growth, and past FP and management preference factor of capital expenditure. In terms of
operationalization, the size of the bank was taken as the volume of the total assets, the
banking risk was operationalized as the leverage ratio, the growth was the asset growth,
the past financial performance was the change in FP between time t-1 and time t, and
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management preference was taken as the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets.
Natural logarithms of total assets value was taken in order to standardize the values. I
applied the regression model in Equation 1 to examine Research Question 1 and test
Hypothesis 1.
FPit = β0 + β1CSRjit-1 + β2LogTotAssett + β3Levt + β4AssetGrowth +
β5LogFPit-1 + β6CapexR + ɛit
(1)

where,
Subscripts

=

Index of bank i, time t, and CSR component j

FPit

=

Financial performance for each US bank, measured as EBITDA
margin and MTB ratio separately

β0

=

Model intercept

β1

=

Slope of rating score of each CSR component

Β2...5

=

Slope of each control variable

CSRjit-1

=

Lagged rating score of CSR component j

FPit-1

=

Preceding year’s FP (ROA or Net-Earnings)

TotAssett

=

Total Assets measuring the size of each bank

Levt

=

Leverage ratio

AssetGrowth =

Ratio of total asset in the current period to the total
assets during the preceding period.

CapexRt

=

Ratio of capital expenditure to total asset to measure management
preference.

ɛit

=

Statistical disturbance term

16
Hypotheses 2 – CSR on the cost of capital. The focus of this hypothesis was to
address the second research question through the use of multifactor regression model,
testing the impact of each CSR component separately on the cost of capital. The cost of
equity capital used was based on FF3F model that incorporated three risk factors
comprising market risk premium (MRP), size (SMB) and growth (HML). The null
hypothesis (H02) and alternative hypothesis (Ha2) are specified as:
H02: Individual CSR components of banks cannot predict their cost of capital.
Ha2: Individual CSR components of banks can predict their cost of capital.
In testing the Hypothesis 2, the individual scores of CSR factors of each bank obtained
from the KLD database represented the independent variable, while the cost of capital of
each bank for each period was the dependent variable. The cost of capital used followed
the Fama and French (1993) model in which the authors attempted to correct the
anomalies that plagued the traditional capital asset pricing model (CAPM) model by
introducing two additional risk factors for size (SMB) and growth (HMB) in addition to
the market risk premium (MRP) which CAPM fully addresses (Eraslan, 2013).
The objective of this hypothesis was to assess the effect of the individual CSR
indicators on the cost of capital of a bank as an FP measure. I considered the use of FF3F
formulation in the model to be superior because Fama and French (1993) introduced
additional risk factors that significantly addressed the anomalies that marred the earlier
traditional, single-factor CAPM model. Fama and French (1996) claimed that the
anomalies in the traditional CAPM model disappeared in their three factor model. This
approach is one of the few in the current literature in which FP was separately tested
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based on the cost of capital with respect to the individual CSR indicators, and is a
significant contribution to the empirical literature. The relation was specified in the
regression model stated in Equation 2.
FF3FCOCit = β0 + β1jCSRijt-1 + β2LogTotAssett + β3LEVERAGE +
β4ASSETGRTH + β5EBITDAMgn + β6MTB + β7CAPEXR
+β8LogME + ɛit
(2)

where,
Subscripts

=

Index of bank i, time t, and CSR component j

FF3FCOCit

=

Cost of capital calculated using Fama-French three-factor
approach

β0

=

Model intercept

β1j

=

Slope of CSR component j

CSRijt-1

=

Lagged rating score of CSR component j

MTB

=

Current period’s MTB ratio

EBITDAMGN

=

EBITDA margin

LogTotAsset

=

Natural logarithm of total assets.

Leverage

=

Ratio of debt to total asset, measuring leverage ratio.

AssetGrth

=

Ratio of total asset in the current period to the total
assets during the preceding period.

CapexR

=

Ratio of capital expenditure to total asset to measure
management preference.

Log_ME

=

Natural logarithm of market capitalization
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ɛit

=

Stochastic error term, assumed to be independent and
insignificant, with a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1.

Determination of cost of capital. Cost of capital was determined based on FF3F
model, using Equation 3 formulation.
where,
E(Ri) – Rf

=

bi[E(Rm-Rf)] + Si E(SMB) + hi E(HML)

E(Ri)

=

Expected rate of return on stock portfolio.

Rf

=

Risk-free rate of return.

E(Rm-Rf)

=

Expected excess return on the market index

bi, Si, hi

=

Slopes of the variables or beta values.

E(SMB)

=

Expected value of the difference between the excess return on a

(3)

portfolio of small stocks and the excess return on a portfolio of big
stocks.
E(HML)

=

Expected value of the difference between the excess return on a
portfolio of High Book-to-Market stocks and the excess return on a
portfolio of Low Book-to-Market stocks.
Theoretical Framework of the Study

This study was guided by the Freeman’s (1984) stakeholder theory that states that
in the long term, it is beneficial for a business firm to be in harmony with its
stakeholders. The empirical studies in which positive relationships between the CSR and
the FP were found presuppose that seeking to satisfy the stakeholders rather than a
narrow focus on the stockholders is profitable and leads to greater wealth to firm owners.
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This is consistent with Jiao’s (2010) contention that commitment to CSR is an investment
in a firm’s intangible assets and enhances its competitiveness. The prevalent euphoria of
the CSR activities of enterprises rests on the positive stakeholder view to create shared
value. This requires firms to invest in innovation and voluntarily engage in other
activities that improve human and environmental condition. The opposite view is that the
stakeholder theory may encourage the business managers to indulge in extracting private
benefits at the expense of the stockholders (Jensen, 2010). Jiao (2010) attributed the
empirical studies that found negative CSR-financial performance relation to such
dimension.
Relying on the positive view of the stakeholder theory, I examined the extent to
which the individual CSR components of the banks could predict the banks’ FP
particularly when the confounding effects of key variables were controlled. In the study,
the FP was separately treated both from the accounting perspective and also from the cost
of capital perspective. The concept map shown in Figure 1 relating the individual CSR
components to the respective corporate FP measures was adopted to guide the study. The
chosen variables of the CSR, the FP, and the mediators were based on the reviewed
literature in the context of banking industry.

20

Figure 1: CSR-CFP conceptual model
In this study, I adopted five of the seven KLD CSR qualitative measures
comprising community, governance, diversity, employee relation, and product. Social
ratings were not available for environmental and human right factors as well as those
factors under the exclusionary screens. Two dimensions of the financial performance
were explored: the accounting returns comprising EBITDA margin and MTB ratio and
the market-based cost of capital. Fama-French cost of capital represents the required rate
of return on a security based on the excess returns valued by the company’s beta (a
measure of the company’s systematic risk), the premium relating to the company’s size,
and the premium relating to the company’s growth factor. As intervening variables, the
firm size was operationalized as the volume of total assets, the banking risk was
operationalized as the leverage ratio, the growth was constructed as the asset growth, the
preceding year financial performance was the volume of the prior year financial
performance (either the EBITDA margin or the MTB as the case may be), and the
management preference was constructed as the ratio of capital expenditure to total asset.
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Nature of the Study

In this correlational study, I tested the stakeholder theory that relates the CSR of
business firms to the financial performance. Generally, the potential understanding from
a quantitative research of this nature could be generalized to the larger settings. The
independent variables comprised the CSR ratings published by KLD Research Analytics
Inc. (2015): community, governance, diversity, employee relations, and product. The
dependent variables were that financial performance measures, comprising the
accounting returns (EBITDA margin and MTB) and the Fama-French cost of capital. In
the accounting returns model, I used the firm size, banking risk, growth, preceding-year
financial performance, market capitalization, and managerial discretion in the form of
capital expenditure as the control variables.
For the 71 banks selected for the study, I collected financial data from the
Bankscope database and the stock market returns from the NYSE and NASDAQ.
Because the study data were quantitative in nature, I analyzed the data through multiple
regression models using SPSS.
Definition of Terms
Agency theory: The conception that managers and directors of business firm are subject
to conflict of interest, which may be resolved or minimized by aligning their interests
with the interests of the shareholders through some measures.
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Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM): The model of determining the required rate of
return of a security that is based on the consideration of the excess returns and the
systematic risk of the asset (Fama & French, 1993).
Corporate governance: The means by which business firms are operated, managed and
controlled for the benefit of the stakeholders (OECD, 2008).
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): The behavior of a business firm that aligns with
the interests of the diverse stakeholders and integrates these interests in the operations,
products and practices of the firm (Carol, 1979).
Cost of equity: The minimum rate of return required by the equity shareholders which is
determined with reference to the market price of the stock (Fama & French, 1993).
Earnings management: The unethical practice by management to manipulate financial
performance and financial position of an enterprise (Rahmawati & Dianita, 2014).
Environmental conduct: Behavior of business firms to treat environment as a resource in
a sustainable manner (Idemudia, 2011).
Environmental footprint: The adverse effects of businesses operations on the society,
which corporations have social obligations to reduce to the safe level (Idemudia, 2011).
Ethical conduct: Obligations of business firms to operate with fairness and justice while
dealing with the stakeholders (Carol, 1979).
External stakeholders: A group of people or organizations that influence or are
influenced by the firm such as customers, suppliers, government, trade unions, and
community (Orlitzky, 2013).
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Fama-French three factor (FF3F) model: The variant of capital asset pricing model
(CAPM) that includes additional two factors of size and growth to the market risk
premium considered in the single factor model. The FF3F addresses the anomalies of the
single factor model (Fama & French, 1993).
Financial reporting: The rules governing the maintenance of records in a business and
preparing the required financial statements (Bona, 2012).
Greenwashing: Activities of business firms to improve its public image through strategic
communication process (Sun & Cui, 2014).
Internal stakeholders: A group of people who work directly within the business firm such
as employees, management, and shareholders (Orlitzky, 2013).
Management discretion/preference: Spending decisions taken by firms that are purely
discretionary in nature (Soana, 2011).
Managerial opportunism: The tendency for corporate managers to act unethically by
using corporate resources to advance their own pecuniary and other interests at the
expense of the shareholders (Jensen, 2010).
Ozone layer: atmospheric condition of the earth which becomes threatened by the
environmental footprint of business operations (Idemudia, 2011).
Risk management: The practice of identifying the business risks, analyzing the risks to
understand them, assessing them for the purpose of prioritizing how to treat them, dealing
with them through some strategic actions, and monitoring them to ensure that they are
within tolerable limits (Jo & Harjoto, 2011).
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Social conduct: Concerns of business firms for the working conditions of employees and
the living conditions of other stakeholders (Carol, 1979).
Social responsibility: The role of business firms to support and improve the society while
pursuing legitimate business interests (Carol, 1979).
Socially responsible investment: The expenditure of business firms for the purpose of
improving the relationship with the stakeholders (Nofsinger & Varma, 2014).
Stakeholders: Those that the operation of the business firm has impact upon and those
that can influence the behavior of the firm (Freeman, 1984).
Stakeholder theory: Stakeholder theory states that in the long run it is beneficial for
business firms to keep the stakeholders happy with the firm (Freeman, 1984).
Sustainability: The running of affairs of business organizations in a beneficial way to the
society in future (UN Global Compact and Accenture, 2013).
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC): The overall cost of capital determined as the
weighted average of the cost of equity and the cost of debt. It is used as an opportunity
cost of capital in the firm (Hajiha & Sarfaraz (2013).
Assumptions
A number of assumptions were made in this study. First, it was assumed that the
stakeholder theory used for this study was appropriate even though the study was focused
on only banking industry. This implied that an attempt to generalize the results of the
study beyond the banking industry needs to be treated with caution. The second
assumption was that the five KLD CSR measures adopted as the predictors adequately
captured the views of all the stakeholders of the US banking industry. Third, I assumed
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that the relationship between the CSR and the FP is clear and logical in order to permit
the generation of the hypotheses of the study. The next assumption was that the study of
the CSR in the financial sector was relevant to economic and social development such
that the observed impact of the CSR on the FP of banks should be real and nonspurious.
The fifth assumption was that the hypothesized banks, being the listed banks on the KLD
database, were representative of all the large banks in the United States. Finally, I made
the assumption that the secondary data used in this study– the social ratings of sampled
banks, the financial data of the banks, and the stock performance data of the banks– were
complete and accurate.
Scope and Delimitations
The focus of this study was on examining the effect of the CSR on the FP of the
banks in the United States. CSR variable was viewed as the multidimensional, ethical
ratings at individual component level. The use of multidimensional, ethical ratings was
one of the several ways of measuring CSR. An alternative was to view CSR from the
perceptions of the stakeholders using primary data sources including questionnaires or indepth interviews, or as a disclosure of information relating to social conduct, or as a
unidimensional social measure such as corporate reputation, environmental footprint,
social investment or charitable expenditure. Although several ethical rating agencies exist
that measure CSR in different ways, in this study I adopted the ratings provided by KLD
because of its popularity among the researchers. Unlike the common approach of
aggregating the ratings of the individual CSR measures, in this study I avoided
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aggregating the ratings. Instead, I examined the effect of each of CSR component on the
financial performance measures of each bank.
In this study, I viewed the FP as the accounting returns of EBITDA margin and
MTB as well as the market-based cost of capital. It is recognized that many intervening
variables could confound the relationship between the variables; in this study I limited
such factors to only firm size, banking risk, growth, prior year’s financial performance,
market capitalization, and management preference under accounting returns, with the
addition of the EBITDA margin and MTD for cost of captial model. Each of these factors
is capable of being treated in diverse ways, but I treated the firm size as the asset volume,
the banking risk as the leverage ratio, the growth as the relative growth of the total asset,
the prior year’s FP as the ratio of the current year FP measure (EBITDA margin and
MTB as the case may be) to their prior year levels, and the management preference as the
ratio of capital expenditure to total asset.
I selected a sample of 71 banks that are available on the KLD database and that
were also listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ. This limited sample size was determined by
the simultaneous availability of social, financial, and stock market data. The secondary
data used in the study comprised the proprietary ethical ratings data and the published
financial data of banks in the United States obtained from the Bankscope Database, both
of which are publicly availabe. The stock market data used for computation of cost of
capital were obtained from Yahoo! Finance database. The ethical, financial and stock
market data used were limited to a period of 5 years. Secondary data is commonly used in
social science research because of its ready availability (Singleton & Straits, 2005).
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Multiple regression analysis was employed to analyze the data in order to determine the
correlation among the variables as well as assess their predictability. The chosen data
analysis strategy was based on its popularity in the empirical literature. Finally, an alpha
level of .05 and a beta level of .8 was set to minimize the statistical errors in the study
and permit a meaningful generalizability of the findings to the entire banking industry as
well as to other settings.
Limitations
Many factors may limit the usefulness of the findings of this study. First, the
findings of the study may not be generalizable beyond the US banking industry.
Extending the results to other industries in the United States or outside the geographical
context of the study may render such generalization inaccurate. Second, the limited
variables of this study implied that some important variables may have been omitted from
the regression models which, if included in the models, could potentially alter the
findings of the study. Third, the 5 year data used might not be adequate to permit reliable
generalization. Fourth, the use of secondary data that was not constituted a limitation to
the usefulness of this study, because such data were generated for a different purpose.
Fifth, the accuracy of the secondary data might not be guaranteed. Potential errors and
inaccuracies in the data at the measurement, compilation, or publication level would
render the findings of the study inaccurate. Sixth, the study also suffered from availability
bias, as some banks were dropped from the selection list because they had incomplete
data. Missing or incomplete data is capable of weakening the potential of multiple
regression model. Finally, some assumptions used in this study might be unnoticeably
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violated leading to structural or model errors. Nevertheless, these limitations provide an
opportunity for further studies to build on the outcome of this research.
Significance of the Study

The focus on the individual CSR components made this study to be unique by
filling a gap in knowledge through the identification of the nature and significance of the
effect which each component has on the firm’s bottom line. Guided by this knowledge,
corporate managers might be able to discriminate among the different CSR activities and
allocate more resources to those that have significant positive relationship with the FP
and less to others. Another unique feature of this study was its focus on the rarely
examined market revealed financing cost as a measure of financial performance. Apart
from complementing the prior studies, the study could provide a more complete
understanding of how the different social factors influence the finance cost. Bank policy
makers require such understanding to be able to take effective investment decisions
(Ghoul et al. 2011). The improved understanding of the CSR-FP relationship might fill
the knowledge gap in the literature, aid optimal resource allocations by business
managers, and thus create positive social change.

Summary and Transition
In this chapter, I set the background for the study in the context of the US banking
sector. The research problem that informed the study was identified within the current
empirical literature, with a clear description of the deficiencies of prior studies that
addressed the problem and the significance of the study for corporate managers and
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decision makers in banks to guide them in their resource allocation responsibilities. The
purpose of the study was stated and clarified; the variables of the study were explained,
and the two research questions and hypotheses that guided the inquiry were stated,
explained and justified. Underpinned by the positive view of the stakeholder theory, a
conceptual framework to guide the study was presented, showing how the individual
CSR components were related to each of the financial performance measures. I equally
identified, explained, and justified the intervening variables believed to mediate the
results of the interaction between the CSR components and the financial performance.
The study rested on a number of important assumptions which I identified and explained.
I also explained the scope within which the study was conceptualized and the
delimitations set to ensure a controlled inquiry. The significance of the study was
explained in terms of the potential positive social change that the study could create. I
closed the chapter with the identification of the factors, situations and circumstances that
might limit the generalization of the findings and conclusions to other settings, with the
explanation that these limitations might be explored in further studies.
In the chapter 2, I conducted the review of the theoretical and empirical literature
on CSR-FP relation, to set the context of the study. The literature review was
thematically structured, identifying the key issues in the literature, evaluating the
evidence supporting the issues, assessing the significance of this evidence, and taking a
position for the implication for the current study. This approach was to ensure that the
current study was twined within the confines of the current literature. While analyzing the
literature on particular themes, I ensured that the sources cited to a large extent were
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within the last 5 years in line with the guiding principles of the doctoral studies in
Walden University. I commenced the literature review with a brief introduction and an
explanation of how the resources used for the reviewed were acquired. I then proceeded
to explain the key topics covered including CSR, financial measures of business
performance, CSR theories and business case, and the recent empirical findings on the
CSR-FP link. Under each of these topics, I identified the subthemes and used the
analytical approach to evaluate them and provide a justification for their relevance to the
current study. I closed the literature review chapter by summarizing the gaps identified
during the literature analysis, indicating how these gaps were addressed in the current
study.
In the chapter 3, the methodology for conducting the study was explained, and the
details of the chosen design were provided together with the theoretical and empirical
justifications. I began the chapter by examining the chosen philosophical paradigm of the
study including its ontology and epistemology. I then reviewed the design of the research
and defined the dependent, independent and control variables of the study. The
characteristics of the target population were identified, followed by the description of the
sampling method and the sampling frame that guided how the sampling items were
selected. I explained and justified the instrumentation, data collection procedures, and
data analysis method within the context of the literature reviewed. I also provided the
details of the two hypotheses that guided the inquiry and provided a justification for their
inclusion based on the guiding research questions. I then concluded the chapter by
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providing an insight on how the output of the data analysis should be interpreted based on
the chosen alpha level.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
The current literature on the business value of social conduct is inconclusive and
controversial, as researchers found divergent effects of social performance on the
business financial performance. In this study, I sought to examine the effects of the
corporate social responsibility (CSR) on the business financial performance (FP)
measures proxied by the cost of capital. In this chapter, I reviewed the theoretical and
empirical literature relevant to this study. In the first section, the review of the concepts
of CSR and FP was undertaken as well as the assessment of how they have been viewed
by theorists and empirical researchers. The linkage between the CSR and FP and how this
link has been examined by researchers were reviewed in the second section. The focus of
the third section was on the operationalization of the independent variables (CSR and its
components), dependent variables (both accounting and market derivatives) and control
variables that have been identified in the literature to influence the CSR-FP relation. The
main issues from the literature review were then summarized in the final section, closing
with the identified gaps that needed to be addressed as well as the plan that could help to
address them.
Literature Search Strategy
This literature review was based on various sources including Academic Search
Primer and Business Search Primer or EBSCO, ProQuest Dissertations, and Walden
University Dissertations. Emphasis was on peer-reviewed resources within the past 5
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years . The search strategy was principally based on the advanced search options using
Thoreau Multiple Databases with Boolean operation on such subjects as corporate social
responsibility, stakeholder theory, CSR, corporate financial performance, social
performance, financial performance, social market performance, sustainability, and
corporate ethics. I also utilized the edited resources that were relevant to the theoretical
and empirical development of the CSR and FP constructs.
Corporate Social Responsibility
Evolution and Definition of CSR
Involvement of business firms in societal development activities beyond the
pursuit of profit making to accelerate shareholders’ wealth maximization has been
gaining momentum in business and in academics. Although businesses were found to
have engaged in some form of social activities during the 19th century era of factory
systems the formal writings on and the developments of the CSR concept date back to
1950s (Maden et al. 2012). But understanding the nature of the impact that the CSR has
on the business financial performance has recently elicited increasing academic and
business interests with the escalating demand for businesses to be more responsible to the
stakeholders other than the shareholders and strive to meet their multifarious needs
(Aguinis & Glavas, 2012). The CSR topic is now a common feature of corporate
websites; corporations now designate a senior management member to anchor the CSR
issues, while most reputable business schools now not only engage CSR subject matter
professors, they also integrate CSR ideals into the business management curricular
(Montiel & Delgado-Ceballos, 2014). On a global scale, business corporations have
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integrated the CSR ideals into their business models and operating structures, as a
strategy to maximize profit through self-interest (Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). Common
evolutionary trends that support increasing acceptance and growth of CSR include the
increasing affluence of the global societies as well as the increasing competition and
globalization (Surroca, Tribo, & Zahra, 2013), the need to redress the image crisis
(Avram & Avalsilcai, 2014), advances in communication technology that aid the global
broadcasting of irresponsible corporate acts (Keffas & Olulu-Briggs, 2011; Wang, Lu,
Kweh, & Lai, 2014), and the increasing concern for environmental safety and ecological
sustainability (Idemudia, 2011). Despite this euphoria of social interests by business
firms, there is no universally accepted definition of the CSR yet.
The CSR has been conceptualized in diverse ways and researchers are yet to agree
on a common definition of the construct. It is regarded as essentially contested concept,
with meanings varying with people and with contexts (Saeidi et al. 2014). The emergent
state of the construct is evidenced by lack of cohesion, definitional consensus and
theoretical maturity that dominate the literature. A universal definition is fundamentally
inevitable to the understanding, growth and wide acceptance of the concept. A common
theme of the CSR that has emerged in literature relates to how to create value to the
stakeholders rather than a narrow focus on the stockholders, the corporations’ legal
owners (Peloza & Shang, 2011). An off-shoot of this theme is the popular definition of
CSR as a set of context-specific corporate actions and policies that integrate the
stakeholders’ expectations and the triple bottom line of economic, social and
environmental performance (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012, p. 933). In view of the definitional
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lacuna that presently characterizes the CSR literature, it was accepted for this study that
CSR is a voluntary business firm action directed toward improving the economic, social,
and ecological or environmental conditions of the society including the future generations
(Okoye, 2009). The lack of definitional consensus on CSR can be attributed to the
divergence of the perspectives that are associated with the construct.
Dimensions of CSR
Several dimensions of the CSR have received adequate research attention. The
early conceptualization of CSR was the philanthropic perspective whereby business firms
make charitable donations or contributions to the society (Caroll, 1991). The
organizations that make such corporate contributions including banks do amplify such
acts of generosity in their published information to draw public attention to them so as to
garner support and legitimacy (Wu & Shen, 2013), although the sincerity of the
benevolence act may be questioned by the profit-centeredness inherent in the nature of
business (Jensen, 2010). Environmental issues also feature prominently in the CSR
thought. The CSR concept overlaps with the environmental responsibility including the
human and the natural environment that are often neglected in the CSR discourse
(Idemudia, 2011). The concept has also been viewed as a managerial process (Akanbi &
Ofoegbu, 2012), as exemplified by the creation of executive offices or designates for
CSR responsibilities parallel to the other corporate responsibilities. In this regard, the
CSR is taken as a corporate strategy, aimed at assisting organizations to achieve its goals
through the application of the traditional management functions like planning,
forecasting, coordinating, controlling and directing efforts on the social issues relating to
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the business (Saeidi et al, 2014). Mustafa et al. (2012) contended that CSR has become a
core business strategy aimed at contributing to the bottom line. Thus social responsibility
considerations should therefore be seen not as a burden, but as a tool that may assist to
innovate and gain competitive edge. On the contrary, it was recently observed that CEOs
only used CSR investment as a tool that enables them gain some personal advantage like
empire building and power, after which they reduce their investment in CSR (Jiraporn &
Chintrakarn, 2013), which is in agreement with the school of thought that opportunistic
managers may exploit the CSR for their private benefits (Jensen, 2010). From the human
rights and labor perspective, CSR was viewed as a contribution to social welfare (Maden
et al. 2012), the essence being to motivate employees in the work environment and
enhance corporate reputation. The enumerated diversity of the CSR dimensions partly
explains the inconsistent research outcome on the CSR-FP relation.
Social Irresponsibility Dimension
Corporate social irresponsibility is another dimension of the CSR that is currently
gaining momentum among researchers. It arises from the perceived failure of business to
act in accordance with societal expectations. Following the observation of McWilliams,
Siegel and Wright (2006) that corporate irresponsibility has almost been ignored in the
CSR literature, Herzig and Moon (2013) and Lange and Washburn (2012) examined the
irresponsible conduct of corporations. The irresponsible conduct arises when a corporate
decision is not Pareto-optimal (Arnold & Valentin, 2013). The concept centers around the
commonly observed despicable corporate acts including fraud, fraudulent financial
reporting, deceiving customers, cheating governments, exploiting employees, putting
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other stakeholders like customers, employees and the general public at risk, and polluting
the environment (Herzig & Moon). Such corporate acts of irresponsibility precipitated the
collapse of many corporate giants in the 2000’s such as Parmalat, Enron, and WorldCom
(Arnold & Valentin, 2013). The global meltdown of the 2007-2008 was also attributed to
the irresponsibility of the financial sector (Herzig & Moon). Nevertheless, the empirical
study of the corporate irresponsible acts is marred largely by the perceptive and
subjective assessment of undesirability by the observer (Lange & Washburn, 2012). The
observer’s reactive subjectivity makes the objective analysis of corporate social
irresponsibility a mirage. The corporate social irresponsibility hypothesis is therefore
aimed at providing more complete understanding of the CSR concept.
CSR Theoretical Frameworks
A number of theoretical frameworks have been proposed by researchers to model
the CSR idea. Using the social contract theory signifying the societal license implicitly
granted to businesses to operate, Committee for Economic Development (CED) (1971)
developed a CSR framework of three concentric circles: the inner circle representing the
strict economic responsibility of the business to the society through the provision of
goods or services profitably and the provision of employment; the intermediate circle
representing the obligation to respect the societal value system; and the outer circle
depicting the expectation for active involvement in improving the environment. Even
though its emphasis is on the involvement of businesses in the provision of social/public
goods beyond the narrow economic focus, the framework provides no idea of how the
identified responsibilities can be discharged.
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Caroll (1991) expanded the CED framework by developing a more
comprehensive three dimensional CSR framework, covering the nature of corporate
responsibilities, the topical social issues to which the responsibilities are tied, and the
philosophy of responsiveness. The corporate responsibility dimension was modelled as a
pyramid of four key responsibilities that are based on the societal expectations from the
business firms (Carol, 1979). Arranged in their order of emphasis, these are economic
responsibilities, legal responsibilities, ethical responsibilities, and philanthropic or
discretionary responsibilities (Carol, 1979). The economic responsibility, as the base of
the pyramid, attracts the greatest emphasis, as shown in the Figure 2. The economic
responsibility of business firm is the societal expectation that the business firm should
produce the needed goods and services and sell them profitably, as well as employ people
in the production process (Carol, 1979). According to Caroll, the economic responsibility
is so fundamental that the other responsibilities rest on its assumption. A corollary to this
requirement is that if the business fails in its economic responsibilities, it faces a threat of
going out of business and losing its rights to exist under the terms of the social contract
theory. The legal responsibilities relate to the societal expectation that, in producing the
needed goods and services, business firms must perform their expected roles within the
confines of the extant laws, regulations, norms and customs leading to orderliness in the
society (Caroll, 1991). Failure to abide by the guiding rules increases the risk of being
penalized which may include withdrawal of the implicit social contract certificate (Caroll,
1991). The author posited that every society also expects business firms to act ethically
and morally. Though the business firms are artificial persons, corporate decisions are
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influenced largely by internal decision structure and a set of organizational beliefs, values
and culture (Lange & Washburn, 2012). This connotes that these artificial persons are
also capable of assuming and discharging moral responsibility. So, the society expects
business corporations to act ethically while discharging their other obligations. The
philanthropic responsibilities are voluntary activities that the society desires. Such
gestures are in the form of corporate donations, charitable gifts or community
involvement in purely corporate activities (Borgers & Pownall, 2014; Nofsinger &
Varma, 2014). The society rewards the business firms for such philanthropic gestures in
the form of loyalty to the firm and social acceptance of its products or services (Arnold &
Valentin, 2013). However, Friedman (1970) warned that when firms indulge in
philanthropic activities in anticipation of obtaining these rewards such activities do not
constitute a CSR. This emphasizes the voluntary and nonpremeditated nature of the CSR
concept.

Figure 2: CSR framework: Theoretical framework showing the four-part CSR model
(Carol, 1991), with the responsibilities arranged in their order of emphasis.
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Carroll (1979) provided further insight into how the corporate responsibilities
described in the pyramid can be discharged. Carroll contended that both the social issues
dimension and the corporate response dimension are largely context-dependent: the social
issues are dynamic and are in a state of flux, attracting varying degrees of interest or
concern to each firm or industry, while the responsiveness approach also comes in
varying degrees ranging from doing nothing to doing much depending on the managerial
decisions in the particular firm at a particular time period. This exposition is a
contributing factor as to why the CSR remains an essentially contested concept that is
largely affected by industry conditions and managerial disposition.
Drivers of Corporate Social Responsibility
Consistent with the comprehensive Carol’s (1979) CSR framework, business
firms respond to their social responsibilities in varying degrees of intensity, ranging from
reactive, defensive posture to proactive, leading stance, depending on their motive at the
particular time. It implies that a number of idiosyncratic and environmental factors drive
CSR. Banks, for instance, are largely motivated to pursue CSR because of the strategic
value of the social conduct to their business (Wu & Shen, 2013). The authors posited that
consumers and investors are the predominant drivers of CSR in the banking industry.
Wood (2010) contended that businesses should be concerned with consumerism
amongst other social issues. Consumerism is the idea that consumers tend to reward the
ethically perceived firms by paying higher prices for their products while they punish the
unethically perceived ones with lower prices, boycott and, in extreme cases, violent
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protests (Parsa, Lord, Putrevu & Kreeger, 2015). The market perception is central to the
strategic implication of the CSR to the business firms.
The attitude of business firms to social responsibility is a key consideration by the
investors in their selection processes Ghoul et al. (2011). The use of social screens in the
selection process inevitably results in differential costs of capital among CSR and
nonCSR firms. Ghoul et al. (2011) found evidence supporting the notion that the firms
with socially responsible practices entrenched in their business or corporate strategies
have higher valuations, lower cost of capital and lower risk while those with antisocial
practices such as those that operate in the sin industries like tobacco, beer, and gun attract
lower valuations, higher financing cost and higher risk. The strategic content of the CSR
is therefore a potent driver of business engagement in social conduct.
In consonance with stewardship theory, the business managers who control
corporate resources are placed in a position to manipulate the use of the CSR as a tool to
achieve particular aims (Jensen, 2010). How well the managers use this tool is largely
dependent on the available external control in form of public policy (Brammer, Jackson,
& Matten, 2012), stakeholder pressure (Sobhani et al. 2012), and the internal control
exerted by their governance boards (Jensen, 2010). Jiraporn and Chintrakarn (2013)
observed that CEOs commit resources to CSR for selfish reasons such as to gain more
power. Corporate control is important in order to ensure managerial utilization of the
CSR resources toward organizational value creation.
The presence or the absence of laws and regulations as well as the effectiveness of
their monitoring also moderates the social conduct of business firms. The need for
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business firms to play by the codified rules is part of the legal domain of the Caroll
(1991) CSR framework. Caroll contended that the presence of the laws and regulations
and their enforcement are a major tool that helps to align managerial behavior to good
social conduct. Thus to the extent that failure to operate within the confines of the rules
and regulation is a trajectory of corporate failure, the business pursuit of the CSR is
driven by the need to discharge their legal compliance responsibilities.
The CSR is also driven by the organizational need to build moral capital through
deeply rooted positive cultures and virtues, which aid achievement of business goals
(Griffin & Prakash, 2014). Falling within the philanthropic domain of the Caroll CSR
framework, organizational virtuousness is a tool of strategic value creation (Fernando &
Almeida, 2012). This practice has led to the propagation of new concepts in management
theory such as McDonaldization and Starbuckization (Brammer et al. 2012). Thus the
need to build enduring corporate culture that is deeply rooted in tradition and
virtuousness is instrumental to the philanthropic responsibilities.
Lately, the frontiers of the business engagement in CSR have been further
expanded by the emergence of the concept of enlightened shareholder value and the
associated quest to find business legitimacy (Adeyanju, 2012). While seeking to achieve
their sustainable development goals, governments at national and supranational levels
encourage businesses to espouse CSR ideals (Arnold & Valentin, 2013). The business
corporations are called upon to complement the government efforts in providing public
goods and social services (Griffin & Prakash, 2014). Some jurisdictional governments
also enact and enforce CSR regulations that compel corporations to display a high sense
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of social conduct (Cajias, Fuerst, & Bienert, 2014). Against this backdrop, a handshake
between the private sector and the government ensures sustainable CSR.
CSR Measurement Methodology
Researchers have measured the CSR in diverse ways including the use of
questionnaire surveys, content analysis of disclosed CSR information in corporate
publications, spending measures, unidimensional, and multidimensional ratings based on
some observable social responsibility indicators. Each of these measures has unique
strengths and weaknesses. Soana (2011) argued that the diversity of CSR measures
largely contributes to the contradictory findings on the nature of the CSR-FP relation.
The prevalent diversity of measures is exacerbated by the multiplicity of possible
approaches within each measure. For instance for some studies in which
multidimensional social responsibility ratings were used, researchers adopted KLD
ratings (Becchetti et al. 2012; Lioui & Sharma, 2012), EIRIS Index (Wu & Shen, 2013),
AEI Index (Soana, 2011), and SGP Index (Torres et al. 2012). Each of these rating bodies
determines its index based on some surveys as well as measures on several qualitative
factors.
Questionnaire surveys.
Questionnaires are completed by respondents who may be the targeted
stakeholders or corporate executives based on their perceptions of how the firm
discharges its social responsibilities. Chen & Wang (2011) administered their
questionnaires to the senior executives of Guangdong enterprises of China while Mustafa
et al. (2012) directed their questionnaires to the top management of public listed
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companies in Malaysia. When survey questionnaires are used, they only represent the
views and perceptions of the respondents, which could be bias (Lange & Washburn,
2012).
Content analysis of disclosures in corporate publications.
Scores of researchers have adopted content analysis of disclosures in corporate
publications relating to social and environmental matters. This process involves counting
of words, phrases, clauses or sentences in the publications that relate to the social or
environmental themes and using binary values to quantify them (Ganescu, 2012).
Presupposing that the social disclosure in the corporate publications is a good proxy for
the CSR, many studies adopted this measure to examine the CSR-business value link.
Rahmawati and Dianita (2011), Uadiale and Fagbemi (2012), and Uwuigbe and Egbide
(2012) used content analysis of corporate disclosures to examine the CSR-FP relation. It
has been argued that no research has attested to the validity of content analysis of
published corporate information (Soana, 2011). For this reason, the content analysis
methodology lacks theoretical base and offers only limited practical value.
Spending measures.
CSR could be measured by the level of expenditures such as the voluntary
donations and the charitable contributions made by the firm toward improving the social
and environmental wellbeing of the stakeholders (Soana, 2011). The voluntary social
spendings such as donations, advertising expenditures and training expenditures may help
to bolster the firm’s image, reduce the social pressure against the firm, and ultimately
improve the firm’s competitive performance leading to greater profits and stockholders’
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wealth (Weshah et al. 2012).The motive for the expenditure and the prevalence of
information asymmetry make the efficacy of the social spendings by business managers
to be shrouded in uncertainty which increases agency cost (Sun & Cui, 2014).
Unidimensional indicators.
The unidimensional indicators are focused on only a single aspect of social
responsibility practices such as environmental or philanthropic practices in the local
communities. Because unidimensional CSR measures are limited by lack of
comprehensiveness, Caroll (1979) espoused the economic, legal, ethical, and
philanthropic dimensions of CSR. To overcome the narrow focus of unidimensional
measures, researchers combined the measure with other measures. For instance, Busch &
Hoffmann (2011) measured the CSR as carbon intensity which they related to the firm
sales, but combined this unidimensional measure with the questionnaire surveys and the
sustainability rating index.
Reputational measures.
It is possible to calculate some scores on goodwill associated with the reputation
of a firm and use these scores as measures of the CSR for research purposes. Fortune
regularly provides such a calculation based on the reputation perceived by their
respondents and publishes Corporate Reputational Index, such as its AMAC (America’s
Most Admired Companies) ratings. As a CSR strategy, defending reputation helps the
business corporations to develop legitimacy and gain competitive advantage (Sun & Cui,
2014). The challenge with the reputation-based measures is that the respondents’
perception and the resultant corporate reputational ratings are distorted by the firm’s prior
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financial record (Soana, 2011). Therefore, reputation-based metrics are not likely to
effectively measure CSR.
Multidimensional ethical ratings.
Following the difficulty that the objective measurement of the CSR poses to the
empirical research, specialized agencies have in the last 3 decades sprung up devising
models to quantify various aspects of CSR (Saeidi et al. 2014). These agencies collect
data regularly that relate to the different stakeholder groups. The scores from the data are
then aggregated using arithmetic or weighted average to determine the overall ethical
rating for each organization of interest. These agencies create database of ethical ratings
which researchers have used over time to study the CSR. Currently, there is
preponderance of the use of multidimensional ethical ratings in the measurement of the
CSR for empirical study purposes (Busch & Hoffmann, 2011). Of all the rating systems
currently available, KLD is the mostly used resource (Chen & Delmas, 2011; Montiel &
Delgado-Ceballos, 2014). Out of the 30 recent studies reviewed in this study, ethical
ratings were adopted in 20 or 67% and KLD ethical ratings were adopted in 15 out of
these 20 studies or 75%. Therefore KLD ethical ratings are the most popular amongst
researchers.
Notwithstanding their popularity, Chen and Delmas (2011) contended that the
multidimensional ethical ratings suffer from lack of a ranking of importance of the CSR
factors. According to these authors, two broad aggregation methodologies are commonly
used in the literature: (1) assigning equal weights to the CSR factors; and (2) assigning
weights to the CSR factors based on the stakeholder preferences. Chen and Delmas
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contended further that assigning equal weights to CSR factors assumes equal importance
of all indicators, which is invalid, as stakeholder attributes such as perceptions,
composition, and preferences, are dynamic and tend to change over time. Despite these
limitations, I used KLD ethical rating methodology in this study based on its popularity.
KLD Ethical Rating Index
Based in Boston, USA, KLD is an investment research firm that was established
in 1988. The firm, which was acquired by RiskMetrics Group (RMG) in 2010, developed
KLD STATS database that tracks the CSR activities of the listed US companies, using
qualitative measures of strengths and concerns with two broad screens – qualitative
screens and exclusionary screens. KLD evaluates social performance through multiple
data types including expert opinion, surveys, and public disclosures (MSCI, 2015). The
qualitative screen comprises seven categories: community support, diversity,
employment, environment, human rights, product, and corporate governance (MSCI,
2015). The exclusionary screen includes six categories relating to the business
involvement in the ‘sin’ activities of gambling, firearms, military, nuclear, alcohol, and
tobacco (MSCI, 2015). The strength and the concern factors under each category are
rated and assigned a binary value of “1” if the firm meets the specified criteria or “0” if
the firm does not meet the criteria (MSCI, 2015). However, only the concern factors are
considered under exclusionary screens. On a yearly basis, there are unequal numbers of
strengths and concerns in each category because some rating categories are discontinued
(MSCI, 2015). Because of this, it is therefore difficult to make a direct year-on-year
comparison between the strengths and the concerns within a category.

48
The use of ethical ratings is not without limitations. KLD is considered to be an
imperfect measure of the CSR (Chen & Delmas, 2011; Saeidi et al. 2015), and as a result,
researchers have operationalized KLD ratings in diverse ways to measure the CSR
activities of firms. Servaes and Tamayo (2013) dropped corporate governance and
product categories in their studies. According to them, while corporate governance relates
to shareholders’ financial objective rather than the social objectives of broad
stakeholders, product category is focused on product quality and is not a strong element
of the CSR. Jo and Harjoto (2011) and Wang et al. (2014) summed the values of
strengths to measure the CSR of their sampled firms and also summed the values of the
concerns (weaknesses) to measure their corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR). The
diverse methods of applying the KLD ethical ratings make it difficult to compare
research findings and reach consensus.
Current Trend in CSR Measurement
I found that the use of multidimensional ethical ratings based on objective
methodologies dominates the current literature, and more of such studies used aggregated
ratings compared to those that used individual CSR components. The CSR ethical ratings
were adopted in 20 or two-third of the 30 recent studies reviewed. In 15 of the 20 studies,
KLD ratings were adopted while in the other five researchers used Swiss-based
Sustainability Asset Management (Busch & Hoffmann, 2011), Fortune Magazine’s
AMAC (America’s Most Admired Companies) ratings (Sun & Cui, 2014), EIRIS (Wu &
Shen, 2013), Singaporean SGP ratings (Torres et al. 2012), and Italian AEI ratings
(Soana, 2011). Researchers measured the CSR using the content analysis of disclosures in
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one study, the questionnaire surveys in six studies, and the spending measures in three
studies. Furthermore, of the 20 studies in which CSR was measured as social ratings, the
aggregated composite measures were used in 17 studies or 85% while individual
components of the ratings were adopted in only three studies or 15%. Where the ratings
of the individual components of CSR were used, researchers isolated the CSR factors that
were positively related to FP from those that were not, leading to more relevant
conclusions. Nevertheless, how well a measure reflects CSR remains a puzzle yet to be
resolved and will continue to feature in the future studies (Chatterji, Levine, & Toffel,
2012).
Financial Measures of Business Performance
Financial performance (FP), unlike the CSR, presents little challenge in research
in both conceptual and measurement terms. Stewardship model of business requires every
business firm to make profit and to increase the firm value (Friedman, 1970; Jensen,
2010). Empirical researchers are unanimous in viewing profit or value creation from two
perspectives: accounting perspectives and market perspectives, each of these presents its
own unique challenges (Goss & Roberts, 2011; Wu & Shen, 2013). Although the number
of the CSR studies is still inadequate, studies that are based on the accounting measures
of performance have more proportionately received due attention, while the market-based
performance remains underexamined (Becchetti et al. 2012; Ghoul et al. 2011).
Accounting Measures of Performance
Profit determination follows strict sets of accounting rules embodied in generally
accepted accounting practices (GAAP), accounting standards, and other supra-national
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and jurisdictional regulations. Appropriate accounting rules and policies are selected
based on the management objectives and decisions. The accounting measures of financial
performance proliferate in the recent literature, and they include the earnings per share
(Becchetti et al. 2013; Ghoul et al. 2011), the EPS growth and return on
equity/assets/sales (Becchetti et al. 2013; Chen & Wang, 2011; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013;
Wu & Shen, 2013), and the asset growth (Wu & Shen). The other measures I found in the
recent literature include the turnover and turnover growth (Arnold & Valentine, 2013),
the net-/non-interest income on non-performing loan (Wu & Shen, 2013), the loan
contract terms (Goss & Roberts, 2011), the brand equity (Torres et al. 2012), the cost-toincome ratio (Soana, 2011), and the absolute forecast error on EPS (Becchetti et al.
2013). Since accounting numbers follow strict sets of accounting rules, are validated by
the independent external auditors, and are contained in the published financial statements,
they are expected to be of high quality and subject to minimal manipulation (Jiao, 2010).
However, because accounting indices are backward looking and are based on convention
and corporate choice, they can be biased, incomparable, and open to manipulation
(Gregory et al. 2014). This is typified by the spate of corporate scandals that have been
recorded in recent history which were characterized by manipulation by the corporate
managers often in tacit collusion with their auditors.
Market-based Measures of Business Performance
Market-based performance measures focus less on accounting numbers or rules;
so they are less susceptible to managerial subjectivity, manipulation or opportunism
(Hajiha & Sarfaraz, 2013). Market-based measures are determined by the external and

51
independent evaluation of the firm performance, reflecting the investors’ perception and
expectations of the future performance of the firm (Gregory et al. 2014). They are also
not without limitations. Because market-based measures utilize capital market parameters
such as security prices to evaluate firm FP, their focus is only on the financial
stakeholders, while nonfinancial stakeholders who are also affected by corporate social
conduct and misconduct are ignored (McWilliams et al. 2006). Market-focused measures
may also not reflect the investors’ assessment of the true value of information asymmetry
(Dhaliwal et al. 2014). Conversely, market-based measures provide opportunity to
consider alternative benchmarks and triangulate the findings from performance
evaluation process to ensure a balanced and more objective conclusion (Ghoul et al.
2011). Market-based measures can be categorized into two broad types: (1) measures
based on share value, and (2) measures based on cost of capital. Each of these measures
can be separately related to the CSR measures for testing possible association.
Share value-based measures of financial performance.
Share-values have been used extensively to measure the firm financial
performance (Tafti et al. 2012). The most commonly adopted measures are based on
share prices including: (1) stock price (Baird et al. 2012), (2) price-earnings ratio (Soana,
2011), (3) MTB ratio (Deng et al. 2013; Soana, 2011), and (4) Tobin’s q (Busch &
Hoffmann, 2011; Inoue & Lee, 2011; Jo & Harjoto, 2011; Kang et al.; Lioui & Sharma,
2012; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). Of all these, the use of Tobin’s q is more prominent
among researchers. Market returns have also been used by researchers to measure of
financial performance in the current literature. This involves the calculation of excess or
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abnormal market returns (Becchetti et al. 2012; Deng et al. 2013). Only very few scholars
used the volatility of market returns (Deng et al.) or adopted asset pricing approach in
their empirical models (Becchetti et al. 2012). The use of volatility and asset pricing
approaches to studying the CSR-financial performance relation is an area that deserves
extensive exploitation by researchers.
Cost of capital as a measure of financial performance.
In finance theory there are two sides to profitability: maximizing returns and
minimizing financing cost. There is inadequate research into the relation between CSR
and the financing cost dimension of corporate financial performance (Goss & Roberts,
2011). Campbell et al. (2012) observed that the relation between WACC and internal
financial resources is positive and significant. For CSR research purposes, the cost of
capital can be operationalized as the cost of debt, the cost of equity, and WACC. In the
review of the current literature, I sighted only four of such studies: Cajias et al. (2014),
Ghoul et al. (2011), Gregory et al. (2014), and Hajiha & Sarfaraz (2013).
Ghoul et al. (2011) examined the relationship between the CSR composite scores
and the cost of equity; the authors found a positive interaction between the two variables.
In their research, Campbell et al. (2012) examined the cost of debt, the cost of equity and
the WACC separately against their nonCSR related independent variables. The focus of
this study on the underresearched effect of CSR factors on the financing cost could help
to improve the understanding of the CSR-FP relation.
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Information Asymmetry and Financial Performance Measures
Financial performance measures are conditioned by information asymmetry (Jiao,
2010). The managerial tendency to manipulate financials increases the information
asymmetry, which complicates the financial reporting and performance measurement
system (Grougiou et al. 2014). A number of factors affect the degree to which
information asymmetry masks financial performance measures. First, information
asymmetry is increased with market imperfection and reduced when market is perfect
(Armstrong, Core, Taylor, & Verrecchia, 2011). Second, information asymmetry is
reduced in large firms and increased in small firms (Bouslah et al. 2013). Lastly,
information asymmetry is increased when earnings management practice is entrenched
and reduced in more transparent environment (Grougiou et al. 2014). Genuine CSR
disclosures help to reduce information asymmetry, risk and financing cost (Dhaliwal et
al. 2014; Rahmawati & Dianita, 2014). This suggests that the ethical dimension of CSR
has implication for the quality of financial information of a business firm.
Current Trend in Operationalization of Financial Performance
I observed from the recent literature I reviewed that financial performance was
divergently operationalized, though still within the accounting and the market-based
dimensions. In most of the studies, the traditional definitions of FP such as ROE, ROA,
Sales growth, market returns, and Tobin’s q were not used. In a good number of the
studies, financial performance was operationalized in an unconventional manner such as
netinterest income, noninterest income, and nonperforming loan (Wu & Shen, 2013),
loan contract terms (Goss & Roberts, 2011), brand equity (Torres et al. 2012), cost-to-
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income ratio (Soana, 2011), absolute forecast error on EPS (Becchetti et al. 2013), cost of
equity (Ghoul et al. 2011), and volatility of market returns and risk-adjusted market
performance (Baird et al. 2012).
In a few of the studies reviewed, researchers tested the financial performance
from the market expectations perspectives. This is consistent with the claim by Becchetti
et al. (2012) and Ghoul et al. (2011) that finance literature suffers from inadequate
research on the CSR-FP relation from the investors’ perspectives. Deng et al. (2013)
employed Fama-French three factor model and Carhart four-factor model to test whether
social performance was incorporated in the stock returns and found this to be affirmative.
Becchetti et al. also tested the market reaction to corporate entry into and exit from the
multidimensional KLD’s Domino 400 Social Index using Fama-French three factor
model and also found significant impact of the announcement of the CSR event on the
cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date. Similarly, Ghoul et al., who
tested the cost of equity premium on the various CSR components, found that some high
CSR elements are associated with lower equity capital cost, implying a positive CSR-FP
relation.
In an attempt to enrich the understanding of the impact of the CSR on the FP from
the market perspectives, the FP was tested in many studies based on the various marketbased measures. From the 30 studies reviewed, I found that Tobin’s q was used by six
researchers (Busch & Hoffmann, 2011; Inoue & Lee, 2011; Jo & Harjoto, 2011; Lioui &
Sharma, 2012; Moura-Leite et al. 2014; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013), share value by three
researchers (Becchetti et al. 2013; Baird et al. 2012; Tafti, Hosseini, & Emami. 2012;
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Gregory et al. 2014), excess returns in nine studies (Becchetti et al. 2012; Deng et al.
2013), and, finally, cost of capital in four studies (Cajias et al. 2014; Ghoul et al. 2011;
Gregory et al. 2014; Hajiha & Sarfaraz, 2013). Thus while Tobin’s q and excess returns
are prominent in the current literature, share values and cost of capital are uncommon
measures of FP. In the CSR studies, using FP measures that are not based on market
dynamics amounts to model misspecification and faulty design (McWilliams et al. 2006).
A more comprehensive approach would be to test the market-based cost of capital on
each of the CSR factors , as the result of such design should reflect the expectations of
the stakeholders (Becchetti et al. 2012; Ghoul et al. (2011). This research was aimed at
addressing this gap in the empirical literature, and in this regard I regressed the marketrevealed cost of capital against the individual CSR components of the selected US banks.
CSR Theories and Business Case
A number of organizational theories have been applied to study the relation
between corporation and society (Okoye, 2009). The common ones that researchers have
used are the neoclassical economic theory, the stakeholder theory, the institutional theory,
and the resource-based view, although it has been argued that each of these theories is
useful for a particular purpose when applied to the CSR depending on the dominant
research questions (Montiel & Delgado-Ceballos, 2014).
Neoclassical Economic Theory of CSR
CSR theory evolved from the Smithsonian view of corporation as a member of
the larger economic system, where the constituents are driven by self-interest and where
invisible hand operates to allocate resources to achieve a balance (Carroll, 1991). Leaning
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on this contractarian view of a firm, Friedman (1970) argued that business corporation is
obliged to pursue only profit making, contending that social responsibility and business
are incompatible. This pure economic view of corporation was also emphasized by a
number of empirical researchers. Jensen (2010) contended that when corporations
diverge from their basic goal of making profit for their owners to the pursuit of social
endeavors, this creates an opportunity for the managers to move away from the radar of
control, motivating them to indulge in pursing private benefits to the detriment of the
owners and other stakeholders. This theoretical perspective is informed by the
philanthropic dimension of the CSR. Thus the neoclassical economic theory is useful as a
starting point of theorizing the CSR-FP relation. The complex and dynamic nature of the
social and human environment suggests that a broader conception of corporate conduct is
imperative (Okoye, 2009).
Stakeholder Theory of CSR
Propounded by Freeman (1984), stakeholder theory is based on the axiom that it
is in the best long-term interest of a business to care for its stakeholders on whom the
firm depends for its inputs and outputs. This perspective is a paradigm shift from the
neoclassical theory that focuses only on the business owners. Stakeholder theory, referred
to as good management theory, is about doing good to those that the firm interacts with in
order to create the enabling environment for the business firm to gain competitive
advantage and grow (Busch & Hoffmann, 2011). The stakeholder theory is a dominating
theory in the empirical literature, as it is well supported by researchers (Ghoul et al.
2011). In support of the stakeholder theory, Deng et al. (2013) found that the acquirer’s
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social performance is positively related to merger performance. Orlitzky (2013) drew
attention to the increasing pressure many corporations face to become more socially
responsible and embrace the CSR in the process.
The stakeholder theory has equally been used to study several other CSR
contexts. It was used to test if the CSR creates value after merger of firms (Deng et al.
2013), if the stakeholder welfare impacts on the firm valuation (Jiao, 2010), if the climate
change impacts on the financial performance of firms (Busch & Hoffmann, 2011), if the
environmental factors affect the profitability of a business (Lioui & Sharma, 2012), and if
the CSR impacts the financial risk of a company (Ghoul et al. 2011). Stakeholder is a
broad concept; its scope encompasses the internal stakeholders like managers and
employees, the external stakeholders like investors who commit resources based on their
perception of the information available to them, the future generations who are affected
by the corporation’s past, present and future activities, and the broad society together
with the societal issues that condition human values (Orlitzky, 2013). This populist
characteristic of the stakeholder theory is instrumental to the development of the strategic
case for the CSR (Becchetti et al. 2013). This is done by integrating the social dimension
into all the facets of business process to gain competitive advantage, leading to the
achievement of organizational goals of profitability, stability, and growth (Chen & Wang,
2011). Conceptualized this way, it is possible to clearly identify the organizational goals
and its stakeholders, develop strategies to manage the stakeholders through the
manipulation of attitudes, structures, and practices, and finally assess the relationship
between stakeholder management and the consequences for the results (Kasim, 2012).
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This seems to explain why most of the empirical studies into the CSR-FP relation results
in the positive relationship, depicting the normal investment-return behavior.
Institutional Theory of CSR
The role of institutions on the ability of corporations to act in socially responsible
or irresponsible manner provides an alternative theory of the CSR. Because empirical
research on the CSR has largely been dominated by the stakeholder theory, the
institutional theory of the CSR was long neglected (Brammer et al. 2012). The authors
proposed six key institutional factors: (1) the design of regulation, (2) the availability of
effective self-regulation, (3) the effectiveness of the stakeholder monitoring, (4) the
degree to which the normative calls are embedded in the business culture, (5) the
membership of trade association, and (6) the engagement in dialogue with the
trade/employee unions and the investor groups. Based on these factors, while some firms
are considered socially responsible many others are considered socially irresponsible
(Montiel & Delgado-Ceballos, 2014). Using these institutional factors, one can determine
whether a firm acts in a socially responsible or irresponsible manner to particular
stakeholder group. The institutional factors are neither exhaustive nor static (Servaes &
Tamayo, 2013). The institutional theory has been in some recent studies where
institutional factors were found to mediate the impact of the CSR on the FP such as level
of customer awareness (Servaes & Tamayo, 2013) and the degree of earnings
management (Rahmawatti & Dianita, 2011). From the above, it could be inferred that the
institutional theory of CSR complements the stakeholder theory as it explores various
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conditions that could mediate the behavior of the CSR-FP relation under the stakeholder
theory.
Resource-based View of CSR
Resource-based view is another popular theory I found in the CSR literature. The
theory is about the notion that possession of a strategic resource or asset such as CSR
capability can strengthen a firm’s competitive position if the competitors do not have
access to such resources. Hart (1995) posited that environmental social responsibility is a
key capability that creates competitive advantage to a firm. Although what constitutes an
organizational resource is context dependent, nevertheless, to the extent that the CSR
confers social legitimacy on its holders, competitive advantage is strengthened by the
presence of the social legitimacy (Dawkins & Fraas, 2013). For instance, Lioui and
Sharma (2012) found negative relationship between the environmental CSR and the FP
agents. It is imperative for a firm not only to identify the resources at its disposal but also
to subject them to careful analysis of their effect on the performance outcome.
The above analysis suggests that each theory is about a particular perspective that
is held of the CSR dimension, implying that the theories are not competitive but rather
complementary. It is important that researchers select a theory that is most appropriate for
the research questions being studied. Although application of the stakeholder theory
remains common in the empirical literature, the theory suffers from some fundamental
weaknesses. Jensen (2010) contended that the failure of the proponents of the stakeholder
theory to specify how managers should make tradeoffs among the competing interests
increases managerial opportunism. Because managers cannot make purposeful resource
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allocation decisions, they become unaccountable for their actions and may indulge in
pursuing private benefits using the CSR screens. Orlitzky (2013) also shared the view
that the stakeholder orientation inherent in the CSR is a restraint to value maximization, a
primary long-run business objective. These views seem to be confirmed by UN Global
Compact and Accenture (2013) claiming that global business leaders expressed
skepticism in the CSR-business value link and questioned the continued championing of
the sustainability drive by the business sector. This underscores the need to consider the
conceptual weaknesses inherent in the application of stakeholder theory.
Recent Empirical Findings on CSR-FP Link
The empirical literature on CSR-FP link revolves around two central issues: the
nature of the interaction and the direction of the causation between the two social
constructs. Although, the study of both issues started over 6 decades ago, the empirical
debates about them remain unsettled (Grougiou et al. 2014; Jo & Harjoto, 2011). The
mutual interaction between the stakeholders and the business firms has over time shaped
the development of the CSR as a business management strategy which many firms now
imbibe to sustain competitive edge (Hajiha & Sarfaraz, 2013). Despite over 6 decades of
research into the CSR-FP relationship, researchers continuously seek to determine the
causal impact of CSR on FP and vice versa. In this section, I attempt to analyze and
synthesize the recent empirical studies on the CSR-FP relation with a view to
determining the common trend and identifying the significant gaps in the literature in
order to advance the debate on the topic and improve human knowledge.
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In this study, 30 recent studies on the CSR-FP relation within the recent 5 years
between 2011 and 2015 were analyzed, with findings revolving around positive, negative,
neutral, and mixed relationships between the two constructs, depending largely on the
methodology adopted in each study and how the study was designed. This is largely
consistent with the earlier studies. The studies differed in the geographical settings, the
perspectives adopted toward measurement of CSR and FP, the direction of the study as to
which construct is treated as independent variable or dependent variable, the nature of
control variables used, and finally the method of analysis. Attempt was made in some of
the studies to perform causal analysis through Granger causality test of lagged variables.
As indicated in the Table 1, out of the 30 papers analyzed, no relationship was
found between CSR and FP in Soana (2011) and Dinsmore (2014) while positive and/or
negative relationships were revealed in the other 29 studies (or 97%). Consistent with the
earlier literature, in 22 of the 30 studies reviewed (or 73%), researchers recorded positive
CSR-FP relationship. While negative relationships were observed in only two studies (or
7%), mixed relationships were found in only five of the 30 studies reviewed (or 17%).
Thus in this analysis the studies showing non-positive (negative or neutral) relationships
are rare, amounting to only three or 10% of the papers reviewed.
Table 1
Summary of Recent Empirical Studies Reviewed
S/n

Year

1
2
3

2011
2012
2013

Category of studies
Positive Negative Mixed
4
1
2
8
1
1
3
2

Neutral
1

TOTAL
8
10
5
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4
2014
5
2015
Total
Proportion (%)

4
3
22
73%

2
7%

5
17%

1
3%

4
3
30
100%

The comprehensive result of the analysis of the 30 peer reviewed articles on the
topic is shown in Appendix 1, indicating the scope, the variables covered, the analytical
tools adopted, the contexts of study, and the nature of the relationships found in each
study. Although the outcome of the current literature is consistent with the prior literature
predominantly, tending towards positive CSR-FP relationship, the inconsistent results of
the studies analyzed supports the lingering contested nature of the CSR. Despite the
efforts that have been made over time to improve the methodological designs of studies,
the inconsistencies of the findings on the CSR-FP relation are far from being resolved.
So, the recent empirical research into the CSR-FP relation remains largely inconclusive,
as researchers continue to find positive, negative, neutral and mixed relationships
between CSR and FP in their respective studies.
Divergent CSR-FP Relationships
In the current literature, the studies showing positive CSR-FP relationship are
prevalent. Positive relationship was found in 22 out of the 30 studies reviewed, or 73%.
This is consistent with the prior literature (Jensen, 2010; Jiao, 2010) as well as the
recent dissertations (Adeleke, 2014; Fomukong, 2014; Kasim, 2012). Negative CSR-FP
relation was reported in two studies (Lioui & Sharma, 2012; Rahmawati & Dianita, 2011)
while no relation was found in only one study (Soana, 2011). One may attribute the
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skewness of findings toward positive CSR-FP relation to conceptual and methodological
issues.
First, the adopted measures of the CSR accounted for most of the variations
amongst the 30 recent studies reviewed. In 20 of the studies (or 67%) multidimensional
ratings of CSR were adopted as the predictor variables. Among the 20 studies in which
ethical ratings were used, 15 (or 75%) were based on KLD ethical ratings that were
largely aggregated or composite scores. Out of the 15 studies that were based on the KLD
ratings, positive CSR-FP relationship was found in 11 or 73% (Cajias et al. 2014; Deng et
al. 2013; Gregory et al. 2014; Hajiha & Sarfaraz, 2013; Moura-Leite et al. 2014; Servaes
& Tamayo, 2013). Thus the use of composite KLD ratings tends to yield more of positive
CSR-FP relationships. Similarly, positive CSR-FP relationships were equally found in all
the six studies where CSR was measured using questionnaires (Chen & Wang, 2011;
Ganescu, 2012; Mustafa et al. 2012; Parsa et al. 2015; Saeidi et al. 2015; Tafti et al.
2012) and also in all the three studies where CSR was based on spending measures
(Adeyanju, 2012; Wang, Wu & Sun 2015; Weshah et al. 2012). Similarly, negative
relationship was observed in the only study that adopted content analysis of disclosures to
measure CSR (Rahmawati & Dianita, 2011) as well as where CSR was focused on the
environmental factors (Lioui & Sharma, 2012). With this revelation, it is important for
researchers to consider the impact of their chosen measures, as the choice of measure
may influence the outcome of the studies.
Second, the level of aggregation of the CSR multidimensional scores contributed
to the findings of the studies which skewed in favor of positive relationships. The use of
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individual component measures is a recent dimension in the literature. Out of the 20
studies where CSR was based on multidimensional ratings, individual components of
CSR were tested in only six (Baird et al. 2012; Gregory et al. 2014; Inoue & Lee, 2011;
Lioui & Sharma, 2012; Moura-Leite et al. 2014; Nandy & Lodh, 2012) while aggregated
scores were tested in 14 studies. Positive CSR-FP relationship was found in 10 out of the
14 studies (or 71%) that were based on the aggregated scores while 50% was recorded in
the studies that were based on the individual components. The implication of this is that
positive CSR-FP relationship is escalated when aggregated CSR scores compared to
when individual CSR components are used. This is because the components are not likely
to behave homogenously with respect to the FP, since stakeholders’ needs are
heterogeneous and are, in many cases, conflicting (Moura-Leite et al. 2014). The true
behavior of the CSR seems to be exposed when the individual components of CSR is
examined. This implies that the decomposed CSR measures are more effective than the
composite CSR scores, although it remains uncommon in the literature. It has been
suggested that the aggregated CSR ratings be decomposed into their individual
components to improve the understanding of the nature of each CSR factor (Goss &
Roberts, 2011; Wu & Shen, 2013). The fact that the component approach to measuring
CSR was rarely adopted in the recent studies reviewed is indicative of an
underresearched area.
Third, the findings of the recent studies reviewed were conditioned by the
broadness or the narrowness of the study contexts. The studies in which multiple
industries are addressed out-number those in which single sectors are treated, which can
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be considered as a contributing factor to the divergence of the research outcome observed
in the literature. In the current literature represented by the 30 recent studies reviewed,
multiple industries were examined in 19 (or 63%) of the studies while single industries
were addressed in only 11 (or 37%) with varying results. In the 19 studies that were
based on the broad context, positive CSR-FP relationship was found in 15, or 79% of
them (Cajias et al. 2014; Moura-Leite et al. 2014; Hajiha & Sarfaraz, 2013; Nandy &
Lodh, 2012). On the other hand, positive CSR-FP relationship was found in 7 out of the
11 studies (or 64%) that were based on single industries (Saeidi et al. 2015; Wang et al.
2015; Parsa et al. 2015; Weshah et al. 2012). Thus positive CSR-FP relationship is prone
to occur when multiple industries are examined in the study. From the above analysis,
examining the CSR-FP relation in multiple industries and multiple countries in a single
set of studies is prevalent, with escalated outcome of positive CSR-FP relationship. In
such studies the fundamental contextual condition of stakeholder theory is not
recognized. Stakeholders’ goals, objectives and aspirations tend to differ across the
contexts of industrial and national boundaries (Baird et al. 2012). Thus combining the
CSR ratings of different industries and different countries may lead to inconsistencies,
even though such a strategy yields more of positive CSR-FP relation. A better approach
is therefore to conduct the study in the context of each industry and each country (Baird
et al. 2012 and Soana, 2011).
Fourth the divergent operationalization of the FP is a contributing factor to the
recorded dominance of the positive CSR-FP relationship. Consistent with the prior
literature, the use of traditional accounting measures of FP outnumbered that of market-
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based measures of FP in the current literature. Out of the 30 recent studies reviewed, the
FP was operationalized from the perspective of the traditional accounting in 17 (or 57%).
In such studies, the FP was operationalized as ROA or ROE (Mustafa et al. 2012; Saeidi
et al. 2015; Wu & Shen, 2013), interest income (Wu & Shen, 2013), loan contract (Nandy
& Lodh, 2012), customer willingness to pay (Parsa et al. 2015), brand equity (Torres et
al. 2012), and Tobin’s q (Busch & Hoffmann, 2011; Inoue & Lee, 2011; Jo & Harjoto,
2011; Lioui & Sharma, 2012; Moura-Leite et al. 2014; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). The
market-based measures of the FP were used by researchers in 10 studies or 33% while
CSR was treated as the dependent variable in only three studies or 10%. The marketbased measures used include share value (Baird et al. 2012; Tafti et al. 2012), excess
returns (Becchetti et al. 2012; Deng et al. 2013), absolute forecast error (Becchetti et al.
2013), default risk (Sun & Cui, 2014), cost of equity (Ghoul et al. 2011), cost of capital
(Cajias et al. 2014; Gregory et al. 2014), and WACC (Hajiha & Sarfaraz, 2013). A
positive CSR-FP relationship was found in 11 (or 65%) of the 17 studies where
traditional accounting based measures as FP while eight (or 80%) were observed in the
10 studies in which the market based measures of performance were used. Interestingly,
positive relationship was observed in all the four studies of the effect of the CSR on the
FP, when the FP was measured as the cost of capital (Cajias et al. 2014; Ghoul et al.
2011, Gregory et al. 2014; Hajiha & Sarfaraz, 2013). The implication of this finding is
that socially focused strategies may be an effective tool to managing financial risk and
accelerating firm value.
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The studies in which mixed relationships were found were next in the hierarchy of
importance to those in which positive relationships were observed. The mixed outcome
observed in only five of the 30 studies examined, was contingent upon several factors: (1)
the nature of the industry studied (Baird et al. 2012; Inoue & Lee, 2011), (2) short-run or
long-run horizon (Inoue & Lee, 2011), (3) nature of the particular CSR component tested
(Baird et al. 2012; Busch & Hoffmann, 2011), and (4) the nature of the FP measures (Wu
& Shen, 2013). Regarding the time horizons, although negative CSR-FP relationship was
found in the short run, a positive relationship was observed in the long run (Inoue & Lee).
This is consistent with the view that CSR is an investment in intangible asset that takes
some time to yield the expected returns (Jiao, 2010). Also, the multidimensional nature of
the CSR suggests that individual CSR components are likely to produce different effects
on the FP (Baird et al. 2012).
Divergent Relationship Interpretations
The interpretation of the relationship between CSR and FP has also become a
crucial factor that now features in the literature. Jensen (2010) drew attention to the
prevalent misinterpretation of CSR-FP relation. He claimed that the negative CSR-FP
relation could signify investors’ confidence in the firm and their preparedness to accept
lower returns in the short run or in alignment with their private social responsibility
values. However, Jiao (2010) contended that the positive relationship is indicative of the
fact that CSR is an intangible investment with potential for value enhancement while the
negative relationship may imply the presence of managerial opportunism. It then means
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that each study’s theoretical and conceptual framework should guide how the result is
interpreted.
Geographical and Industrial Concentration of Studies
The geographical setting of the studies revealed a concentration of the CSR
studies in the US, as 14 out of the 30 studies reviewed were conducted using the US data.
This is in consonance with the widely reported view in the literature that CSR originated
in the United States, where formal writings on the CSR have been most evident, and a
sizeable body of literature has accumulated (Caroll, 1991).
Many sectors of the economy are still underresearched. The CSR-FP relation in
the US banking sector is yet to be specifically tested. Among the 30 recent studies
examined, only five were focused on the banking sector, translating to 16.7%, which
implies that the effect of CSR on the FP in the banking sector is underresearched. The
five banking sector-focused studies relate to Nigeria (Adeyanju, 2012), Iran (Tafti et al.
2012), Jordan (Weshah et al. 2012), Italy (Soana, 2011), and multiple countries including
the United States (Wu & Shen, 2013). Thus, none of the studies was specifically focused
on the US banking sector, particularly after the 2007-2008 financial crisis despite its
global ravaging effects. During the crisis the beta, a measure of systematic risk, of many
banking sectors around the world soared simultaneously (Jánský, Adam, & Benecká,
2012), constituting a threat to the survival of the financial sector. It is desirable to
examine the effectiveness of the social efforts of the banks in reversing the escalated
systematic risk. The other industries specifically focused on are the carbon/energy (Busch
& Hoffmann, 2011), the tourism (Inoue & Lee, 2011), the airline (Wang et al. 2015), the
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retail and consumer goods (Parsa et al. 2015), the automotive (Ganescu, 2012), and the
manufacturing (Saeidi et al. 2015) industries. The results of these industry focused
studies vary with the nature of the industries. In the studies that were focused on the
banking sector, the CSR-FP relationship found include positive (Adeyanju, 2012; Tafti et
al. 2012; Weshah et al. 2012), mixed (Wu & Shen, 2013), and neutral (Dinsmore, 2014;
Soana, 2011), depending on the methodology adopted. Researchers found a positive
CSR-FP relationship in the automotive (Ganescu, 2012), the retail and consumer goods
(Parsa et al. 2015), the airline (Wang et al. 2015), and the manufacturing (Saeidi et al.
2015) sectors. A mixed CSR-FP relationship was found in the carbon/energy (Busch &
Hoffmann, 2011) and the tourism (Inoue & Lee, 2011) industries. The fact that none of
these studies was focused specifically on the US banking sector is indicative of a gap that
needs to be filled to enrich the literature.
Divergent Control Variables
Researchers incorporated control variables in their models in all the recent studies
examined, except in Soana (2011) and Weshah et al. (2012) in which the authors
excluded control variables in their model for the sake of simplicity of their analyses.
Prominent among the variables controlled in the models of the studies reviewed are: size
(Saeidi et al. 2015), risk (Jo & Harjoto, 2011; Moura-Leite et al. 2014), banking risk (Wu
& Shen, 2013), management preference (Torres et al. 2012), capital expenditure (Gregory
et al. 2014), earnings (Lioui & Sharma, 2012; Nandy & Lodh, 2012; Saeidi et al. 2015),
firm growth (Cajias et al. 2014; Chen & Wang, 2011), industry (Deng et al. 2013), and
year (Inoue & Lee, 2011; Nandy & Lodh, 2012). As shown in Table 2, of all these
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variables only the size, the risk and the industry factors occurred most in the recent
studies.
Table 2
Summary of Control Variables in the Current Literature
S/n

Control Variables

Operationalization

1
2

Size factors
Risk factors

3

Industry factors

4

Firm growth factors

5

Management
preference/discretion
Year
Profitability &
Earnings
Total

Total Assets, Sales, Audit Fee
Debt/Equity Ratio, Leverage,
Capital Structure
Industry classification, sector
codes,
Sales growth, EPS growth,
asset growth
R&D, Advertising & Capital
Expenditure
Year
Profits, Earnings, EPS, P/E
ratio, ROE, ROA, ROS.

6
7

Number of
Occurrence
in Studies
22
17

%

29%
23%

10

13%

7

9%

7

9%

7
5

9%
7%

75

100%

A major revelation from the review of the current literature from the above is that
of the five studies conducted on the banking sector, only Wu and Shen (2013) controlled
for the banking risk. I therefore controlled for risk proxied by leverage ratio in this study
in addition to the control variables dominant in the above literature.
Study Analytic Tools
The common analytical tools adopted in the studies reviewed were the multiple
regression models combined with the structural equations in some cases. The regression
models were applied in four ways: (1) as a straight OLS with multifactor analysis for
ANOVA tests (Chen & Wang, 2011; Jo & Harjoto, 2011), (2) with the Granger causality
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by lagging some variables in order to give an idea of the causal relationship between the
CSR and the FP (Cajias et al. 2014; Ghoul et al. 2011; Sun & Cui, 2014), (3) with the
Fama-French three factor model (FF3F), and (4) with the Carhart four factor model
(4FM). All these were set up and analyzed via multiple regression tools (Deng et al.
2013). Using asset pricing models such as CAPM FF3F and Cahart 4FM is a new
dimension in the CSR literature and needs to be refined further.
Summary of Gaps in the Current Literature
Identification of Gaps in Current Literature
A number of gaps are evident in the current literature. First, the tradition of
inconsistencies in research findings signifies inadequacy of studies conducted into the
CSR-FP interaction. Until a common ground is found, more studies are required to
resolve the observed inconsistencies attributed to the methodological shortcomings in the
prior studies. Second, the observed prevalent use of composite, aggregated
multidimensional measures of CSR in most studies is fundamentally flawed. The
possibility of imperfect correlation of individual components of CSR ratings renders the
use of composite measures inappropriate with the potential to produce inaccurate results
(Goss & Roberts, 2011). In view of this limitation, the studies in which the individual
components of CSR are tested tend to be more reliable than those in which the
aggregate/composite measures are tested (Goss & Roberts; Wu & Shen, 2013). In spite of
this, it is in only a handful of studies that researchers tested the individual CSR
components, indicating a significant gap in the current literature. Third, the mixed
approach is prevalent in the literature whereby the study data of different industries in
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multiple countries are aggregated for the purpose of testing the study models. This is
inconsistent with stakeholder theory, as interests and expectations of stakeholders are
contextually diverse; they are divergent across the industrial and the geographical settings
(Baird et al. 2012; Soana, 2011). Dearth of studies of specific industries and specific
countries on CSR-FP relation constitutes a weakness in the current literature that needs to
be addressed.
Finally, studies in which CSR-FP relation was tested from the perspectives of
market expectations are scanty in the current literature. Of the 30 recent studies reviewed,
only four studies were found in which the CSR and cost of capital relation was examined
(Cajias et al. 2014; Ghoul et al. 2011; Gregory et al. 2014; Hajiha & Sarfaraz, 2013).
Thus, how the CSR studies relate to the cost of finance as a measure of the FP remains an
underresearched area. Even though Ghoul et al. (2011) observed that better CSR ratings
are associated with lower cost of capital, it is obvious that research into the influence of
the business social conduct on financial outcome is generally scanty. Several researchers
such as Hajiha and Sarfaraz (2013), Goss and Roberts (2011) and Hajiha and Sarfaraz
(2013) have separately called for inquiries into the CSR- financing cost relation, a call I
attempted to respond to in this study.
Plan to Fill the Identified Gaps in Literature
Consistent with most studies on the CSR-FP interaction, this study was performed
in two modes: even though the individual component CSR measures were tested in the
two parts, the first part was focused on the traditional accounting measures of
performance using EBITDA margin and MTB ratio. The multivariate regression model
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used for this purpose included a number of firm-specific and management preference
control variables common in the literature. In the second part of the study, I addressed the
effect of the CSR factors on the market-revealed cost of capital relation for the sampled
banks using the FF3F model. The insight from the efforts aimed at addressing the
enumerated gaps could enable managers and decision makers in banks to allocate scarce
corporate resources to social performance in a more effective manner.
Chapter Summary
The literature review conducted in this chapter centered on the stakeholder theory,
an alternative perspective to the conventional neoclassical economic theory of social
responsibility. The stakeholder theory recognizes the need for businesses to shift
emphasis from the stockholders to the other stakeholders, and by so doing the business
firm would enjoy the support and the cooperation of the stakeholders to create value and
competitive advantage which in the long run should lead to greater value to the
stockholders. The stakeholder theory applied in this study was underpinned by the
Carroll’s (1991) four-part theorem. In the review of the current literature on the CSR-FP
relation, several areas of inconsistency in findings were observed, indicating some gaps
that need to be explored further.
Necessitated by the need to address some of the identified gaps in the empirical
literature, this study was designed in way to minimize the highlighted deficiencies in the
prior studies. In chapter 3, I explored the research method and design.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
The aim of this study was to test the effect of the individual CSR components on
the financial performance (FP) of banks in the US, both when the FP is viewed from the
accounting returns perspective and also from the market-revealed cost of capital
perspective. Because this quantitative study was grounded in the positivist paradigm,
multiple regression analysis was used to test the study hypotheses. The detailed account
of the methodological issues involved in designing and implementing this dissertation
was provided in this chapter. The starting point of the chapter was the description of the
philosophical worldview of the study, providing the epistemology and the ontology
applicable to the research questions. This was followed by the description of the research
design selected, the target population, the sampling method, the instrumentation, the data
collection procedures, the research questions, the hypotheses formulation, and the data
analysis strategy. I concluded the chapter with the insights of how the output of the
statistical analysis was interpreted and a brief summary of the chapter.
The Philosophical Paradigm of the Study
Ontology and Epistemology of the Study
Generally, research is guided by the philosophical worldview that revolves around
the ontology and the epistemology of the study. Ontology refers to either the objectivity
of the social reality or its subjectivity, that is, whether it is socially constructed (Collis &
Hussey, 2009, p. 59). These two ontological views are referred to as objectivism and
constructionism, respectively (Creswell, 2009, p. 7). Objectivism presupposes that the
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reality is constant and cannot be affected by the researcher or participants (Creswell,
2009). Constructionism is the view that social reality is constructed and is therefore not
constant (Creswell). Similarly, epistemology relates to how valid knowledge comes about
(Collis & Hussey, 2009, p. 59). Two schools of epistemological thought are the
positivists who hold the belief that valid knowledge is observable and measurable and the
interpretivist who views valid knowledge as that expressed by the research participants.
Following this analysis, quantitative research aligns with objectivism ontology and
positivist epistemology based on their deterministic characteristic while qualitative
research relates to constructionism ontology and interpretivist epistemology (Creswell,
2009, p. 7).
Selected Guiding Philosophical Worldview of the Study
This study was anchored on the deterministic philosophy of cause and outcomes,
in which it was proposed that the firm financial performance would be influenced by the
firm’s social responsibility practices. This followed the reasoning of the postpositivist
epistemological worldview which contends that the knowledge of the world can be
scientifically and objectively obtained by reducing ideas into variables that can be tested
using numerical measures (Creswell, 2009, p. 7). Such a study entails the use of
quantitative research paradigm focused on testing a theory through the specification of
the hypotheses and the collection and analysis of numerical data to support or refute such
hypotheses. According to Creswell, quantitative design is suitable when there is a need to
identify the factors influencing an outcome or to test a theory or a relationship for the
purpose of generalizing the findings to larger settings. Theoretically, quantitative design
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differs from qualitative or mixed method research paradigms. The qualitative paradigm is
useful if little is known about the social phenomenon of study such as the nature of the
variables to examine, and the lived experience of the research subjects is then required to
provide the needed knowledge through the human construction of the social
phenomenon. The mixed methods research is suitable when a better understanding of the
phenomenon can be obtained only through the blended strengths of both quantitative and
qualitative paradigms by combining the quantitative and the qualitative data which
provides opportunity for triangulation (Creswell, p. 18). The qualitative design has been
followed in some earlier studies on the CSR-FP interaction such as Heijden, Driessen,
and Cramer (2010) and Fernando and Almeida (2012) where case study strategy was
used. The recent study by UN Global Compact and Accenture (2013) was conducted
using mixed-methods paradigm. Generally, qualitative research provides limited
opportunity to generalize findings to other settings.
Description of Research Design
Statistical Design of the Study
Consistent with the quantitative research paradigm, this research was designed as
a correlational study where multivariate regression analysis was applied in examining the
CSR-FP relation. Based on the research questions in the study, two regression models
were used, reflecting the bidimensional nature of a business financial performance
measures: the accounting returns and the market-based financial performance measure. In
the accounting returns model, EBITDA margin and MTB ratio were used while the
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market-determined cost of capital was applied in the market-focused financial
performance model.
Unlike in the simple regression where outcome variable is tested against only one
predictor, two or more predictors are involved in multiple or multivariate regression.
According to Field (2009, p. 210), a multiple or multivariate regression model is suitable
where the study involves determining the linear combination of predictors that maximally
correlate with the dependent variable. This study was designed to ascertain the linear
combination of the CSR factors that correlate maximally with the FP measures of the
banks in the US. The idea is to optimize those factors that positively correlate with the FP
to create value and deemphasize those that do not significantly correlate positively with
the FP in order to preserve value.
Generally, a multiple regression model is typified by the relation: Yi = (b0 + b1X1i
+ b2X2i + … bnXni) + Ɛi. Yi stands for the outcome variable, b0 represents the model
intercept, b1 , b2 up to bn represent the slopes of the first, second and the nth predictors,
while Ɛi represents the residual term. The disturbance term is determined as the variation
between the predicted value of Yi and the corresponding observed value (Field, p.210).
Definition of the Variables of the Study
As a postpositivist research that relies on the empirical validation of knowledge
and the objective measurement of the reality, the concepts and the constructs of the study
embodied in the research questions were converted into their empirical equivalents
through the assignment of some values to define and operationalize the variables of the
study.

78
Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008, p. 49) distinguished between three
categories of properties of variables in quantitative research as the analytical, the
measurement, and the relational properties. According to them, the analytical dimension
of the variables shows the role each variable plays in the explanatory scheme of research.
In this regard, three kinds of variables are distinguished: dependent, independent, and
control variables. The dependent or outcome variable is the variable being predicted
while the independent variable is the predictor. The control variables are included in the
model in order minimize the extent to which the explanatory power of the model is
wrongly attributed to the selected predictor(s). Because the presence of control variables
minimizes the disturbance term, the causal link between the dependent and independent
variables contained in the hypotheses becomes more established when such confounding
factors are adequately controlled for (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, p. 51).
The measurement dimension of the variable properties relates to whether the
variables of the study are measured continuously or discretely. The level of measurement
of the variable is important for quantitative research design that relies on the use of
statistical tools to analyze the quantitative data of the study. Finally, the relational
dimension is about the nature of the relation that exists between the variables. This
relation can take directional form (positive or negative) and can also be about the strength
or magnitude ranging from lowest magnitude of no relation to highest magnitude of
perfect relation (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, p. 55).
Independent variables of the study.
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In this study, the CSR factors were the predictors or the independent variables in
the two models: the accounting return and the market performance models. Representing
the predictors were the CSR factors relating to community, governance, diversity,
employee relation, and product, as part of the 13 KLD MSCI CSR indicators (MSCI,
2015). MSCI provides these 13 CSR indicators in two categories: (i) the seven qualitative
screen factors comprising and (ii) the six exclusionary screen factors or controversial
business issues consisting of tobacco, military, alcohol, firearms, nuclear power, and
gambling. However, I found that KLD MSCI ratings were not available for
environmental and human right factors as well as all the exclusionary screen factors.
KLD MSCI used the qualitative screens to measure the strengths and the concerns of
each of the seven factors in the qualitative category. I described each of the selected
factors in detail below.
Community factor.
The community support (COM) factor strengths cover charitable giving activities,
donations to support innovation, community engagement, and engagement in notably
positive community activities (MSCI, 2015). The COM factor concern measures the
gravity of the aspects of the firm’s activities in its local communities.
Employee relations factor.
The employee relations strengths indicator measures the firm’s fair treatment of
its unionized workforce and the effectiveness of its relationship with its employees and
suppliers. The employee relations concern indicator measures the company’s record of
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poor relation with organized unions, the violation of health and safety standards, and
engagement in supply chain and other labor-management controversies.
Diversity factor.
The factors relating to diversity strengths include how well the minority and
women groups are represented in the firm’s decision making and input sourcing as well
as the extent of consideration of work/life balance programs in the workplace. The
concerns indicator is focused on the diversity related controversies.
Product factor.
The product strengths indicator measures the firm’s commitment to quality and
safety of its products as well as their accessibility by the economically disadvantaged.
Conversely, the product concerns indicators measure the firm’s involvement in
controversies over the quality of its products or services, including its marketing,
customer relations, contracting, and competitive business practices.
Governance factor.
The focus of the governance strengths indicator is on the quality and fairness of
the reporting of the firm’s activities including its support for public policies, and how
these positively impact the stakeholders. Governance related concerns have measures that
focus on the incompleteness of firm’s social responsibility and sustainability reporting,
absence of support for public policies, severity of controversies relating to the firm’s
executive compensation and governance practices, and issues around the firm’s business
ethics practices.
Measurement of the independent variable.
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KLD CSR ratings of organizations were binary values of 1 if the firm meets the
specified criteria and 0 if the firm does not meet the criteria. Researchers have utilized
these values in divergent ways. Callan and Thomas (2009) examined the whole of the 13
factors by developing a 5-point scale of +2 to -2 to measure the strengths and the
concerns of each factor. Ghoul et al. (2011) considered the qualitative issues and
controversial issues separately based on their belief that the two screens are inherently
different and may not coexist in the same setting. The authors determined the absolute net
scores for each indicator and excluded corporate governance factor based on their
operating definition of the construct that precludes any conflict between internal
stakeholders and shareholders. Servaes and Tamayo (2013) decimalized the CSR scores
and took the net for each indicator; they equally excluded product and corporate
governance indicators from their model. Goss and Roberts (2011) warned that strengths
and concerns of each CSR factor should be analyzed separately as the omnibus CSR
score is a less accurate measure. The observed divergence in the application of CSR
scores using KLD ratings compelled me to carefully select a suitable approach in the
current study to operationalize the CSR scores that aligned with the research questions of
the study.
Consequently, to measure the CSR value of each indicator, the categorical ratings
by KLD was scaled using 5-point scale of +2 to -2, with +2 representing two or more
strengths, 1 representing one strength, 0 representing presence of neither strength nor
concern, -2 representing two or more concerns and -1 representing one concern. Each
qualitative indicator was then scored as the net of the strength and the concerns. This
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measurement and scaling approach followed the earlier studies of Callan & Thomas
(2009), Goss & Roberts (2011), Graves & Waddock (1994, 2000), Hillman & Keim
(2001), and Waddock & Graves (1997).
In order to strengthen the predictive capability of the regression models proposed
in the study, each CSR component was properly lagged which permitted the testing of
Granger causality. Granger causality testing through the appropriate lagging of the
independent variables is a growing feature of the current literature. A few of the current
researchers that performed Granger causality testing included Choi et al. (2010), Makni et
al. (2009), and Scholtens (2008).
Dependent variables of the study.
The financial data which were at interval or ratio level of measurement were used
to operationalize the dependent or outcome variables in the two models of this study.
These data included both absolute values and constructed ratios. The absolute values
were standardized using their natural logarithms to make them appropriate for the linear
regression analysis, an approach that is equally common in the literature.
Accounting-based financial performance model.
In the accounting returns model, EBITDA margin and MTB were regressed
against the CSR factors. EBITDA margin has been tested by a number of researchers
including Gregory et al. (2014) and Saeidi et al. (2015). MTB represents the constructed
ratio of market price per share to the book value per share, an approach that was recently
tested empirically by Hajiha and Sarfaraz (2013) and Wu and Shen (2013). Both
accounting returns are included in the published financial statements of banks and are
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also included in the returns filed with companies registry. The financial data for these
variables in respect of the sampled banks were obtained from the Bankscope database.
Market-based cost of capital model.
In this model, the equity capital cost of the banks as a measure of financial
performance was individually regressed against the lagged CSR factors. In this study, the
cost of capital was determined based on the Fama-French three-factor (FF3F) asset
pricing model, which considers three risk factors of market risk premium, size premium,
and growth premium to determine the required rate of return by the investors. FF3F is
considered to be superior to the traditional single-factor CAPM (Fama & French, 1993).
Using a similar approach, Ghoul et al. (2011) empirically tested the CSR on the equity
capital cost of industries in the US.
Control variables of the study.
Consistent with the current literature, the accounting returns model included five
control variables: the size, the risk, the growth, the preceding year accounting financial
performance, and the management preference. Size, preceding year’s accounting
financial performance, and the management preference factors were addressed by Lioui
and Sharma (2012), Torres et al. (2012), and Yang et al. (2010), while risk was a
considered control variable in Wu and Shen’s (2013) study. In terms of
operationalization, the size was measured as the absolute value of the total assets but
standardized by natural logarithm, the preceding year’s accounting FP was the preceding
year’s EBITDA margin or MTB as applicable, the management preference was measured
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as the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets, and the risk was measured as the
leverage ratio.
The control variables in the cost of capital model included total assets, asset
growth, market capitalization, leverage, EBITDA margin, MTB, and capital expenditure
to total asset ratio. These control variables were also based on the financial data that were
included in the published financial statements of the banks, accessed through the
Bankscope database.
Target Population
The unit of analysis in this study was banks and the population of interest (target
population) was the listed banks in the United States. The findings of the study could be
generalized to the ethically rated listed banks in the country. I accessed the ethically rated
banks in the US from the KLD database. According to the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) (2014), there were 6,730 insured banks in the US. Regulated by the
Federal Reserve System, the US banking industry comprises the national banks, the
regional banks, money center banks, savings and loans and credit services banks. The
industry has been undergoing several challenges, the latest of which was the aftermath of
the subprime mortgage crises leading to closure of a large number of banks during postcrisis period. Faced with this situation, close attention to soft issues like social
responsibility of banking business becomes a critical recovery and defensive strategy for
most banks.
KLD Research and Analytics Inc. regularly publishes social ratings of the large
listed US companies numbering over 3000. The rated firms cut across all industries
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including the financial services sector. In this study I extracted the list of the ethically
rated listed banks, which also had complete financial and stock market data to form the
study sample.
Sampling Method
Sampling Design and Sampling Frame
A single stage sampling design was adopted in this study since there was access to
the names in the population (Creswell, 2009, p. 148). The banks that formed the sample
of the study were drawn from the actual population of the ethically rated banks, which
also had the requisite financial and stock market data. The banks were selected from the
list of the US banks included in the Socrates Database of KLD Research and Analytics
Inc. To be retained the banks must also have the relevant financial information in the
Bankscope database and share price information Yahoo! Finance database. This
requirement was necessary so as to minimize the tendency of missing data for the
purpose of the SPSS analysis. The constructed sampling frame of the study was therefore
defined as the KLD rated US banks, with the requisite financial data in the Bankscope
database and share price information in the Yahoo! Finance database.
Annually, the ethical ratings of the corporations are provided in the form of binary
representation for performance indicators contained in an excel spreadsheet. Meeting an
established criterion for a rating is indicated as 1 in the excel spreadsheet cell under that
indicator while failure to meet criteria established for a rating is indicated with a 0 in the
excel spreadsheet cell under that indicator. In situations where an indicator has not been
researched for a particular company, this is indicated by “NR” (not rated) in the excel
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spreadsheet cell of that indicator. The ethical ratings are based on mixed methodology
including survey questionnaires, interviews of the relevant stakeholders, and analysis of
the content of the published social information. The ratings are therefore robust.
Following the acquisition of KLD by MSCI ESG Research, significant rating
methodologies were introduced from 2010. This principally entails the introduction of
industry specific ESG rating templates for each of the seven ESG ratings categories and
effectively ensures that ratings are researched for companies that are relevant to the
industry.
Fundamentally, the KLD data obtained included the entire 3,000 US largest
companies by market capitalization. This compels a need to isolate those companies that
are outside the banking industry, to have a sampling frame that contained only the list of
banks that were ethically rated. The number was later pruned by the availability of the
requisite financial and stock market data for each of the ethically rated banks.
Sample Size, Statistical Errors, and Threats to Statistical Conclusion Validity
The need for generalizability of the findings of this study requires that the
selected banks adequately represent the population being studied. Representativeness of
the population implies that the sample statistics ought to reflect the population parameters
as closely as possible. A way to ensure this is to select a sample size that is adequate
(Trochim, 2008). Determining adequate sample size is best achieved by conducting
power analysis, based on some standard parameters such as the alpha level, the power
level, the test type, and the effect size of the explanatory variables (Rudestam & Newton,
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2007, p. 93). Generally, power analysis provides insight to the sample size considered to
be appropriate for the detection of effects resulting from the predictors.
Even with the adequate sample size, the threat to conclusion validity still exists,
i.e., that the conclusions from the test procedures may be different from the conclusions
that may be drawn if the statistical procedures are applied to the entire population of
interest. This development is referred to as sampling risk. Practically, sampling risk is the
risk that the conclusion to be drawn from the sample test would be different if the same
test procedures were applied to the entire population. In other words, sampling risk is the
risk of incorrect conclusion drawn from the sample because of the presence of statistical
errors. Such statistical errors are of two categories: Type I and Type II errors, both of
which directly depend on the null hypotheses. The consideration of these errors
underscores the importance of selecting a sample that truly represents the population.
Also called an error of the first kind, Type I error arises from rejecting the H0
when H0 is true, implying false positive. The chance of committing Type I error is
measured by the alpha or the significance level (α) of the test, which is statistically taken
as the complement of the confidence level. Conventionally, a 5% chance is allowed for a
Type I error occurring in a test (Cohen, 1992).
Conversely, Type II error arises from the failure to reject the H0 when H0 is false,
implying false negative. Rudestam and Newton (2007, p. 95) attributed such error to the
inadequate power of the study. Because the selected level of power gives an indication of
the risk of the presence of the Type II error in the study findings, it is important to avoid
an underpowered situation which may lead to obtaining nonsignificant findings.
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Statistically, Type II error is denoted by beta (β). As the complement of β (or 1- β), the
power of the test is related to the Type II error. Unlike in the case of the error of the first
kind, the general convention is to allow a 20% chance of the Type II error in a study,
which translates to the power level of 80% (Cohen, 1992).
The implication of false positive or the Type I error occurring in the current study
is that it may lead to overinvestment in the CSR projects. Although, the firm may
perceive overinvestment in CSR as destructive to business value, however, such
investment is desired by the society. According to Friedman (1970), voluntary
commitment of corporate resources to a social course without expecting value in return is
the central theme of pure CSR. On the other hand, the implication of the false negative or
the Type II error occurring in this study is that it may lead to underinvestment in the CSR
initiatives, which is detrimental to societal aspirations and sustainable development. From
the societal perspective, underinvestment in CSR implied by the Type II error in the
context of this study is more devastating than overinvestment in CSR implied by the
Type I error. This study is therefore designed primarily to reduce the risk of committing
the Type II error, by increasing the power level beyond the conventional 0.8 level. This
goes a long way in mitigating the threats to the conclusion validity (Trochim, 2006).
According to Cohen (1992), an increase in the desired power level beyond the
conventional 0.8 entails increased sample size and reduced alpha level with a caveat that
the increased sample size may be constrained by the research budget. In view of the
budget constraints, I limited the power level to the conventional 0.8, translating to 0.20
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chance of the error of the second kind. I also limited the alpha level to the conventional
0.05 for this study.
Consequently, in determining the sample size that is representative of the actual
population I relied on the running of the version 3.0.10 of G*Power Analysis. This
procedure returned a sample size of 92 banks to be selected from the sampling frame. The
G*Power analysis was based on the selection of the F test as Family Test for the multiple
regression model, R2 deviation from 0, and power analysis of “A priori: Compute
required sample size - given alpha, power, and effect size”. The analysis was also based
on the 0.15 medium size effect, the alpha of 0.05, and the power of 0.8. However, only 71
banks could be selected because of the need to ensure that the ethically rated banks also
had the requisite financial and stock market data. A sample size of 71 banks was
considered adequate for this study, as it was an improvement over some earlier studies
that used much less sample size. Fomukong (2014) selected 50 companies to examine the
relationship between CSR and EVA in the US context.
Instrumentation
As noted in chapter 2, there is no generally accepted method of measuring CSR
performance of firms, a development that led researchers to adopt multiple measures for
the evaluation of firms’ social performance. Some researchers adopted direct
measurement through questionnaires administered to the stakeholders, some measured
the CSR performance of their subjects through a unidimensional measure such as
spending, reputation, or environmental practices, while others adopted multidimensional
ethical ratings using the third-party provided social responsibility ratings. In this study I
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adopted such third party developed measures for social responsibility of banks in the
United States. In this regard, the CSR ratings performed and archived by KLD Research
and Analytics Inc. were used to assess the social responsibility performance of the banks
in the US. KLD CSR rating has become popular among empirical researchers as its
preponderance was revealed in chapter 2.
I also utilized secondary financial data in this study to measure the dependent
variables and the control variables. As secondary data, the financial data were accessed
from the Bankscope database, as they are also contained in the published financial
statements of public interest entities including banks. Thus extensive reliance was placed
on the third-party sources for the data used in this study.
I am not oblivious of the potential limitations inherent in the use of third-party
archival data for research such as the problem of missing, incomplete or compromised
data, the problem of inadequate data, and the possible challenge of lack of access to the
proprietary database belonging to the third party owner (Rudestam & Newton, 2007, p.
101), as well as the enormity of the financial cost of access where available. In order to
obviate these challenges, I defined the sampling frame such that any case with incomplete
data was excluded from the sample.
Data Collection Procedures
As a secondary data analysis, archival data used for this study are privately
owned. The data to be used are in three categories: (1) the CSR ratings on the ESG
factors of the banks, (2) the financial data comprising the absolute values and the
constructed ratios for the banks that constitute the subjects of this study, and (3) the stock
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market data. The proprietary CSR ratings of the research subjects was obtained from the
KLD’s Socrates database after obtaining the access. The financial data were obtained
from the Bankscope database and the stock market data were downloaded from the
Yahoo! Finance database which were publicly available. I am aware of my responsibility
to secure these data for the prescribed period after the approval of the study.
Research Questions
Consistent with the statement of the problem and the purpose of this study, two
research questions were advanced, with focus on the effect of the individual CSR factors
of the accounting returns and the market-revealed cost of capital of the banks, as
measures of financial performance. The research questions are restated as follows:
Research Question 1: To what extent can individual CSR components predict
bank accounting performance, controlling for the effects of bank unique and
management preference factors?
Research Question 2: To what extent can individual CSR components of banks
help in predicting the banks’ cost of capital?
In the Research Question 1, the unique factors considered as control variables were firm
size, risk, growth, and prior financial performance while the management preference
factor considered as control variable was the capital expenditure relative to the total asset
value. These factors were measured in financial terms, although the absolute values like
the value of total assets that measures the size of each bank were standardized by their
natural logarithms. In both research questions, the independent variables were the
individual KLD CSR factors under qualitative screens.
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Hypotheses Formulation
To answer the two research questions posed in this study, two hypotheses were
tested. The central aim of the statistical test of hypotheses was to determine if the null
hypotheses in each case could be rejected, so that the speculative, alternative hypotheses
could be accepted (Fisher, 1935, p. 19). However, the extent of correct rejection or nonrejection of the null hypotheses given the reality of the state of the entire population
determines the chances of Type I and Type II errors, which have been extensively
considered in this study. The two hypotheses are described as follows.
Hypothesis 1
To address the first research question on the effect of the individual CSR factors
on the accounting returns of the sampled US banks controlling for the bank unique
factors of size, risk, growth, and past FP and the management preference factor of capital
expenditure, the null hypothesis (H0) and alternative hypothesis (H1) were specified as:
H01: The individual CSR components of banks cannot predict the banks’
accounting performance after controlling for the effects of the firm unique and the
management preference factors.

Ha1: The individual CSR components of banks can predict the banks’ accounting
performance after controlling for the effects of the firm unique and the
management preference factors.
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Hypothesis 2
The second research question is on the effect of the individual CSR factors on the
bank financing cost as a measure of financial performance, also controlling for the effects
of the firm unique and the management preference factors. The null hypothesis (H0) and
alternative hypothesis (H1) were restated below.
H02: The individual CSR components of banks cannot predict their cost of
capital.
Ha2: The individual CSR components of banks can predict their cost of capital.
Consistent with Fisher’s (1935, p. 19) views, because the null hypotheses were phrased in
a way that permitted their rejection, I speculated that the alternative hypotheses would be
accepted if the corresponding null hypotheses were rejected. The associated statistical
errors in terms of the chances of incorrect rejection of a true H0 and failure to reject a
false H0 have been adequately considered in this study. I considered that the chance of
Type I error (or alpha level) set at the conventional alpha level of 5% and the chance of
Type II error set at the conventional 20% level were appropriate for this research. The
aim of these measures was to preserve the reliability and generalizability of the
conclusions to be drawn from the outcome of the statistical tests performed.
Data Analysis
The secondary data of this study were analyzed by means of multiple regression
analytical tool, a dominant strategy in the recent empirical literature on this topic.
Consequently, two empirical models were presented: accounting returns model and
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market-based cost of capital model. I used IBM SPSS Version 21 for the statistical
analysis to test the models.
Models of the Study
The two models in the study were to assist in testing the null hypotheses advanced
with a view to answering the research questions posed. The models related the outcome
variables to the predictors and the control variables with a provision for the statistical
disturbance terms. The models were described below.
Accounting returns model. The first research question focused on the effect of
the individual CSR factors on the accounting returns of the sampled banks controlling for
the bank unique factors of size, risk, growth, and past FP and management preference
factor of capital expenditure. I examined this research question by applying the multiple
regression model specified in Equation 4.

FPit = β0 + β1CSRjit-1 + β2LogTotAssett + β3Levt + β4AssetGrowth +
β5LogFPit-1 + β6CapexR + ɛit

(4)

where:
Subscripts

=

Index of bank i, time t, and CSR component j

FPit

=

Financial performance for each US bank, measured as EBITDA
margin and MTB ratio separately

β0

=

Model intercept

β1

=

Slope of rating score of each CSR component

Β2...5

=

Slope of each control variable

95
CSRjit-1

=

Lagged rating score of CSR component j

FPit-1

=

Preceding year’s FP (ROA or Net-Earnings)

TotAssett

=

Total Assets measuring the size of each bank

Levt

=

Leverage ratio

AssetGrowth =

Ratio of total asset in the current period to the total
assets during the preceding period.

CapexRt

=

Ratio of capital expenditure to total asset to measure management
preference.

ɛit

=

Statistical disturbance term

Although there were several empirical inquiries into the impact of the CSR on the
accounting based FP such as Callan & Thomas (2009), Choi et al. (2010), Deng et al.
(2013), Jo & Harjoto (2011), and Wu & Shen (2013), in most of such studies aggregate
perspective was adopted, covering multiple industries and multiple countries, leading to
the use of condensed CSR scores. The studies using the aggregated approach were tainted
by the likely imperfect correlation of the individual CSR components (Scholtens, 2008)
and were also likely to lead to inaccurate CSR scores that compromise the results (Goss
& Robert, 2011). In order to obviate this challenge and also in line with the fact that
stakeholders’ need is conceptually contextual, a more appropriate approach was to
decompose the CSR scores by focusing on the individual components which underscored
a need for examining this research question and the use of the accompanying model.
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In this model, two dependent variables (EBITDA margin and MTB) were
separately tested in line with the current practice of the empirical research on the topic.
Thus in the first trial, the EBITDA margin was regressed against the CSR components
and the control variables in the Equation 4 and in the second trial, the MTB was
regressed against the CSR components and the control variables also in the Equation 4.
The outcome of each trial was separately and independently interpreted which enabled
the unique conclusions made.
Market revealed cost of capital model.
The second research question had to do with the effect of the individual CSR
factors on the market revealed cost of capital as a measure of financial performance,
controlling for the bank unique factors (total asset volume, asset growth, Leverage,
EBITDA margin, MTB ratio, and market capitalization) and the management preference
factors (the ratio of capital expenditure to total asset). In this regard, the cost of capital
used was based on the revealed required rate of returns revealed in the stock market
reflecting the premium for the systematic risk, premium for size and premium for the
growth factor based on the Fama-French three-factor model. I therefore used the
regression model specified in Equation 5 to examine this research question.

FF3FCOCit = β0 + β1jCSRijt-1 + β2LogTotAssett + β3LEVERAGE +
β4ASSETGRTH + β5EBITDAMgn + β6MTB + β7CAPEXR
+β8LogME + ɛit
where,

(5)
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Subscripts

=

Index of bank i, time t, and CSR component j

FF3FCOCit

=

Cost of capital calculated using Fama-French three-factor
approach

β0

=

Model intercept

β1j

=

Slope of CSR component j

CSRijt-1

=

Lagged rating score of CSR component j

MTB

=

Current period’s MTB ratio

EBITDAMGN

=

EBITDA margin

LogTotAsset

=

Natural logarithm of total assets.

Leverage

=

Ratio of debt to total asset, measuring leverage ratio.

AssetGrth

=

Ratio of total asset in the current period to the total
assets during the preceding period.

CapexR

=

Ratio of capital expenditure to total asset to measure
management preference.

Log_ME

=

Natural logarithm of market capitalization

ɛit

=

Stochastic error term, assumed to be independent and
insignificant, with a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1.

The cost of capital was determined based on the Fama and French (1993)
formulation of the required rate of return reflecting the market premium, risk premium
and growth premium, which is represented in the model in the Equation 6 below.

E(Ri) – Rf

=

bi[E(Rm-Rf)] + Si E(SMB) + hi E(HML)

(6)
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where,
E(Ri)

=

Expected rate of return on stock portfolio (same as cost of equity).

Rf

=

Risk-free rate of return.

E(Rm-Rf)

=

Expected excess return on the market index

bi, Si, hi

=

Slopes of the variables or beta values.

E(SMB)

=

Expected value of the difference between the excess return on a
portfolio of small stocks and the excess return on a portfolio of big
stocks.

E(HML)

=

Expected value of the difference between the excess return on a
portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and the excess return on a
portfolio of low book-to-market stocks.

Many researchers have examined the relationship between the CSR and the
market-determined financial returns, but only a few have addressed the effect of the
individual CSR components on the financing cost of firms, banks in particular. Ghoul et
al. (2011), Goss and Roberts (2011), and Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) alluded to this
fact in their separate calls for future CSR studies with focus on financing cost, which
underscored the essence of examining this research question.
As in the accounting-based financial performance model, the dependent variable
(cost of capital) was separately tested in this model in line with the current practice of the
empirical research on the topic. Therefore, the FF3F-based cost of capital was regressed
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against the individual CSR factors in the Equation 6. The outcome interpreted to produce
appropriate conclusions.
Testing the Assumptions of Multiple Regression Analysis
Multiple regression analysis, which dominates the current empirical literature, is
based on a number of assumptions. According to Field (2009, p. 220), these assumptions
must be checked to be true before any meaningful conclusion is drawn about a
population. Field explored nine of these assumptions: (1) measurement of variables, (2)
presence of variance, (3) absence of perfect multicollinearity among the predictors, (4)
no strong correlation between the predictors and the external variables, (5) presence of
homoscedasticity, (6) lack of autocorrelation of error terms, (7) normally distributed
errors, (8) independence of data, and (9) linearity of relationship. Greene (2012, p. 56)
added full rank to this list. I described each of these assumptions below and explained
how it was tested in this study in order to permit the generalization of the conclusions
drawn from the tests based on sample data to the entire population.
Measurement of variables.
Multiple regression analysis requires the predictor variables to be measurable at
interval level or categorical (binary) variables. It also requires the outcome variable to be
measurable at interval level or continuous, but most importantly to be unbounded,
without any variability on the outcome. The secondary data used as the independent
variables met this requirement. The indicators of the CSR components available in the
KLD database were categorical values of 1 where the performance criterion is met and 0
where the performance criterion was not met by the subject. Some prior researchers
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transformed these categorical values using 5-point scale of +2 to -2, with +2 representing
two or more strengths, 1 representing one strength, 0 representing the presence of neither
strength nor concern, -2 representing two or more concerns and -1 representing one
concern. Such recent researchers include Callan and Thomas (2009) and Goss and
Roberts (2011) as well as the much earlier studies of Graves and Waddock (1994, 2000),
Hillman and Keim (2001), and Waddock and Graves (1997). As done in the earlier
studies, I measured the CSR value of each indicator by scaling the KLD categorical
ratings, based on the net of the strength and the concerns.
Non-zero variance.
The predictors are expected to have some variation in value; their variances
should not be 0. Because, the CSR values to be used as predictors were transformed to
interval level, they had variation in value, which satisfied this assumption.
No perfect multicollinearity.
Multiple regression analysis does not allow perfect linear relationship between the
predictors, meaning that independent variables are not allowed to correlate too highly,
though some moderate correlation may not noticeably distort the regression results. In
this study, running multiple regression analysis in SPSS generated a table of the
significance of correlation among the independent variables. I checked to ensure that
none of these correlations was significant in order to satisfy the assumption of low
multicollinearity.
Predictors are uncorrelated with external variables or disturbance term.
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In order to ensure reliability of conclusions drawn from multiple regression
analysis, predictors should not correlate with external variables or with the disturbance
terms where external variables are subsumed in the disturbance terms. This implied that
the predictors should not be a relevant factor in the prediction of the disturbance terms or
the external variables.
Homoscedasticity.
This assumption of multiple regression is that variance of the residuals (or
disturbance terms) at each level of predictor is constant and equal. In other words,
heteroscedasticity – where variances are unequal – violates the assumption of multiple
regression analysis and should be tested. SPSS helped to check that this assumption was
not violated while testing the regression model with the study data.
Lack of autocorrelation.
Multiple regression analysis does not allow disturbances at different levels of
observation to correlate with each other or to be dependent on each other. Field (2009, p.
220) recommended testing this assumption with the Durbin-Watson test. Durbin-Watson
test is a statistical procedure for detecting presence of serial correlations between
disturbance errors/terms. I performed Durbin-Watson test in each regression model of
this study.
Normally distributed errors.
In multiple regression analysis, randomness of residuals and normal distribution
of variables with a mean of 0 are basic assumptions. The residuals represent the
difference between the observed value of the dependent variable and its calculated value
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based on the model at each level of observation. These differences should be close to 0,
and when this happens it confirms that the model is strong. I performed this test using
residuals plot to confirm that the residuals have a mean that is close to 0.
Independence.
Multiple regression analysis assumes that the values of outcome variables come
from separate entities, and are therefore independent. The assurance that this assumption
was met was provided by the sampling frame which comprised different banks that were
ethically rated.
Linearity.
The multiple regression analysis specifies a linear, straight line relationship
between the outcome variable and the predictors, with a constant slope. The essence of
this assumption is to permit fair generalizability of the findings. According to Field
(2009, p. 247), linearity assumption is tested by a scatter plot of *ZRESID against
*ZPRED. If there is no curve pattern in the scatter plot, then the relationship is linear and
the assumption of linearity is met.
Full rank.
It is assumed in multiple regression analysis that no exact linear relationship
exists between any of the independent variables. According to Greene (2012, p. 56), this
assumption is necessary for estimation of the parameters of the regression model.
Method of Entering Predictors into SPSS
In entering the predictor variables into the SPSS, I was guided by the common
approach in the empirical literature. The empirical literature revealed that the qualitative
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screens factors are commonly tested and known by researchers without any order of
importance. Hence, hierarchical (blockwise entry) method of entering data into the SPSS
is more appropriate for this study and was adopted. According to Field (2009, p. 212),
hierarchical method requires that the known predictors are entered first followed by
additional predictors. Thus, I entered the control variables first followed by the CSR
factors. However, the control variables and predictors were entered as a block, implying a
forced entry approach (Field).
Interpreting the Output of the Multiple Regression Analysis
For the purpose of testing the two hypotheses, the statistical alpha p value was set
at 0.05. The decision to reject or not to reject the H0 in both cases was guided by the
computed statistical significance value which was compared with the set p value of 0.05.
Where the computed significance value was less than the set 0.05, the relationship was
deemed to be significant and the H0 was rejected in favour of the Ha. Similarly, where the
computed significance value exceeded the set 0.05, the relationship was deemed to be not
statistically significant, so the H0 was not rejected. The other important results of the
analysis were the signs and size of the coefficients of each CSR component. A
component with positive coefficient showed positive relationship with the outcome
variable while a component with negative sign indicated negative relationship of the
component with the outcome variable. Finally, the strength of the relationship between
the variables was measured by the size of the predictor’s coefficient. This was achieved
by comparing the computed level of significance of the coefficient of each predictor with
the set p value of 0.05. A correlation coefficient was interpreted as: a coefficient in the
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range .10-.30 was taken as low correlation, a coefficient in the range .40-.50 was taken as
moderate correlation, and a coefficient of .60 and above was taken as high correlation.
Summary
In this chapter, I provided a direction of the study by articulating the philosophical
assumptions and paradigms guiding the research. The quantitative research design used
was also described and justified in the context of the literature. I identified the variables
of the study, justified their selection and explained how they were operationalized. An
insight was provided into the characteristics of the target population, where the
population was located, as well as how the sample was drawn from this population with
the explanation of how the sample size was determined based on the assessment of the
practical implications of the statistical errors and the availability of complete data. The
chapter also included the details of the method adopted in gathering the required data and
how this data were analyzed. To conclude the chapter, I restated the hypotheses of the
study, described how they were tested, explained the assumptions of the regression model
and how these assumptions were tested. I also explained how the variables were entered
into the SPSS as well as how the outputs of the SPSS regression analysis were
interpreted. This chapter provided a basis for chapter 4 of the dissertation which focused
on the results of the analysis.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
In this study, I examined the relationship between corporate social responsibility
(CSR) factors and financial performance indices in the banking sector of the United
States. The purpose of this quantitative study was to contribute to the ongoing debate as
to whether corporate social conduct has any effect on the financial performance of
business organizations, and if it does, to understand the nature and significance of such
effects. I envisaged that a good understanding of this relationship might empower
business managers with the essential information they require for their routine resource
allocative decisions. The emphasis of the study of the CSR was on both the accounting
performance measures and the market-based financial performance measures, which are
yet to be adequately addressed in the literature.
Two research questions were proposed in this study. The first question was
focused on the extent to which the individual CSR factors could predict the bank
accounting performance when the effects of the bank unique and management preference
factors are controlled. On this question, a bidimensional view was taken of the
accounting performance: MTB ratio which integrates market-based performance
indicator with book-based indicator and EBITDA margin which is purely book-based.
The second question was whether the individual CSR factors of banks could help in
predicting the banks’ cost of capital. The paucity of research into the market-based
financial performance measures in general and financing cost in particular was
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instrumental to the choice of market-revealed cost of capital as a measure of financial
performance in the study of CSR.
As required of a scholarly study, a hypothesis was proposed for each of the
research questions and the hypotheses were subjected to statistical testing. In Hypothesis
1, I suggested that the individual CSR factors could predict the banks’ accounting
performance. In Hypothesis 2, I suggested that the individual CSR factors of banks could
predict the banks’ cost of capital. In both cases, the effects of the bank unique and
management preference factors were well controlled to minimize the potential bias
resulting from the interaction of these factors with the firm financial performance indices.
As a factor analysis, both hypotheses were modelled using multiple regression statistical
tools. The outcome of the statistical testing and modelling of these hypotheses is
presented this chapter.
Organization of Chapter 4
As a transitional material for the discussion of the study findings to provide
insights for further advancement of academic inquiry on CSR, this chapter was focused
on the discussion and interpretation of the findings from the statistical analyses
performed on the collected data. The chapter was structured into four sections: (a) data
collection, where I described how the data was collected, the timeframe as well as other
conditions stipulated in the approval to collect data, and data collection outcome vis-à-vis
the plan; (b) descriptive statistical analysis of the collected data, where I discussed the
outcome of subjecting the collected data to basic statistical analysis and, based on the
outcome of the analysis, considered the relevance of the data for the study; (c) inferential
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statistical data analysis, where I discussed the findings from the statistical analyses
performed based on the hypotheses of the study; and (d) summary of results, where I
bring all the findings on the descriptive and inferential analysis together and indicated a
transition to chapter 5.
Data Collection
IRB Approval for Data Collection
I obtained the IRB’s approval for this doctoral capstone, with the approval No.
11-20-15-0158708. The approval was contingent upon my adherence to the procedures
described in the application requests, which emphasized strict compliance with ethical
requirements for Walden doctoral capstone. In collecting the data, I was strictly guided
by the details of the IRB procedures. I commenced the data collection from the various
sources after the approval was granted and concluded it within 6 weeks of receiving
approval.
Sources of Collected Data
As stated in chapter 1 and chapter 3, this study was conducted using secondary
data of different types from multiple sources. The CSR ratings which formed the
independent variables of the study were obtained from MSCI ESG Research Inc. The
financial data which formed the dependent variables and control variables were obtained
from the Bankscope database, based on the mandatory returns filed by the individual
organizations. Stock price data were obtained from the Yahoo! database based on their
daily price publications. Finally, I obtained the beta (a measure of systematic risks of
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firms) of the sampled banks from the Yahoo! Finance database to aid in the computation
of the cost of capital used in testing the study hypotheses.
Apart from Yahoo! Finance, which is publicly and freely available, I obtained the
required permission from the respective database organizations before I could gain access
to the other data sources. Some of these sources required payment of registration and
subscription fees before I could gain access to the data. The starting point was to select
the sample banks that had been socially rated by the MSCI ESG Inc.
US Financial Services Sector and MSCI Socially Rated Banks
Financial data were available for 5,535 financial service providers in the United
States based on the mandatory periodic returns filed with the company registry, but not
all of these firms were socially rated by MSCI ESG Inc. MSCI publishes social ratings
for over 3,000 large companies in the United State, covering different sectors of the
economy, though I observed that social ratings were available for only 370 of the firms
that provide banking related services including credit services, savings & loan, money
center banks, and regional banks subsectors. The subsectorial composition of the
financial service providers for which CSR ratings data were available is presented in
Table 3.
Table 3
Sectorial Composition of Banks with CSR Ratings
S/n

Subsector

1

Credit services

No. of Firms

Proportion

129

35%
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2

Savings & loans

31

8%

3

Money center banks

41

11%

5

Regional banks

192

45%

Total

370

Selection of Sample
In chapter 3, I proposed a sample size of 92 banks based on random selection. The
sampling frame comprises the banks that (a) were socially rated by MSCI, (b) had
complete financial data in the Bankscope database, and (c) were listed on the US stock
exchange (NYSE or NASDAQ). Although financial data were available for 5,535
financial service providers in the United Stated, MSCI ratings were available for only 370
large banks. Further reviewed showed that complete financial data were not available for
207 of the CSR-rated banks and stock information was also not available for another set
of 92 CSR-rated banks. The unavailability of the essential information necessitated that
these 299 banks (207 plus 92) be dropped from the sampling population. The sample of
this study therefore comprised the remaining 71 banks. The sampled banks, which cut
across four subsectors of the US finance industry, were geographically spread across the
country. The sectorial and geographical distribution of the sample is presented in Table 4.
The complete list of the banks is detailed in Appendix B.
Table 4
Sectorial Composition of Sample
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Sector

No. of firms Proportion

Credit Services

9

13%

Foreign Money Center Banks

1

1%

Foreign Regional Banks

2

3%

Money Center Banks

5

7%

Regional - Mid-Atlantic Banks

5

7%

Regional - Midwest Banks

13

18%

Regional - Northeast Banks

5

7%

Regional - Pacific Banks

8

11%

Regional - Southeast Banks

5

7%

Regional - Southwest Banks

7

10%

Savings & Loans

11

15%

Total

71

A sample size of 71 banks was considered to be large. Review showed that the
selected banks had complete CSR ratings, financial data, and stock market data required
for the study. I did not encounter any situation relating to missing data. The 71 sampled
banks were listed on the stock exchange, 15 on NYSE and 56 on NASDAQ.
MSCI Socially Rated Banks
MSCI CSR ratings covered the seven qualitative screens of community,
governance, diversity, employee relation, product, environment and human right and the
three exclusionary screens of alcohol, gambling, firearms, military, nuclear power, and

111
tobacco. However, a review of the available information for the banking sector on the
database showed that ratings were available only for community, governance, diversity,
employee relation, and product. The banks were not rated for environment and human
rights as well as the exclusionary factors, apparently due to the nature of the banking
industry.
The independent variables of the study were therefore restricted to the five CSR
factors of community, governance, diversity, employee relation, and product for which
ratings were available. The available ratings were in the form of 0 or 1, indicating the
firm’s performance under each factor element. Like many other researchers, the
difference between the sums of strengths and concerns under each factor was used as the
score for that CSR factor. The binary ratings were then transformed using natural
logarithms to make them suitable for regression analysis.
The observed peculiarity of the selection of the sample, based on the intersection
of three independent databases (MSCI, Bankscope, and Stock Exchanges), in no way
diminishes the external validity of the research. The joint availability of data from the
three independent sources for each of the selected bank is to a large extent random since
the data sources were completely independent.
Inclusion of Covariates in the Regression Models
The two research hypotheses in this study were tested using factor analysis based
on multiple regression models. Three dependent variables were involved in the study
comprising EBITDA margin, MTB ratio, and Cost of Capital based on Fama-French
three factor model consisting of premiums for systematic risk factor, size factor, and
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value factor when determining the investors’ required rates of returns. Each of the
dependent variables is a measure of financial performance. While EBITDA margin, a
purely accounting return, is capable of being manipulated by management, MTB ratio is
also subject to potential manipulation through the determination of the book value per
share. But cost of capital is entirely market determined, devoid of potential manipulation
by management. The CSR factors were rated by independent organizations based on a
number of criteria some of which were based on surveys, publications, and expert
opinion. Following the independent determination of the dependent and the independent
variables, it is not unreasonable to claim that the social performance when significant
should influence the financial performance. But it has been established in the prior
literature that some financial factors largely explain financial performance measures. This
suggests that the known confounding financial factors be controlled in the study. This
was the basis of controlling for size in terms of asset volume, growth in terms of asset
growth rate, previous year’s performance, market capitalization, and capital expenditure.
Data were collected on each of these covariates and their effects on the dependent
variable were isolated to permit a reasonable testing of the effect of the CSR factors on
the financial performance measures. The univariate properties of the individual variables
are presented in Table 5.
Table 5
Univariate Properties of the Study Variables
Variable

Minimum

Maximum M

S.D.

N
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EBITDAMgn

.0028

.8026

.290181

.1920500

71

MTB

.0693

3.5263

1.0539

.5318848

71

FF3FCOC

.0569

.1905

.10922

.02452

71

COMscore

1.3863

2.0794

1.6130

.16305

71

GOVscore

1.0986

1.7918

1.6821

.1570

71

DIVscore

1.3863

2.0794

1.6314

.1959

71

EMPRscore

1.3863

1.7918

1.5631

.1119

71

PRODscore

.6931

1.6094

1.5902

.1142

71

LogTotAsset

20.7649

25.0842

22.4800

.9547

71

ASSETGRTH

.6506

.9775

.8030

.0606

71

CAPEXR

-.0509

.0000

-.0027

.0071

71

EBITDAMgnt-1

.0033

.8311

.29166

.1973

71

MTBt-1

.0603

3.5289

1.0201

.5344

71

Leverage

.0024

.3863

.0965

.0459

71

LogME

17.7443

24.1239

20.4691

1.2405

71

The statistical variation in these variables was further explored in the descriptive
statistical analysis supra.
Plan Implementation Challenges
While implementing the research plan I did not encounter any serious challenge
that could warrant a significant change in the methodology. I was only confronted with
data unavailability which compelled me to refocus on the operationalization of variables
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and also to drop the contemplation to examine the whole of the 13 CSR factors as the
predictors. It was also not possible to consider the weighted average cost of capital
(WACC) as a measure of financial performance because the ingredients necessary to
determine each bank’s cost of debt were largely unavailable. Consequently, the equity
cost of capital was taken as the cost of capital for the study.
Determination of Fama-French Three Factor Model Cost of Capital
I computed the cost of capital based on the Fama-French three-factor model
(FF3FM). This requires the determination of the excess returns due to market premium or
systematic risk, size factor, and value factor.
Premium for excess market returns.
In line with the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), an excess return on market is
determined as:
Ri – Rf = Betai (ERm – Rf)

(7)

In the Equation 7, Ri is the required rate of return expected by the investors, Rf represents
the risk-free rate of return in the economy, Betai stands for the measure of the systematic
risk on the individual security, and ERm represents the expected return on the market.
The ERm was determined from the market return based on the average return on
the NYSE index and NASDAQ index over a period of 5 years from January 2010 to
December 2014. The two exchanges were used since the sampled banks were listed in
either NYSE or NASDAQ. The excess market returns from the average returns and the
risk free rate are presented in Table 6. The 30-day return on the US treasury stock was
quoted as 2.21%, which was used as the risk free rate in this study (U.S. Department of
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the Treasury, 2015). The calculated rate based on the individual firm betas represents the
portfolio return that mimics the market risk premium factor, which is the same as
determined under the single factor CAPM model.
Table 6
Determination of Excess Market Returns for Systematic Risk
Exchange

No. of sampled
firms listed
56

Average Daily
Returns on Index
over 5 Years
12.131%

NASDAQ
NYSE

2.21%

9.921%

15

10.328%

2.21%

8.118%

Excess Market Returns

Rf

Excess Market
Returns (Rm-Rf)

ERm - Rf = 9.019%

The premium for systematic risk was determined by multiplying the individual security’s
beta and the excess market returns of 9.019%.
Premium for size factor (SMB).
The premiums for the size and value factors were determined following Fama and
French (1993). I ranked the average returns of the sampled firms by their market
capitalization and categorized them into the top 20 percentile as the Big and bottom 80
percentile as the Small. I also ranked the average returns of the sampled banks by their
book-to-market (BTM) ratio, categorizing the top 30 percentile as the Value, the bottom
30 percentile as the Growth portfolio, and the middle 40 percentile as the Neutral. When
combined, I obtained the intersection of the stocks comprising SmallValue, SmallNeutral,
and Small Growth which constituted the Small portfolio on one hand and BigValue, Big
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Neutral, and BigGrowth constituting Big portfolio on the other hand. Yielding 0.24% as
the size factor returns, the average of the total returns of the three Small portfolios minus
the average of the total returns of the three Big portfolios are presented in Table 7. This is
the portfolio return that mimics the size factor, for which investors expect some
compensation. The expectation of Fama and French (1993) was that this premium should
be added to the required rates of return on the securities in the portfolio.
Table 7
Calculation of Size Factor Returns (SMB)
Small Portfolio
Portfolio

Big Portfolio
No

Total Returns

Average

Intersection

No.

Total Returns

Average

SmallValue

3

27.367%

9.122%

BigValue

18

114.524%

6.362%

SmallNeutral

7

34.631%

4.947%

BigNeutral

22

117.123%

5.324%

SmallGrowth

4

16.577%

4.144%

BigGrowth

17

98.679%

5.805%

14

Average

6.071%

57

Average

5.830%

Note: Average returns of Small minus Big is 0.24%, calculated as 6.071% - 5.830%.
Premium for value factor (HML).
Also following Fama and French (1993), the premium for value factor was
determined by creating two portfolios – High portfolio and Low portfolio – and
subtracting the average return of the Low portfolio from that of the High portfolio. The
calculation of value factor returns as 2.77% is presented in Table 8. This is the portfolio
that mimics the value or growth factor for which investors also require some
compensation. Fama and French (1993) also contended that this premium be added to the
investors’ required rates of return.
Table 8
Calculation of Value Factor Returns (HML)
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High Portfolio

Low Portfolio

Portfolio

No

Total Returns

Average

Portfolio

No

Total Returns

Average

BigValue

18

114.524%

6.362%

BigGrowth

17

98.679%

5.805%

SmallValue

3

27.367%

9.122%

SmallGrowth

4

16.577%

4.144%

21

Average

7.742%

21

Average

4.975%

Note: Average returns of High minus Low is 2.77%, calculated as 7.742% - 4.975%.
The sum of premium for systematic risk, premium for size factor, premium for
value/growth factor, and the risk free rate gives the total required rates of returns which
represents the cost of capital used in the study. Appendix C shows the details of
premiums and the resulting cost of capital for each firm in the selected sample.
Data Analysis: Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive Statistics of the Control Variables in Hypotheses 1
In Hypothesis 1, the control variables include asset volume, asset growth, capital
expenditure/total asset ratio, leverage ratio, market capitalization, and prior-year financial
performance measure (using EBITDA margin or MTB ratio if the dependent variable is
EBITDA margin or MTB ratio respectively). In either case, the statistical descriptives of
these control variables are presented in Table 9. Although, the control variables were
measured in absolute values, ratios, or percentages, where control variables were
measured in absolute values, the natural logarithmic values were calculated using
Microsoft Excel function before they were used in the regression model and SPSS.
Table 9
Statistical Descriptives of the Control Variables in Hypotheses 1
Variable
TotAssets ($'m)
Log_TotAssets

Min
Max
M
S.D. N
1,042.51 78,330.43 9,488.77 12,200.48 71
20.7649
25.0842 22.4800
.9547 71
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Market Capitalization ($'m)
Log_ME
AssetGrwth (%)
Capex/Asset (ratio)
EBITDAMgnt-1 (%)
MTB t-1
Leverage (%)

50.85
17.7443
65.06
-.0509
.33
.0603
.24

29,983.14
24.1239
97.75
.0000
83.11
3.5289
38.63

1,944.91
20.4691
80.30
-.0027
29.17
1.0201
9.65

4280.89
1.2405
6.06
.0071
19.73
.5344
4.59

71
71
71
71
71
71
71

As stated in the earlier chapters, the financial data used for this study were
publicly available, based on the mandatory regular returns filed by individual banks. The
financial data of each bank were pulled for 5 years, from 2010 to 2014 and their simple
averages were computed and used to measure the control variables. In several prior
studies, size of firms was adequately controlled in the regression models. I adopted a
bidimensional approach to controlling for the size in the model, using both book value
approach and market value approach. I therefore collected financial data on the total
assets for the five-year period. The 71 sampled banks recorded total assets of $673.7
billion for each year from 2010 to 2014, which translated to the average total asset
volume of $9.49 billion ($5.218 billion, median) per bank per year. The asset values were
then transformed to their natural logarithms to make them suitable for regression
analysis. This produced an average log value of 22.48 (22.38, median). The yearend
market values were extracted from the financial data collected. The annual total market
value stood at $138.09 billion for the sampled banks, with mean market value of $1.944
billion per bank ($708 million, median) for each of the 5 years. Growth factor was
controlled in the Hypothesis 1 and it was measured as the annual growth rate of each
firm’s total assets, which translated to average annual growth rate of 80.3% (79.7%,
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median) in total assets of the selected banks. Risk was also controlled in the Hypothesis
1, as prior research showed that risk had significant influence on the accounting returns.
In this study, I measured risk as the leverage ratio; that is, the ratio of debt to capital
employed. Leverage ratio was also included in the financial returns filed by banks. For
the sampled banks, leverage ratio had a mean value of 9.65% (9.25%, median). Prior year
accounting returns were controlled in the Hypothesis 1. When the dependent variable was
EBITDA margin, the prior year EBITDA margin (or EBITDAMgnt-1) was controlled and
when the dependent variable was taken as MTB ratio, the prior year MTB (i.e., MTBt-1)
was controlled in the regression models. In both cases, the financial data collected
showed the average prior year EBITDA margin as 29.17% (27.74%, median) and the
average prior year MTB ratio as 1.02 (0.918, median). Finally, management preference
factor, which prior researchers have established to significantly influence accounting
returns, was controlled in the Hypothesis 1. As stated in the earlier chapters, I
operationalized management preference factor as the ratio of capital expenditure to total
assets, since capital expenditure is a discretionary expenditure made by management to
influence financial performance. Descriptive statistics showed an average ratio of
0.0027:1 for capital expenditure/total assets for each of the 5 years involved for each
bank (0.0027, median). I expected that if these variables were appropriately measured as
indicated and included in the regression model, their influence would be effectively
isolated from the dependent variables in Hypothesis 1.
Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variables in Hypotheses 1
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In Hypothesis 1, I claimed that corporate social responsibility factors could
predict the financial performance of banks. In this hypothesis, I sought to measure the
financial performance using both accounting (book) returns subject to the full managerial
control and partially market based returns. For these measures, I used EBITDA margin
and MTB ratio respectively. The descriptive statistics for the dependent variables are
shown in Table 10.
Table 10
Statistical Descriptives of the Dependent Variables in Hypotheses 1
Variable
EBITDA Margin (%)
MTB (ratio)

Min

Max

M

S.D. N

0.28

80.26

29.02

19.21 71

0.0693

3.5263

1.0539

.5319 71

EBITDA margin and MTB ratio were among the mandatory returns firms were
required to file with the company registry. EBITDA margin is measured as EBITDA a
percentage of revenue or turnover for the year. The sampled banks recorded an average
annual EBITDA margin of 29.02% (26.19%, median). MTB, though reported by the
sampled firms, is measured as the ratio of Market Price per share (MPS) to Book Value
per share (BVPS). The sampled banks reported a mean MTB of 1.054 (0.946, median).
The values of these dependent variables were fed directly into the regression model as
they were not below the interval measurement level.
Descriptive Statistics of the Control Variables in Hypotheses 2
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The focus of the Hypothesis 2 was on the testing of the market-based cost of
capital of the sampled banks. I therefore claimed that corporate social responsibility
factors of banks could predict the banks’ cost of capital. In order to preserve the
predictive value of the corporate social responsibilities on the cost of capital, I controlled
for the size measured by the asset volume and market capitalization, the growth measured
by the annual growth rate in asset volume, and the financial returns measured by
EBITDA margin and MTB ratio. While the descriptive statistics of the size and growth
(asset volume/market capitalization and asset growth rate) have earlier been reported
under Table 9, the descriptive statistics of the EBITDA margin and MTB ratio were
reported under Table 10.
Descriptive Statistics of the Independent Variables in Hypotheses 1 and 2
The individual corporate social responsibility (CSR) factors represent the
independent variables for both hypotheses. Leaning on the research methodology of
MSCI for CSR, I tested the MSCI’s ratings for community, governance, diversity,
employee relations, and product. I interacted with the MSCI Research Inc. who provided
access to the ratings data used for this study. The 3 year ratings data collected covered the
period from 2011 to 2013 to ensure a 1-year lag against the financial data for the period
2012 to 2014 to permit the testing of Granger causality of the models. The CSR ratings
scores for each CSR factor are presented in Table 11.
Table 11
Distribution of CSR Ratings Scores of the Sampled Banks

122
CSR Factor

CSR Score

Community

361

Governance

386

Diversity

370

Employee Relation

341

Product

350

Aggregate (Total)

1808

In calculating the scores, consideration was given to the fact that environmental
and human right factors were ignored in this study. This was because MSCI did not
provide performance ratings for these factors. Exclusion was therefore justified in order
not to bias the model. Table 11 showed that governance had the highest performance
scores while employee relation factor had the least scores. The impact of each of these
factors on the financial performance was the subject of the testing of the Hypothesis 1
and Hypothesis 2. To arrive at these overall scores for each factor, I summed the binary
scores for strength and concern separately, and subtracted the sums of concern from those
of the strength. The natural logarithmic values of the resultant sums were then taken to
standardize the values and make them suitable for regression. As a check, these figures
can be converted back using the Excel exponent function.
Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variables in Hypothesis 2
Having obtained the Fama-French three-factor cost of capital by pulling the
premium for systematic risk as demonstrated under Table 6, the premium for size factor
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in Table 7, and the premium for value factor in Table 8, together with the risk free factor,
I obtained a distribution of the cost of capital which was then regressed against the
individual bank’s independent variables (i.e., individual CSR factors). For this purpose,
the distribution of the estimated cost of capital is presented in Table 12.
Table 12
Descriptive Statistics of the Estimated Cost of Capital
Variable
FF3FCOC

Min

Max

M

S.D. N

5.69

19.05

10.92

2.45 71

The 71 sampled banks reported mean cost of capital of 10.92% (11.03%, median) for
each of the 5 years sampled, 2010 to 2014.
Data Analysis: Evaluation of Statistical Assumptions and Hypothesis Testing
In this section, I explore the SPSS outputs on the models presented in order to
assess the level of their compliance with the regression assumptions made in chapter 3.
This analysis is organized along the themes of study hypotheses. While testing each
model, I evaluated the extent to which the linear regression assumptions were met or
violated. The principal of such assumptions included multicollinearity, homoscedasticity,
auto-correlation, and normality of distribution. I adopted triangulated approach to assess
compliance with these assumptions by using plots and statistical numbers for the
evaluation.
Hypothesis 1: Individual CSR Factors and Accounting Returns
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The first hypothesis of the study, focused on the relation between the individual
CSR factors and the accounting returns is restated as follows:

H01:

The individual CSR factors of banks cannot predict the banks’
accounting performance after controlling for the effects of the firm unique
and the management preference factors.

Ha2:

The individual CSR components of banks can predict the banks’
accounting performance after controlling for the effects of the firm unique
and the management preference factors.

The underlying research question that led to this hypothesis is: To what extent can the
individual CSR factors of banks predict the bank accounting returns, controlling for the
effects of bank unique and management preference factors? The focus was therefore on
the measurement of the effect of the individual CSR factors on the accounting
performance measures. In chapters 1 and 3, I specified a regression model in the Equation
(8) to test Hypothesis 1:
FPit = β0 + β1CSRjit-1 + β2LogTotAssett + β3Levt + β4AssetGrowth +
β5LogFPit-1 + β6CapexR + ɛit

(8)

where:
Subscripts

=

Index of bank i, time t, and CSR component j

FPit

=

Financial performance for each US bank, measured as EBITDA
margin and MTB ratio separately

125
β0

=

Model intercept

β1

=

Slope of rating score of each CSR component

Β2...5

=

Slope of each control variable

CSRjit-1

=

Lagged rating score of CSR component j

FPit-1

=

Preceding year’s FP (ROA or Net-Earnings)

TotAssett

=

Total Assets measuring the size of each bank

Levt

=

Leverage ratio

AssetGrowth =

Ratio of total asset in the current period to the total
assets during the preceding period.

CapexRt

=

Ratio of capital expenditure to total asset to measure management
preference.

ɛit

=

Statistical disturbance term

I lagged the CSR factors by 1 year in order to examine the proposition that the individual
CSR factors in a prior period Granger-influences the firm accounting returns in the
subsequent period.
Evaluating the EBITDAMgn regression model.
In the first part of this model, EBITDA margin (a measure of accounting
performance) was regressed against the individual CSR factors (Comscore, Govscore,
Divscore, Empscore, and Prodscore) and the specified control variables (TotAsset,
AssetGrowth, Leverage, EBITDAMgnt-1, and CapexR). Essentially, I entered
EBITDAMgn as the dependent variable. I then adopted hierarchical (blockwise entry)
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method through the forced entry approach by entering the control variables in a block and
the independent variables in another block without following any order. The control
variables were entered all at once as a block, and, later, the independent variables were
entered in the second block, also all at once. This strategy was to enable me isolate the
effects of the control variables on the dependent variable. Because I made no decision on
the order of entry of the variables in either block, all the variables within each block were
entered once, thus adopting a forced entry approach. According to Field (2009, p. 212), a
forced entry approach is appropriate for theory testing.
Running the EBITDAMgn regression model yielded the model summary detailed
in the Table 13, showing the extent to which the model was successful in predicting
EBITDAMgn from the individual CSR scores.
Table 13
EBITDAMgn Regression Model: Model Summary
Model Summary
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R

Std. Error of

Square

the Estimate

Change Statistics
R Square

F Change

df1

Durbin-

df2

Change
1

.983

Watson

Change

a

.966

.962

.0371967

.966

300.338

6

64

.000

b

.967

.961

.0379379

.001

.505

5

59

.771

.983

2

Sig. F

1.923

Note:
a.

Predictors: (Constant), EBITDAMgnt-1, Leverage, ASSETGRTH, LogTotAsset, LogME, CAPEXR

b. Predictors: (Constant), EBITDAMgn t-1, Leverage, ASSETGRTH, LogTotAsset, LogME, CAPEXR, COMscore,
GOVscore, DIVscore, EMPRscore, PRODscore.

The regression outputs detailed in Table 13 and Table 14 showed that the linear
combination of the 11 control and predictor variables was significantly related to the
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EBITDAMgn, R2 = .97, adjusted R2 = .96, F(11, 59) = 157.71, p < .001. The control
variables predicted EBITDAMgn significantly over and above the CSR scores, R2 = .97,
F(6, 64) = 300.34, p < .001, but the CSR scores did not predict EBITDAMgn
significantly after partialling out the effects of the control variables, R2 change = .001,
F(5, 59) = .51, p = .77. Based on these results, the CSR scores appear to offer little
additional predictive power.
Further, the SPSS model summary showed that the relationship between the
control variables (EBITDAMgnt-1, Leverage, AssetGrowth, LogTotAsset, LogME, and
CAPEXR) and the outcome variable (EBITDAMgn) was significant, R = .98, adjusted R2
= .96, F(6,64) = 300.34, p < .001. The independent variables (COMscore, GOVscore,
DIVscore, EMPRscore, and PRODscore) did not predict significantly over and above the
control variable measures, R2 change = .001, F(5,59) = .51, p = .78. The difference
between the R2 and the Adjusted R2 was only .001, or .1%. This marginal difference
suggests that if the model were to be applied to the population rather than the sample,
variance would be reduced by merely .1%, which is negligible. It then suggests that the
model, though largely explained by the control variables, could well generalize the ideal
world with a strong goodness of fit. As advised by Field (2009, p. 222), a test of the
cross-validity of the EBITDA margin model was performed by calculating the Adjusted
R2 using Stein’s formula:
Adjusted R2 =1 –

n-1
n-2
n-k-1 n-k-2

n+1
n

(1- R2)

(9)
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where ‘n’ represents the sample size and ‘k’ stands for the number of independent
variables.
The performance of this test showed that the adjusted R2 calculated was .95 which
was close to the SPPS-determined adjusted R2 of .97 and provided a further testament
that the cross validity of this model was good.
Table 14 presents the ANOVA result of the test whether the EBITDAMgn model
significantly predicted the outcome better than the mean. When only control variables
were included in the model, the EBITDAMgn was strongly predicted by these control
variables, F(6,64) = 300.34, significant, p < .001. The inclusion of the CSR scores (the
independent variables) into the model did not yield a significant improvement in the
explained variation, R2 change = .001, F(5,59) = .51, p = .78. This was interpreted to
mean that the observed marginal improvement resulting from the inclusion of the CSR
scores into the EBITDAMgn regression model could have occurred by chance.
In summary, when the model included only the control variables, it strongly
predicted the EBITDAMgn, F(6,64) = 300.34, significant, p < .001. Again, when the
model included both the control variables and the criterion variables (the CSR factors), it
still predicted the criterion variable strongly, F(11,59) = 157.71, significant, p < .001,
though with a substantial reduction in the F value. This could be interpreted to mean that
the improvement due to the regression model was not unlikely to have occurred by
chance.
Table 14
Evaluating the ANOVA Values of EBITDA Margin Model
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Model
Regression
1 Residual
Total
Regression
2 Residual
Total

ANOVA
Sum of Squares Df Mean Square
2.493 6
.416
.089 64
.001
2.582 70
2.497 11
.227
.085 59
.001
2.582 70

F
300.338

Sig.
.000b

157.712

.000c

Test of autocorrelation in the EBITDAMgn model.
The Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.923 shown in Table 13 is indicative of the
presence or absence of autocorrelation in the data. As a convenient rule, Field (2009,
p.236) suggested that Durbin-Watson statistic either lying between 1 and 3 or being close
to 2 showed absence of autocorrelation. In this model, Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.9 lies
between 1 and 3, and is also close to 2, implying lack of autocorrelation in the data.
Autocorrelation is an independence error that occurs when two observations have
residual terms that are correlated. Regression analysis assumes that residual terms must
not be correlated.
Evaluating the parameters in the EBITDAMgn model.
The parameters in the EBITDA margin model were evaluated, including the beta
and correlation coefficients. The summary of the coefficients for each of the variables is
presented in Table 15.
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Table 15
Coefficients in the EBITDA Margin Model
Model

Unstandardized
Coefficients

B
(Constant)
LogTotAsset
ASSETGRTH
CAPEXR
Leverage
LogME
EBITDAMgnt-1
COMscore
GOVscore
DIVscore
EMPRscore
PRODscore

-.100
.012
-.004
.326
-.046
-.004
.973
-.036
.002
.003
.025
-.042

Std.
Error
.208
.005
.089
.751
.128
.004
.024
.031
.040
.025
.044
.046

Std.
Coefficien
ts
Beta

.059
-.001
.012
-.011
-.025
.999
-.030
.002
.004
.015
-.025

t

-.480
2.362
-.051
.434
-.363
-.916
40.186
-1.133
.055
.137
.578
-.905

Sig.

.633
.021
.960
.666
.718
.364
.000
.262
.957
.891
.565
.369

95.0% Confidence
Interval for B

Lower
Bound
-.517
.002
-.182
-1.176
-.302
-.012
.924
-.098
-.077
-.047
-.062
-.134

Correlations

Collinearity
Statistics

Upper
Zero- Partial Part ToleBound
order
rance
.317
.022 -.193
.294 .056 .884
.173 .058
-.007 -.001 .711
1.828 .089
.056 .010 .732
.209 .019
-.047 -.009 .598
.005 .057
-.118 -.022 .767
1.021 .981
.982 .949 .901
.027 -.034
-.146 -.027 .786
.082 .018
.007 .001 .528
.054 .022
.018 .003 .840
.113 .000
.075 .014 .852
.050 .094
-.117 -.021 .745

VIF

1.131
1.407
1.366
1.671
1.303
1.110
1.273
1.893
1.190
1.174
1.342
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The EBITA margin model below was depicted by the equation with the substituted
coefficients.
EBITDAMGNt = -0.1 - 0.03LogCOMscore + 0.002LogGOVscore +
0.004LogDIVscore + 0.02LogEMPRscore 0.02LogPRODscore + 0.06LogTotAssett - 0.01Lev 0.001AssetGrowth + EBITDAMgnt-1 + 0.12CapexR 0.03LogME

From the model, the standardized beta values/coefficients of COMscore and
PRODscore were negative implying that efforts made to improve community and product
scores might hurt margin. The standardized beta values of GOVscore, DIVscore and
EMPRscore were positive implying that greater efforts aimed at improving these social
scores might lead to some improvement in the margin. The standardized betas of all the
CSR scores did not appear to be tangible, because their t values were not significant,
p>.05. Among the control variables, only AssetGrowth, Leverage, and LogME showed
negative relationship with EBITDA margin while the other ones (TotAsset,
EBITDAMgnt-1 and CapexR) showed positive relationship. The coefficient of
EBITDAMgn t-1 was significant and not likely to be due to chance, with t = 2.36, p = .02.
Also the standardized beta value of LogTotAsset was equally significant, t = 40.19, p
<.001. The standardized betas of the other control variables (AssetGrowth, CapexR,
Leverage and ME) were not significant, p > .05. This implied that their beta values might
be due to chances and might not be significantly different from 0. Finally, the alpha value
of the model (β0) is 0, with t = -.48, p = .63 (not significant).
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Test of assumptions of collinearity in the EBITDAMgn model.
The collinearity statistics, which was required to assess the presence or absence of
multicollinearity in the data, was also shown in Table 15. As a rule of thumb, if the
largest variance inflation factor (VIF) is greater than 10, there is evidence of collinearity
in the data. Also as a rule of thumb, a tolerance below 0.1 shows presence of a serious
problem with collinearity and tolerance below 0.2 equally indicates a potential problem.
The largest VIF of 1.9 and the lowest tolerance (1/VIF) of 0.53 are within the acceptable
range, indicating that multicollinearity was not present in the data.
Evaluating the correlation coefficients in the EBITDAMgn model.
The Pearson partial correlation coefficient for EBITDA margin model was
presented in Table 16, showing that no significant correlation was recorded between
EBITDA margin and all the variables in the model. The only exception was the previous
EBITDA margin which was highly correlated with the EBITDA margin, with R = .98,
p<.001. The strong positive correlation between the current year EBITDA margin and the
previous year EBITDA margin is understandable since they are an extension of each
other. Notwithstanding, LogTotAsset and COMscore showed negative correlation
coefficients, implying a tendency to have negative relationships with the EBITDA
margin, while other variables showed positive correlation coefficients suggesting positive
relationships with the EBITDA margin. A review of the correlation matrix presented in
Table 16 did not show correlation coefficient (r) that is greater than .9, apart from the
EBITDA margins of the current and the previous years. This also supported the fact that
multicollinearity was not present in the data.
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Table 16
Correlation Coefficients in the EBITDA Margin Model
EBITDAMgn
EBITDAMgin
LogTotAsset
Sig. (1-tailed)
ASSETGRTH
Sig. (1-tailed)
CAPEXR
Sig. (1-tailed)
Leverage
Sig. (1-tailed)
LogME
Sig. (1-tailed)
EBITDAMgnt-1
Sig. (1-tailed)
COMscore
Sig. (1-tailed)
GOVscore
Sig. (1-tailed)
DIVscore
Sig. (1-tailed)

1.000
-.193
.054
.058
.315
.089
.231
.019
.439
.057
.319
.981
.000
-.034
.388
.018
.441
.022
.429

LogTot ASSET CAP
Asset
GRTH EXR

Lev

LogME

EBITDA COM GOV DIV EMPR PROD
Mgnt-1
score score score score score

1.000
-.031
.398
-.135
.131
-.176
.071
.037
.380
-.250
.018
-.045
.355
.078
.260
-.079
.256

1.000
-.306
.005
-.182
.064
.299
.006
.072
.275
.102
.199
.006
.481
.072
.274

1.000
.357
.001
-.033
.394
.087
.234
-.026
.415
-.148
.110
.015
.450

1.000
-.295
.006
.030
.401
.118
.164
-.380
.001
.142
.119

1.000
.075
.267
-.090
.227
.076
.264
-.104
.194

1.000
-.008
.475
.009
.469
.020
.434

1.000
-.403 1.000
.000
.055 -.354 1.000
.323 .001
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EMPRscore
Sig. (1-tailed)
PRODscore
Sig. (1-tailed)

.000
.498
.094
.217

-.078
.258
.081
.251

-.172
.076
-.159
.093

-.061
.305
-.024
.420

.178
.069
.033
.392

.017
.444
.034
.390

-.005
.484
.110
.181

.077
.262
-.195
.052

.029
.404
.387
.000

-.020 1.000
.435
-.178 -.015 1.000
.069 .451
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In terms of the effect size, Field (2009, p. 57) suggested that correlation
coefficients also stand for the effect size of the regression model, with +-.1, +-.3, and +-.5
representing small effect, medium effect, and large effect respectively. The effect size of
the variables that reported effect in the testing of the EBITDA margin model is presented
in Table 17. The other variables did not report any significant effect.
Table 17
Determination of Effect Size in the EBITDAMgn Model
Variable

r

Effect Size

EBITDAMgnt-1

.98 Large

LogTotAsset

-.19 Small

AssetGrowth

.06 Small

CapexR

.09 Small

LogME

.06 Small

PRODscore

.09 Small

Evaluation of homoscedasticity assumption in the EBITDAMgn model.
In regression analysis it is assumed that at each level of the predictor variables,
the variances of the residuals should be constant (Field, 2009, p. 220). The constancy of
the variances in this manner is referred to as homoscedasticity while the lack of it is
referred to as heteroscedasticity. Following Field’s (2009) suggestion, I used a scatter
plot of ZRSID against the ZPRED which is shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Plot of *ZRESID against *ZPRED for EBITDAMgn OLS Regression Model
According to Field (2009, p. 247), the assumption of homoscedasticity is met only
when the dots in the plot are random and the graph does not funnel out. The dots in the
Figure 3 are scattered without any clear pattern and the graph did not funnel out, so the
assumption of homoscedasticity was met in this data.
Test of linearity assumption in the EBITDAMgn model.
Linearity is a fundamental assumption of regression analysis. Field (2009, p. 247)
suggested that linearity assumption be tested by a scatter plot of *ZRESID against
*ZPRED. According to him, if there is no curve pattern in the scatter plot, then the
relationship is linear and the assumption of linearity is met. The dots in the Figure 3 did
not reveal any curve pattern or curvilinear relationship between the *ZRESID and
*ZPRED. Therefore, the linearity assumption was met in the EBITDAMgn model.
Test of homogeneity of variance assumption in the EBITDAMgn model.
Regression analysis assumes that variances are homogeneous. Accordding to
Field (2009, p. 340), variances are homogenous if Levene’s statistic is not significant. In
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Table 18, the Levene’s statistic of the mean of the distribution is not significant, Levene’s
statistic = 0.77, p = .47. This implied that the assumption of homogeneity of variances
was not violated in the data.
Table 18
Levene Test of Homogeneity of Variance

EBITDAMgn

Based on Mean
Based on Median
Based on Median and
with adjusted df
Based on trimmed mean

Levene
df1
Statistic
.766 2
.619 2
.619 2
.653

2

df2

Sig.

66
66
58.897

.469
.541
.542

66

.524

Evaluation of normality assumption in the EBITDAMgn model.
Another assumption of the regression analysis is the normality of the distribution.
In this study, I tested normality through the use of histograms. The Figure 4 below is the
histogram with a fitted normal curve for the EBITDA margin model. The normal bellshaped curve around the histogram is indicative of a data that reflects normal distribution
with mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1.

Figure 4. Histogram of normally distributed residuals for the EBITDAMgn OLS Model.
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The normal P-P plot of regression standardized residual for EBITDA margin in
Figure 5 indicates some variations of the residuals from the regression line. Field (2009,
p. 248) suggested that quantitative test be performed to confirm if such a plot is
significantly outside a normal distribution.

Figure 5. Normal P-P Plot of the expected against the observed cumulated probability for
the EBITDAMgn OLS Model.
I explored two quantitative tests of normality assumption. First, I examined the
skewness and kurtosis and computed their standardized scores. Field (2009, p. 139)
suggested that if the distribution is normal, then the skewness and kurtosis of the
distributions should be close to 0 and the standardized skewness (ZSkewness) and the
standardized kurtosis (ZKurtosis) should be within the +/-1.96 for small sample size, +/2.58 for medium sample size, or +/-3.29 for large sample size. The sample size for this
study was 71, which qualified for medium sample size. As suggested by Field, the
standard scores are determined by division of the skewness or kurtosis by their respective
standard errors. Presented in Table 19 are the values of the skewness and kurtosis along
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with their respective standard errors and the computed standard scores. The individual
skewness and kurtosis are not too far from 0, and the ZSkewness and ZKurtosis were
within the standard score of +-2.58 applicable to the medium size sample of this study.
This therefore suggests that the distributions of the data relating to the dependent and the
independent variables were normal distributions.
Table 19
Test of Normality: Standard Scores of Skewness and Kurtosis
Skewness Kurtosis
EBITDAMgn
MTB
COC
COMscore
GOVscore
DIVscore
EMPRscore
PRODscore

0.552
0.675
0.615
0.126
-0.733
0.450
-0.491
-0.287

-0.175
0.255
0.282
-0.346
0.943
-0.418
-0.282
0.564

S.E.
S.E.
ZSkewness ZKurtosis
Skewness Kurtosis
0.285
0.563
1.937
-0.311
0.285
0.563
2.368
0.453
0.285
0.563
2.158
0.501
0.285
0.563
0.442
-0.615
0.285
0.563
-2.572
1.675
0.285
0.563
1.579
-0.742
0.285
0.563
-1.723
-0.501
0.285
0.563
-1.007
1.002

Secondly, in line with Field’s (2009, p. 145) recommendation a further test of
Kolmogorov-Smirnov combined with Shapiro-Wilk test was conducted to evaluate the
extent of non-compliance with the assumption of normality of distribution. Table 18
shows the outcome of these two tests. Field suggested that if the statistics of these tests
are significant (p < .05), then the distributions are not normal, but if they are not
significant (p > 0.05), then the distributions are normal. The statistics of both
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests presented in Table 20 are not significant (p
> .05) for EBITDA margin against the CSR scores. This implies that the distributions are
close to a normal distribution.
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Table 20
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk Tests of Normality
Tests of Normality
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Statistic

EBITDAMgn

df

Shapiro-Wilk

Sig.

Statistic

Df

Sig.

COMscore

0.071

71

.200

0.976

71

0.678

GOVscore

0.236

71

.200

0.935

71

0.632

DIVscore
EMPRscore
PRODscore

0.109

71

.200

0.97

71

0.891

0.081

71

.200

0.96

71

0.092

0.073

71

.200

0.961

71

0.053

Evaluating the MTB model.
Hypothesis 1 sought to test the impact of the individual CSR scores on the
accounting returns when the firm unique factors and management preference factors are
controlled. It required accounting returns to be operationalized as EBITDA margin and
MTB ratio respectively. Having explored the regression model when accounting return
was operationalized as EBITDA margin, I then tested the hypothesis when accounting
return was operationalized as MTB ratio. In this regard, I used the same input into the
SPSS regression, but swapped the EBITDA margin with the MTB as the dependent
variable and also swapped the EBITDAMgn t-1 with the MTB t-1 in the control variables.
Running the MTB regression model yielded the model summary detailed in Table 21,
showing the extent to which the model was successful in predicting the MTB from the
individual CSR scores when the effects of the specified confounding variables were
controlled.
Table 21
MTB Regression Model: Model Summary
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Model Summary
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R

Std. Error of

Square

the Estimate

Change Statistics
R Square

F Change

df1

Durbin-

df2

Change
1

.999

Watson

Change

a

.997

.997

.0300144

.997

3653.056

6

64

.000

b

.997

.997

.0298064

.000

1.179

5

59

.330

.999

2

Sig. F

2.326

Note:
a. Predictors: (Constant), MTBt-1, LogTotAsset, Leverage, LogME, ASSETGRTH, CAPEXR
b. Predictors: (Constant), MTB t-1, LogTotAsset, Leverage, LogME, ASSETGRTH, CAPEXR, DIVscore, PRODscore,
EMPRscore, COMscore, GOVscore

It was shown in Table 21 and Table 22 that the linear combination of the 11
control and predictor variables was significantly related to the MTB, R2 = .997, adjusted
R2 = .997, F(11, 59) = 2021.02, p < .001. The control variables predicted MTB
significantly over and above the CSR scores, R2 = .997, F(6.64) = 3653.05, p < .001, but
the CSR scores did not predict MTB significantly after partialling out the effects of the
control variables, R2 change = .000, F(5, 59) = 1.18, p = .33. Based on these results, the
CSR scores appear to offer little additional predictive power beyond that contributed by
the control variables.
Further, the SPSS model summary showed that the relationship between the
control variables (MTBt-1, Leverage, AssetGrowth, LogTotAsset, LogME, and CAPEXR)
and the outcome variable (MTB) was significant, R = .999, adjusted R2 = .997, F(6,64) =
3653.06, p < .001. Like the EBITDA margin model, the five predictors (COMscore,
GOVscore, DIVscore, EMPRscore, and PRODscore) also did not predict significantly
over and above the control variable measures, R2 change = .000, F(5,59) = 1.18, p = .33.
The difference between the R2 and the Adjusted R2 was nil, suggesting that applying this
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model to the population rather than the sample would not lead to any meaningful change
in the variance. It follows that the model, though largely explained by the control
variables, could well generalize the ideal world with a strong goodness of fit.
I also performed the test of cross-validity of the MTB model by calculating the
Adjusted R2 using Stein’s formula:
Adjusted R2 =1 –

n-1
n-2
n-k-1 n-k-2

n+1
n

(1- R2)

(9)

where ‘n’ represents the sample size and ‘k’ stands for the number of independent
variables.
This test yielded adjusted R2 of .995 which was close to the SPPS-determined R2 of .997,
a further indication that the cross validity of this model was good.
Similarly, the ANOVA result of the test whether the MTB model significantly
predicted the outcome better than the mean was presented in Table 22. When only control
variables were included in the model, the MTB was strongly predicted by these control
variables, F(6,64) = 3653.06, significant, p < .001. The inclusion of the CSR scores (the
independent variables) into the MTB model did not yield a meaningful improvement in
the explained variation, R2 change = .000, F(5,59) = 1.18, p = .33. This was interpreted to
mean that the observed marginal improvement in the F ratio, resulting from the inclusion
of the CSR scores into the MTB regression model could have occurred by chance.
In summary, when the model included only the control variables, it strongly
predicted the MTB F(6,64) = 3653.06, p < .001 (significant). Again, when the model
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included both the control variables and the criterion variables (the CSR factors), F(11,59)
= 1.8, p < .001 (significant). This was interpreted to mean that the inclusion of the CSR
factors into the MTB model did not yield meaning improvement in the regression model.
Table 22
Evaluating the ANOVA Values of MTB Model

Model
Regression
1 Residual
Total
Regression
2 Residual
Total

ANOVA
Sum of Squares df Mean Square
F
19.745
6
3.291 3653.056
.058 64
.001
19.803 70
19.751 11
1.796 2021.017
.052 59
.001
19.803 70

Sig.
.000

.000

Test of Autocorrelation in the MTB model.
The Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.3 shown in Table 19 is indicative of the presence
or absence of autocorrelation in the data. The statistic represented a measure of the extent
of autocorrelation in the data used in the testing of the model. As stated earlier, DurbinWatson statistic lying between 1 and 3 or being close to 2 showed absence of
autocorrelation. The Durbin-Watson statistic in the MTB model of 2.3 lied between 1 and
3 and was also close to 2, suggesting lack of autocorrelation in the data.
Evaluating the parameters in the MTB model.
The parameters in the MTB model, including the beta and correlation coefficients,
were evaluated. The summary of the coefficients for each of the variables in the MTB
model is presented in Table 23.
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Table 23
Coefficients in the MTB Model
Model

Unstandardized
Coefficients
B

(Constant)
LogTotAsset
ASSETGRTH
CAPEXR
Leverage
LogME
MTBt-1
COMscore
GOVscore
DIVscore
EMPRscore
PRODscore

-.107
.002
-.050
1.78
-.170
-.002
1.008
.014
.066
.013
.019
-.004

Std.
Error
.168
.004
.076
.631
.102
.003
.009
.026
.032
.020
.035
.037

Std.
Coefficients
Beta

.004
-.006
.024
-.015
-.004
1.013
.004
.020
.005
.004
-.001

t

-.636
.577
-.654
2.814
-1.670
-.512
109.884
.551
2.091
.652
.546
-.098

Sig.

.527
.566
.515
.007
.100
.611
.000
.584
.041
.517
.587
.922

95.0% Confidence
Interval for B
Lower
Bound
-.443
-.005
-.201
.513
-.373
-.008
.990
-.037
.003
-.027
-.050
-.077

Correlations

Collinearity
Statistics

Upper
Zero- Partial Part ToleBound
order
rance
.229
.010 -.006
.075 .004 .941
.102 .501
-.085 -.004 .601
3.039 -.373
.344 .019 .639
.034 -.035
-.212 -.011 .585
.005 .267
-.066 -.003 .726
1.026 .998
.998 .736 .528
.065 .072
.292 .004 .731
.129 -.122
.263 .014 .515
.053 -.039
.085 .004 .829
.088 -.037
.071 .004 .850
.070 .060
-.013 -.001 .726

The regression coefficients in the Table 21 were substituted in the MTB model producing the following equation:
MTB = - 0.107 + 0.004LogCOMscore + 0.02LogGOVscore + 0.005LogDIVscore +
0.004LogEMPRscore - 0.001LogPRODscore +0.004LogTotAssett - 0.004Lev
- 0.01AssetGrowth + 1.01MTBt-1 + 0.02CapexR - 0.004LogME

VIF

1.063
1.665
1.564
1.709
1.378
1.894
1.369
1.942
1.207
1.177
1.378
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The MTB model showed that among the CSR factors only the PRODscore had
negative standardized beta, implying that efforts made to improve the product scores
would hurt MTB. The standardized beta values of COMscore, GOVscore, DIVscore and
EMPRscore were all positive with the implication that greater efforts to improve these
social factors might pay off with improvement in the MTB. The model showed a
significant beta value of the GOVscore social factor, t = 2.09, p = 0.04 (significant). The t
score of the other social factors (COMscore, GOVscore, DIVscore, EMPRscore and
PRODscore) were not significant, p > .05 respectively.
Like EBITDA margin model, the MTB model also showed that AssetGrowth,
Leverage, and ME had negative beta values, implying negative relationship with MTB,
while TotAsset, MTBt-1 and CapexR had positive relationships. The coefficient of
previous MTB was also significant and this was unlikely to be due to chance, with t =
109.88, p = <.001. Also the standardized beta value of CapexR is equally significantly
different from 0, with t = 2.81, p = .01. The t scores of the coefficients of the other
control variables (TotAsset, AssetGrowth, Leverage, and ME) were not significant, with
p > .05, suggesting that their beta coefficients might be due to chances and not
significantly different from 0. Finally, the alpha value of the model (β0) is 0, with t = 0.64, p = .53 (not significant).
A review of the collinearity statistics in Table 21 showed that the largest VIF was
1.9 and the lowest tolerance was 0.52, which were within the required thresholds. This
implied that the data used for the testing of the MTB model was free from
multicollinearity.
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Evaluating the correlation coefficients in the MTB model.
The Pearson partial correlation coefficient was obtained for the MTB model. The
correlation coefficients for each of the variables including their p values were presented
in Table 16. As observed in the EBITDA margin model, the strongest relationship was
reported between MTB and MTBt-1, apparently because the two variables were an
extension of each other, r = .998, p < .001 (significant). Of the control variables,
AssetGrowth showed significantly high correlation with the MTB, r = .5, p < .001
(significant), CapexR showed moderate negative correlation with the MTB, r = -.37, p =
.001 (significant), while LogME showed moderate positive correlation with the MTB, r =
.27, p = .01 (significant). Amongst the criterion variables (the CSR factors), only
COMscore showed a low positive correlation with the MTB, r = .29, p = .01 (significant).
The other CSR factors (GOVscore, DIVscore, EMPRscore, and PRODscore) did not
show significant correlation with the MTB. Notwithstanding, GOVscore, DIVscore, and
EMPRscore showed negative correlation coefficients, implying a tendency to be
negatively related with the MTB.
The correlation coefficients presented in Table 24 did not show any correlation
coefficient (r) that is greater than .9, apart from the correlation coefficient of the MTB of
the current and the previous years. This also supported the fact that multicollinearity was
not present in the data.
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Table 24
Correlation Coefficients of MTB Model

MTB
LogTotAsset
Sig. (1-tailed)
ASSETGRTH
Sig. (1-tailed)
CAPEXR
Sig. (1-tailed)
Leverage
Sig. (1-tailed)
LogME
Sig. (1-tailed)
MTBt-1
Sig. (1-tailed)
COMscore
Sig. (1-tailed)
GOVscore
Sig. (1-tailed)
DIVscore
Sig. (1-tailed)

EBITDA
Mgn
1.000
-0.006
0.481
0.501
0
-0.373
0.001
-0.035
0.387
0.267
0.012
0.998
0
0.292
0.007
-0.122
0.155
-0.039
0.374

LogTot ASSET CAP
Asset
GRTH EXR

Lev

LogME

MTBt-1 COM GOV DIV
score score score

1.000
-0.031
0.398
-0.135
0.131
-0.176
0.071
0.037
0.38
-0.01
0.468
-0.045
0.355
0.078
0.26
-0.079
0.256

1.000
-0.306
0.005
-0.182
0.064
0.299
0.006
0.505
0
0.102
0.199
0.006
0.481
0.072
0.274

1.000
0.357
0.001
-0.033
0.394
-0.385
0
-0.026
0.415
-0.148
0.11
0.015
0.45

1.000
-0.295
0.006
-0.024
0.421
0.118
0.164
-0.38
0.001
0.142
0.119

1.000
0.265
0.013
-0.09
0.227
0.076
0.264
-0.104
0.194

1.000
0.293
0.007
-0.138
0.125
-0.035
0.387

1.000
-0.403 1.000
0.055 -0.354 1.000
0.323 0.001

EMPR PROD
score
score
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EMPRscore
Sig. (1-tailed)
PRODscore
Sig. (1-tailed)

-0.037
0.381
0.06
0.308

-0.078
0.258
0.081
0.251

-0.172
0.076
-0.159
0.093

-0.061
0.305
-0.024
0.42

0.178
0.069
0.033
0.392

0.017
0.444
0.034
0.39

-0.037
0.378
0.055
0.325

0.077
0.262
-0.195
0.052

0.029
0.404
0.387
0

-0.02 1,000
0.435
-0.178 -0.015
0.069 0.451

1,000
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The effect size of the variables that reported effect in the testing of the MTB
model was presented in Table 25. No significant effect was found in the remaining
variables.
Table 25
Determination of Effect Size in the MTB Model
Variable
MTBprev
AssetGrowth

r

Effect Size

.998 Large
.50 Large

CapexR

-.37 Medium

LogME

.27 Medium

COMscore

.29 Medium

PRODscore

.10 Small

Evaluation of homogeneity of variance assumption in the MTB model.
In Table 26, I presented the Levene statistics for the MTB model based on the
three measures of central tendency. The Levene’s statistic of the mean of the distribution
is not significant, Levene’s statistic = 1.83, p = .17. So, the assumption of homogeneity of
variance was not violated in the model.
Table 26
Levene Test of Homogeneity of Variance

MTB

Based on Mean

Levene
df1
Statistic
1.826 2

df2

Sig.
66

.169
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Based on Median
Based on Median and with adjusted df
Based on trimmed mean

1.818
1.818
1.872

2
2
2

66
42.322
66

.170
.175
.162

Evaluation of homoscedasticity assumption in the MTB model.
Following Field’s (2009) suggestion, I constructed a scatter plot of ZRSID against
the ZPRED which is shown in Figure 6. The dots in the figure appeared random and the
graph did not funnel out, confirming that the assumption of homoscedasticity was met in
this data.

Figure 6. Plot of *ZRESID against *ZPRED for MTB OLS Regression Model
Test of linearity assumption in the MTB model.
A review of the dots in the Figure 3 did not reveal any curve pattern or curvilinear
relationship between the *ZRESID and *ZPRED. This suggests that the linearity
assumption made on the MTB regression model was not violated.
Evaluation of normality assumption in the MTB model.
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I used both graphical and quantitative approaches to test the normality of the data
used for the MTB model. The Figure 7 below is the histogram with a fitted normal curve
for the MTB distribution. The fitted curve reflects normal bell-shaped curve, implying
that the distribution followed normal distribution with mean of 0 and standard deviation
of 1.

Figure 7. Histogram of the normally distributed residuals for the MTB distribution OLS
model
The normal P-P plot of the regression standardized residuals equally showed
evidence of normal distribution for the MTB. The normal P-P plot for the MTB
dependent variable is shown in Figure 8.
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Figure 8. Normal P-P Plot of the expected against the observed cumulated probability for
the MTB OLS Model
The individual skewness and kurtosis of MTB and the predictors (CSR scores)
were not too far from 0, and their ZSkewness and ZKurtosis were also within the
standard score of +/-2.58 applicable to the medium size sample of this study. This was a
testament that the distributions of the data relating to the dependent and the independent
variables of the MTB model followed normal distributions. The skewness and kurtosis as
well as their standard scores for each of the variables relevant to the MTB model were
presented in Table 27.
Table 27
Test of Normality: Standard Scores of Skewness and Kurtosis
Skewness Kurtosis
MTB

0.675

S.E.
S.E.
ZSkewness ZKurtosis
Skewness Kurtosis
0.255
0.285
0.563
2.368
0.453
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COC
COMscore
GOVscore
DIVscore
EMPRscore
PRODscore

0.615
0.126
-0.733
0.450
-0.491
-0.287

0.282
-0.346
0.943
-0.418
-0.282
0.564

0.285
0.285
0.285
0.285
0.285
0.285

0.563
0.563
0.563
0.563
0.563
0.563

2.158
0.442
-2.572
1.579
-1.723
-1.007

0.501
-0.615
1.675
-0.742
-0.501
1.002

A further test of Kolmogorov-Smirnov and that of Shapiro-Wilk were performed
to quantitatively evaluate the extent of compliance with the assumption of normality of
distribution. The outcome of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests of
normality for MTB model was detailed in Table 28. The statistics of both KolmogorovSmirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests were not significant (p > .05) for MTB against each of
the criterion variables. This implied that the distributions of the MTB and the CSR scores
were normal.
Table 28
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk Tests of Normality

MTB

Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Shapiro-Wilk
Statistic
df
Sig.
Statistic
df
0.092
71
.200
0.975
71
COMscore
GOVscore
0.111
71
.200
0.951
71
0.136
71
.200
0.914
71
DIVscore
0.166
71
.200
0.908
71
EMPRscore
0.113
71
0.08
0.887
71
PRODscore

Sig.
0.642
0.284
0.208
0.08
0.06

Hypothesis 2: Individual CSR Factors and Cost of Capital
The second hypothesis of the study, focused on the relation between the
individual CSR factors and the cost of capital is restated as follows:
H02: Individual CSR factors of banks cannot predict the banks’ cost of capital.

154
Ha2: Individual CSR factors of banks can predict the banks’ cost of capital.
This hypothesis addressed the second research question through the use of multifactor
regression model, testing the impact of each CSR component separately on the cost of
capital. The cost of capital used was based on Fama-French three-factor (FF3F) model
that factored three different risk factors of market risk premium (MRP), size (SMB) and
value (HML) into the rates of return required by investors. The objective of the
hypothesis was to assess the effect of the individual CSR factors on the cost of capital of
a bank as a measure of financial performance. In chapters 1 and 3, I specified the
regression model represented by the Equation (10) below to test Hypothesis 2.
FF3FCOCit = β0 + β1jCSRijt-1 + β2LogTotAssett + β3LEVERAGE +
β4ASSETGRTH + β5EBITDAMgn + β6MTB +
β7CAPEXR +β8LogME + ɛit

(10)

where,
Subscripts

=

Index of bank i, time t, and CSR component j

FF3FCOCit

=

Cost of capital calculated using Fama-French three-factor
approach

β0

=

Model intercept

β1j

=

Slope of CSR component j

CSRijt-1

=

Lagged rating score of CSR component j

MTB

=

Current period’s MTB ratio

EBITDAMGN

=

EBITDA margin
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LogTotAsset

=

Natural logarithm of total assets.

Leverage

=

Ratio of debt to total asset, measuring leverage ratio.

AssetGrth

=

Ratio of total asset in the current period to the total
assets during the preceding period.

CapexR

=

Ratio of capital expenditure to total asset to measure
management preference.

Log_ME

=

Natural logarithm of market capitalization

ɛit

=

Stochastic error term, assumed to be independent and
insignificant, with a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1.

The underlying research question that led to this hypothesis is: To what extent can the
individual CSR factors of a bank predict the bank’s cost of capital, controlling for the
effects of bank unique and management preference factors? I lagged the CSR factors by
1 year in order to support my claim that the individual CSR factors in a prior period
Granger-influences the firm’s cost of capital in the subsequent period.
Evaluating the FF3FCOC (Fama-French three-factor cost of capital) model.
In Hypothesis 2, I sought to test whether individual CSR scores could predict the
cost of capital when the firm unique factors and management preference factors were
controlled. As I did in the testing of the Hypothesis 1, I equally adopted hierarchical
block entry and forced entry approaches to input the variables into the SPSS linear
regression in order to isolate the confounding effects of the control variables on the
FF3FCOC. A multiple regression analysis was conducted in two unordered steps: the first
step involved the control variables of MTB, LogTotAsset, Leverage, EBITDAMgn,
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LogME, ASSETGRTH, and CAPEXR, while the second step involved the CSR scores of
DIVscore, PRODscore, EMPRscore, COMscore, and GOVscore. The summary of the
regression model, the ANOVA details, and the bivariate and partial correlations of the
predictors are detailed in Table 29, Table 30, and Table 31 respectively.
Table 29
FF3FCOC Regression Model: Model Summary
Model Summary
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R

Std. Error of

Square

the Estimate

Change Statistics
R Square

F Change

df1

Durbin-

df2

Change
1
2

Watson

Change

a

.375

.305

.0204379

.375

5.390

7

63

.000

b

.414

.286

.0207152

.039

.665

5

58

.042

.612
.639

Sig. F

2.029

a. Predictors: (Constant), MTB, LogTotAsset, Leverage, EBITDAMgn, LogME, ASSETGRTH, CAPEXR
b. Predictors: (Constant), MTB, LogTotAsset, Leverage, EBITDAMgn, LogME, ASSETGRTH, CAPEXR, DIVscore,
PRODscore, EMPRscore, COMscore, GOVscore
c. Dependent Variable: FF3FCOC

Table 30
FF3FCOC Regression Model: ANOVA
Step

Sum of Squares
Df
Mean Square
F
Sig.
Regression
.016
7
.002 5.390 .000
1
Residual
.026
63
.000
Total
.042
70
Regression
.017
12
.001 3.338 .001
2
Residual
.025
58
.000
Total
.042
70
Note: Step 1 contains the dependent variable (FF3FCOC) and the control
variables (MTB, LogTotAsset, Leverage, EBITDAMgn, LogME,
ASSETGRTH, CAPEXR) while Step 2 contains the variables under Step 1
and the CSR factors (DIVscore, PRODscore, EMPRscore, COMscore,
GOVscore).
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Table 31
Bivariate and Partial Correlations of the Predictors with FF3FCOC
Predictors

LogTotAsset
ASSETGRTH
CAPEXR
Leverage
LogME
EBITDAMgn
MTB
COMscore
GOVscore
DIVscore
EMPRscore
PRODscore

Correlation between
each predictor and the
FF3FCOC (zero order)
.008
-.167
-.102
-.339
.221
.314
-.148
-.134
.228
-.162
-.094
.107

Correlation between each predictor
and the FF3FCOC controlling for all
other predictors
-.019
-.196
-.215
-.131
.256
.385
-.238
.073
.038
-.085
-.141
.013

As shown in the Table 29 and the Table 30 the linear combination of the 12
control and predictor variables was significantly related to the FF3FCOC, R2 = .41,
adjusted R2 = .29, F(12,58) = 3.34, p < .05. The control variables predicted significantly
over and above the CSR scores, R2 = .37, F(7,63) = 5.39, p < .001. Also, the CSR scores
equally predicted significantly after partialling out the effects of the control variables, R2
change = .04, F(5,58) = .66, p = .04. Based on these results, the CSR scores appear to
offer significant additional predictive power beyond that contributed by the control
variables, with additional 3.9% variations in FF3FCOC explained by the CSR scores.
Similarly, the ANOVA result of the test whether the FF3FCOC model
significantly predicted the outcome better than the mean was presented in Table 30.

158
When only control variables were included in the model (i.e. step 1), the FF3FCOC was
strongly predicted by these control variables, F(7,63) = 5.39, p < .001. The inclusion of
the CSR scores (the independent variables in to the model) led to some improvement in
the explained variation, F(5,58) = .66, significant, p = .04. This was interpreted to mean
that the observed improvement resulting from the inclusion of the CSR scores into the
regression model could not have occurred by chance.
LogME and EBITDAMgn were strongly positively related to the FF3FCOC with
significant positive bivariate and partial correlation coefficients. Leverage was strongly
negatively related to FF3FCOC only under bivariate correlation while CAPEXR and
MTB were strongly negatively related to FF3FCOC only under partial correlation.
LogTotAsset and ASSETGRTH did not show strong relationship with FF3FCOC either
under bivariate correlation or partial correlation.
I also performed the test of cross-validity of the FF3FCOC model by calculating
the Adjusted R2 using Stein’s formula:
Adjusted R2 =1 –

n-1
n-2
n-k-1 n-k-2

n+1
n

(1- R2)

(11)

where ‘n’ represents the sample size and ‘k’ stands for the number of independent
variables. This test yielded adjusted R2 of.27 which was close to the SPPS-determined
adjusted R2 of .30, an indication that the cross validity of this model was good.
In the Table 29 Durbin-Watson statistic was shown as 2.03, representing the
measure of the extent of autocorrelation in the data used in the testing of the FF3FCOC
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model. As stated earlier, Durbin-Watson statistic lying between 1 and 3 or being close to
2 showed absence of autocorrelation. The Durbin-Watson statistic in the FF3FCOC
model of 2.03 lied between 1 and 3 and was also close to 2, indicating that the
assumption of absence of autocorrelation in the data was not violated.
Evaluating the parameters in the FF3FCOC model.
The parameters in the FF3FCOC model, including the beta and correlation
coefficients, were evaluated. The summary of the coefficients for each of the variables in
the FF3FCOC model is shown in Table 32.
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Table 32
Coefficients in the FF3FCOC Model
Model

Unstandardized
Coefficients
B

(Constant)
LogTotAsset
ASSETGRTH
CAPEXR
Leverage
LogME
EBITDAMgn
MTB
COMscore
GOVscore
DIVscore
EMPRscore
PRODscore

.120
-.001
-.102
-.947
-.092
.006
.054
-.016
.013
.008
-.012
-.033
.003

Std.
Error
.118
.003
.053
.444
.071
.002
.014
.007
.018
.022
.014
.024
.025

Std.
Coefficients

t

Sig.

Beta
-.020
-.253
-.273
-.172
.301
.420
-.340
.086
.053
-.094
-.153
.015

1.017
-.190
-1.945
-2.133
-1.300
2.539
3.812
-2.356
.724
.378
-.846
-1.394
.128

.313
.850
.057
.037
.199
.014
.000
.022
.472
.007
.401
.169
.899

95.0% Confidence
Interval for B
Lower
Bound
-.116
-.006
-.208
-1.836
-.233
.001
.025
-.029
-.023
-.036
-.040
-.082
-.048

Correlations

Collinearity
Statistics

Upper
Zero- Partial Part ToleBound
order
rance
.356
.005 .008
-.025 -.019 .908
.003 -.167
-.247 -.196 .603
-.058 -.102
-.270 -.215 .623
.050 -.339
-.168 -.131 .583
.011 .221
.316 .256 .725
.082 .314
.448 .385 .841
-.002 -.148
-.296 -.238 .490
.049 -.134
.095 .073 .719
.052 .050
.228 .038 .518
.016 -.162
-.110 -.085 .827
.015 -.094
-.180 -.141 .849
.054 .107
.017 .013 .724

VIF

1.102
1.659
1.604
1.714
1.380
1.190
2.039
1.391
1.931
1.210
1.178
1.381
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The regression coefficients in the Table 32 were substituted in the FF3FCOC model
yielding the following equation:
FF3FCOC = 0.12 + 0.09LogCOMscore + 0.05LogGOVscore - 0.09LogDIVscore
- 0.15LogEMPRscore + 0.02LogPRODscore - 0.02LogTotAssett 0.17Lev - 0.25AssetGrowth + 0.42EBITDAMgn - 0.34MTB 0.27CapexR + 0.30LogME

The FF3FCOC model showed that among the CSR factors, COMscore,
GOVscore, and PRODscore had positive standardized beta, implying that efforts made to
improve them would increase FF3FCOC and hurt financial performance. DIVscore and
EMPRscore had negative standardized beta, implying that efforts made to improve their
scores would reduce FF3FCOC and improve financial performance. Of all the CSR
factors, only GOVscore had a significant beta, t = .38, p = .01. Similarly, LogME and
EBITDAMgn had positive standardized beta, implying that increasing them would
increase the FF3FCOC and reduce financial performance while LogToTAsset,
ASSETGRTH, CAPEXR, Leverage, and MTB had negative standardized betas, implying
that increasing them would reduce FF3FCOC and improve the financial performance.
However, the beta values of LogToTAsset and Leverage were not significant, p > .05,
implying that their beta values were negligible. The standardized beta values of the
remaining control variables (ASSETGRTH, CAPEXR, LogME, EBITDAMgn and MTB)
had significant standardized beta, p < .05, implying that the betas were not negligible.
As shown in the Table 32, the largest VIF ranged between 1.1 and 2.04, with the
average of 1.48. These values were within the acceptable 2. The tolerance factor also
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ranged from 0.49 to 0.91 with an average of 0.70 which were above the minimum of 0.1.
These suggested that multicollinearity assumption in the FF3FCOC model was not
violated.
Evaluating the correlation coefficients in the FF3FCOC model.
The Pearson partial correlation coefficient was obtained for the FF3FCOC model.
Table 33 presented these correlation coefficients for each of the variables including their
p values. Significant partial correlations with FF3FCOC were recorded in EBITDAMgn
(r = .31, p = .004), Leverage (r = -.34, p = .002), LogME (r = .22, p = .03) and GOVscore
(r = .23, p = .03). The other variables showed no significant partial correlations with
FF3FCOC, p>.05. Of the four control variables with insignificant correlation coefficients,
only LogTotAsset had positive correlation coefficient while ASSETGRTH, CAPEXR,
and MTB had negative correlation coefficients. Out of the four CSR factors that had
insignificant correlation coefficients, only PRODscore had a positive correlation
coefficient while COMscore, DIVscore and EMPRscore had negative correlation
coefficients.
As shown in Table 33, the highest correlation coefficient (r) was .50 and none of
the variables had correlation coefficient that was greater than .9. Therefore, there was no
evidence that multicollinearity was present in the data.
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Table 33
Correlation Coefficients of FF3FCOC Model
FF3FCOC LogTotAsset
FF3FCOC
LogTotAsset
Sig. (1-tailed)
ASSETGRTH
Sig. (1-tailed)
CAPEXR
Sig. (1-tailed)
Leverage
Sig. (1-tailed)
LogME
Sig. (1-tailed)
EBITDAMgn
Sig. (1-tailed)
MTB
Sig. (1-tailed)
COMscore
Sig. (1-tailed)

1
0.008
0.474
-0.167
0.082
-0.102
0.199
-0.339
0.002
0.221
0.032
0.314
0.004
-0.148
0.109
-0.134
0.133

-0.031
0.398
-0.135
0.131
-0.176
0.071
0.037
0.38
-0.193
0.054
-0.006
0.481
-0.045
0.355

GOVscore

0.228

0.078

Sig. (1-tailed)

0.028

0.26

-0.162

-0.079

0.089

0.256

DIVscore
Sig. (1-tailed)

ASSETGRTH

CAPE
EBITDA
COM GOV DIV EMPR PROD
Leverage LogME
MTB
XR
Mgn
score score score score score

1
1
-0.306
0.005
-0.182
0.064
0.299
0.006
0.058
0.315
0.501
0
0.102
0.199

1
0.357
0.001
-0.033
0.394
0.089
0.231
-0.373
0.001
-0.026
0.415

-0.295
0.006
0.019
0.439
-0.035
0.387
0.118
0.164

0.057
0.319
0.267
0.012
-0.09
0.227

0.006 -0.148

-0.38

0.076

0.481

0.001

0.264

0.11

1
1

0.072 0.015

0.142 -0.104

0.274

0.119

0.45

0.194

1
0.242
1
0.021
-0.034 0.292
1
0.388 0.007
0.018
-0.403
1
0.122
0.441 0.155
0
0.022
0.055 -0.354
0.039
0.429 0.374 0.323 0.001

1
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EMPRscore
Sig. (1-tailed)
PRODscore
Sig. (1-tailed)

-0.094

-0.078

-0.172 -0.061

0.178

0.017

0.218
0.107
0.188

0.258
0.081
0.251

0.076 0.305
-0.159 -0.024
0.093 0.42

0.069
0.033
0.392

0.444
0.034
0.39

0.037
0.498 0.381
0.094 0.06
0.217 0.308
0

0.077 0.029

-0.02

1

0.262 0.404 0.435
-0.195 0.387 -0.178 -0.015
0.052
0 0.069 0.451

1
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I attempted to further measure the effect size of the model through the correlation
coefficients. The effect size of the variables that reported an effect in the testing of the
FF3FCOC model was presented in Table 34. Only LogTotAsset did not report an effect,
because its correlation coefficient was less than .1. As stated earlier, this followed Field’s
(2009, p. 57) suggestion that correlation coefficients stand for the effect size of the
regression model, with +-.1, +-.3, and +-.5 representing small effect, medium effect, and
large effect respectively.
Table 34
Determination of Effect Size in the FF3FCOC Model
Variable
EBITDAMgn
Leverage
GOVscore
LogME
PRODscore
EMPRscore
CAPEXR
COMscore
MTB
DIVscore
ASSETGRTH

Correlation Coefficient
0.3
-0.3
0.2
0.2
0.1
-0.1
-0.1
-0.1
-0.1
-0.2
-0.2

Effect Size
Medium
Medium
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small

Evaluation of homogeneity of variance assumption in the FF3FCOC model.
The assumption of homogeneity of variance was tested and was found not to be
violated. Based on the mean, Levene statistic = 0.14, p = .87 (not significant). The
Levene statistics for FF3FCOC model based on the three measures of central tendency
were presented in Table 35.
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Table 35
Levene Test of Homogeneity of Variance

FF3FCOC

Based on Mean
Based on Median
Based on Median and with adjusted df
Based on trimmed mean

Levene df1
df2
Sig.
Statistic
.140
2
66 .870
.120
2
66 .887
.120
2 62.253 .887
.082
2
66 .922

Evaluation of homoscedasticity assumption in the MTB model.
A scatter plot of ZRSID against the ZPRED was depicted in Figure 9. There
appeared to be no clear pattern in the dots contained in the figure and the graph did not
funnel out, suggesting that the assumption of homoscedasticity was met in this data.

Figure 9. Plot of *ZRESID against *ZPRED of FF3FCOC OLS Model
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Test of linearity assumption in the FF3FCOC model.
The dots in the Figure 9 did not reveal any curve pattern or curvilinear
relationship between the *ZRESID and *ZPRED. Based on Field’s (2009, p. 247)
suggestion, the absence of curvilinear relationship in the graph is indicative that the
linearity assumption made on the FF3FCOC regression model was not violated.
Evaluation of normality assumption in the FF3FCOC model.
Like I did in the earlier models, both graphical and quantitative approaches were
adopted to test the assumption of normality of the data used for FF3FCOC model. The
histogram in Figure 10 showed a normal bell-shaped curve, suggesting that the
distribution followed normal distribution with mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1.

Figure 10. Histogram of normally distributed residuals for FF3FCOC’s OLS Model
The normal P-P plot of the regression standardized residuals is shown in Figure
11, with evidence that the dots, representing the residuals, clustered around the regression
line for the FF3FCOC criterion variable.
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Figure 11. The normal P-P Plot of expected against observed cumulative probability of
FF3FCOC OLS Model.
The individual skewness and kurtosis of FF3FCOC and the independent variables
(CSR scores) were not too far from 0, and their ZSkewness and ZKurtosis were also
within the standard score of +/-2.58, which was applicable to the medium size sample of
this study. The distributions of the data relating to the dependent and the independent
variables of the FF3FCOC model therefore followed normal distributions. The skewness
and kurtosis as well as their standard scores for each of the variables relevant to the
FF3FCOC model are presented in Table 36.
Table 36
Test of Normality: Standard Scores of Skewness and Kurtosis
Skewness Kurtosis
COC
COMscore
GOVscore
DIVscore
EMPRscore
PRODscore

0.615
0.126
-0.733
0.450
-0.491
-0.287

0.282
-0.346
0.943
-0.418
-0.282
0.564

S.E.
S.E.
ZSkewness ZKurtosis
Skewness Kurtosis
0.285
0.563
2.158
0.501
0.285
0.563
0.442
-0.615
0.285
0.563
-2.572
1.675
0.285
0.563
1.579
-0.742
0.285
0.563
-1.723
-0.501
0.285
0.563
-1.007
1.002
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In line with Field’s (2009) suggestion, I performed a further quantitative test of
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and that of Shapiro-Wilk to evaluate the extent of compliance with
the assumption of normality of distribution. The results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and
Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality for FF3FCOC model were presented in Table 37. The
statistics of both Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests were not significant (p >
.05) for FF3FCOC against each of the criterion variables, a further indication that the
distributions of the FF3FCOC and the CSR scores were normal.
Table 37
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk Tests of Normality

FF3FCOC

Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Shapiro-Wilk
Statistic
df
Sig.
Statistic
df
0.087
71
.200
0.961
32
COMscore
GOVscore
0.079
71
.200
0.966
40
0.162
71
.200
0.921
13
DIVscore
0.081
71
.200
0.96
49
EMPRscore
0.077
71
.200
0.967
68
PRODscore

Sig.
0.293
0.26
0.261
0.091
0.064

Summary
The results of my research were presented in this chapter, with the aim of
answering the two research questions posed at the beginning of the chapter. Centrally, I
sought to ascertain if financial performance, however defined, could be predicted by
corporate social conduct.
In the context of the US banking sector, my first research question was: to what
extent can the individual CSR factors of a bank predict the bank’s accounting
performance when the effects of the bank unique and management preference factors are
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controlled? In analyzing this question, two-pronged approach was adopted: first,
financial performance was taken to mean EBITDA margin, a purely book based
parameter, and second, financial performance was taken to mean MTB ratio, a mixed
based parameter.
The result of my hypothesis testing showed that the individual CSR scores on
community, governance, diversity, employee relation, and product did not predict
EBITDA margin significantly over and above the specified control variables. Only 0.1%
additional variation in EBITDA margin was attributed to the CSR scores, which was not
significant at 5% significant level. Therefore the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in
favour of the alternative hypothesis at 5% significant level. However, I found negative
relationship between community and product factors and EBITDA margin and positive
relationship between governance, diversity, and employee relation and EBITDA margin.
Similarly, when the financial performance was taken to mean the MTB, my
hypothesis testing showed that the individual CSR scores on community, governance,
diversity, employee relation, and product still did not predict MTB significantly after
controlling the effects of the specified confounding variables. The CSR factors could not
explain any meaningful amount of the variation in the MTB. Therefore, the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis at 5% significant
level. Notwithstanding, I found that governance had a strong predictive influence on
MTB because it showed a standardized beta that was significant, t = 2.09, p = .04. I also
found that community and governance were significantly positively related with MTB, r
= .29 and r = .23 respectively, p <.05. The analysis also showed that diversity and
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employee relation had positive relationship with MTB while product was negatively
related with MTB.
The second question was whether the individual CSR factors of banks could help
in predicting the banks’ cost of capital. My data analysis showed that the CSR scores
could significantly predict FF3FCOC after partialling out the effects of the control
variables, as significant variation of 3.9% in FF3FCOC was explained by these factors.
Therefore, the null hypothesis should be rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis at
5% significant level. Further analysis showed that, of all the CSR scores, only GOVscore
had a significant beta parameter (B = .05), t = .38, p = .01. GOVscore was also
significantly associated with the FF4FCOC, r = .23, p = .03. GOVscore therefore
accounted for the observed significant variations in FF3FCOC explained by the CSR
scores. I equally found that COMscore, GOVscore, and PRODscore were positively
associated with FF3FCOC while DIVscore and EMPRscore were negatively associated
with the FF3FCOC.
In chapter 5, I provided a detailed discussion of these findings, with the
explanation of the supportive facts on the outcome. I also discussed these findings in the
context of the literature and suggested a direction for future research on the topic.
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Chapter 5: Discussions, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Summary of Findings
In this quantitative study, I examined the relationship between corporate social
responsibility and financial performance of large banks in the United States, using the
data from 2011 to 2014. The aim of the study was to examine the effect of the individual
CSR factors on the financial performance measures with a view to measuring the extent
to which social conduct could predict financial performance. The increasing pressure on
the financial institutions following the 2007-2008 subprime mortgage crises that led to
global economic meltdown compelled them to aggressively embark on social conduct
activities. But whether social activities could stimulate the bottom line was a question
that was yet to be resolved by researchers. The purpose of the study, being relational in
nature, necessitated the adoption of a correlational strategy for the investigation. In order
to fulfill the purpose of the research I proposed two research questions:
1. To what extent can the individual CSR components predict the bank accounting
performance, controlling for the effects of the bank unique and management
preference factors?
2. To what extent can the individual CSR components of banks help in predicting
the banks’ cost of capital, controlling for the effects of the bank unique and
management preference factors?
The individual CSR factors examined included community factor, governance
factor, diversity factor, employee relation factor, and product factor. In order to broaden
the scope of the research, a bidimensional view was taken of the accounting performance
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in the Research Question 1: a purely book-based approach using EBITDA margin and a
mixed measure approach using MTB ratio. The cost of capital focused on in the Research
Question 2 was also a measure of financial performance, connoting an inverse
interpretation, i.e., a higher cost of capital means lower financial performance while a
lower cost of capital implies higher financial performance.
In the first research question, the findings revealed that CSR factors did not
significantly predict the book-based accounting returns. Only 0.1% of the variation in the
EBITDA margin was predicted by the CSR components and this contribution was not
statistically significant at 5% significance level. The confounding factors controlled in the
model (previous year EBITDA margin, leverage, asset growth, total asset, market
capitalization, and capital expenditure) did explain 96.6% of the variation in the current
year EBITDA margin, F(6,64) = 300.34, p < .001, significant. The results showed further
that none of the five CSR factors studied had any significant influence on the bookedbased accounting return. However, the CSR factors behaved differently with regard to the
accounting return. While governance, diversity and employee relation factors showed
positive relation with EBITDA margin, community and product factors were negatively
related with the book-based accounting return, though insignificantly. An implication of
these findings was that bank business managers might not be able to improve their bookbased accounting returns significantly by doing good, suggesting further that efforts made
and the resources expended to improve social conduct by business managers were not
rewarded with improved book-based accounting returns. I provided further explanation of
this implication in subsequent section of this chapter. Similarly, the results also showed

174
that the CSR factors did not predict the mixed-based accounting returns significantly, as
no meaningful variation in MTB was explained by the CSR factors. The controlled
confounding factors explained 99.7% of the variations in the MTB, which was
statistically significant. However, governance factor not only displayed a strong positive
influence on the MTB, measured by the size of the standardized beta, (t = 2.09, p < .05,
significant), it was also positively related to MTB (though low correlation). As in
EBITDA margin, governance, diversity, and employee relations showed positive relation
with the MTB while product showed negative relation with the MTB. But this time
around community showed positive relation with the MTB. An implication of this finding
was that business managers would not be able to manipulate social conduct to improve
their accounting performance, apart from governance factor. This implies that corporate
governance is a factor that needs to be recon with while strategizing to improve the
bottom line. Further discussions on these findings were provided in the later sections.
The findings on the Research Question 2 differed from those of the Research
Question 1. CSR factors predicted Fama-French cost of capital significantly. FamaFrench cost of capital is a purely market-revealed measure of performance. The CSR
factors explained 3.9% of the variations in the cost of capital, which was statistically
significant, p < .05. Like in the case of MTB, governance displayed strong positive
influence on the cost of capital and therefore largely accounted for the variation
explained by the CSR factors. Furthermore, community, governance, and product were
positively related to cost of capital while diversity and employee relation were negatively
related with cost of capital. An implication of these findings was that social conduct
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remained a critical factor that investors (shareholders) consider in their investment
strategies. Among all the CSR factors, corporate governance appeared to be at the
forefront of the social responsibility factors that shareholders used to screen their
investment decisions. The detailed discussion of the implications of these findings was
provided in the later section of the chapter.
In both research questions, the financial factors controlled in the study,
comprising previous year financial performance, management preference in the form of
capital expenditure in relation to the total assets, market capitalization, asset growth, and
total assets, dominated the prediction of the financial performance measures. This
suggests that managers should consider these factors as major determinants of financial
performance, and strategies should be formulated around them to optimize the bottom
line.
In the next section of this chapter, I provide the interpretation of the enumerated
findings. In this regard, I showed the findings that were consistent with the findings of
some prior researchers, those that diverged from the findings in the prior studies, as well
as those that were unique to this study. While interpreting these findings I was guided by
the differing interpretations provided by different researchers to similar findings, in order
to find a meaning for the findings in this study in the context of the literature. The
interpretation was also based on the Carol’s (1979) framework of the stakeholder theory
which provided a theoretical foundation for this study. The interpretation section was
followed by the description of the limitations of the study, the recommendations for
further research based on the prior and the current studies, the social change implications
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at the firm level, at the policy level, at the professional practice level, and at the societal
level. I then rounded off this report with the conclusion of the study, which provided the
central message that formed the critical essence of the research.
Interpretation of Research Findings
In this section, the discussion of the interpretation of findings was structured into
the overview of the literature relating to the findings of this study, interpretation of the
findings on each research question covering the model-level findings and factor-level
findings, relating the findings to the theoretical framework, and the implications of the
interpretations for the empirical literature and the theory.
Overview of the Literature Relating to the Findings
As stated earlier in Chapter 2, divergent findings were reported in the empirical
literature on the nature and the strength of the effects of the CSR activities on the
financial performance of business firms. The results of the prior empirical studies of the
effects of CSR on financial performance included those with strong positive effects, those
with strong negative effects, those with neutral effects, and those with mixed effects. This
study showed mixed effects of the CSR on the financial performance, depending on the
particular model tested. The interpretations of the findings were also not consistent.
Negative effect was interpreted to signify either the shareholders’ confidence in the firm
and their preparedness to accept lower returns in the short run or in alignment with their
private social responsibility values (Jenson, 2010) or to signify the presence of
managerial opportunism (Jiao, 2010).
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As observed in Chapter 1, the increasing pressure on banks after the 2007-2008
financial crisis, forced them to intensify social responsibility to bolster stakeholders’
confidence and redeem their image (Grove, Patelli, Victoravich, & Xu, 2011; Montiel &
Delgado-Ceballos, 2014). Orlitzky (2013) also shared the view that the stakeholder
orientation inherent in the CSR is a restraint to value maximization. These pessimistic
views on business engagement in social conduct seemed to be supported by the global
business leaders, who recently expressed skepticism in the CSR-business value link and
therefore questioned the continued championing of the sustainability drive by the
business sector (UN Global Compact & Accenture, 2013). These downcast views on CSR
suggest that business firms engaged in CSR activities not necessarily because they
believed it would help to improve their bottom line but as a reactive strategy either to
respond to an adverse development (like the need to restore stakeholders’ confidence
following the alleged role of the banking sector in the recent subprime crisis) or to
increase the provision of social goods so as to avoid the risk of being ostracized in the
industry. I interpreted the results of the analysis of the research questions proposed in this
study in the context of this multiperspective literature.
Research Question 1: Effect of CSR Factors on Accounting Returns
Research Question 1 asked: To what extent can the individual CSR components
predict the bank accounting returns, controlling for the effects of the bank unique and
management preference factors? The hypothesized individual CSR factors were
community, governance, diversity, employee relation, and product, while the accounting
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returns were taken as the EBITDA margin (booked based returns) in the first instance and
MTB ratio (mixed based return) in the second instance, each tested separately. Consistent
with the empirical literature on the effect of the CSR on the financial performance and
the insights from the stakeholder theory, I claimed that the CSR factors had significant
positive effect on the accounting returns.
In conflict with my claim, I found that CSR factors did not significantly predict
accounting returns, whether book-based or mixed measure. The model did not report any
significant effect of the CSR factors on the accounting returns measured by EBITDA
margin and MTB. This result was consistent with Soana (2011), in which no effect was
observed between the multidimensional CSR ratings and accounting returns including
ROA, ROE, CIR (cost to income ratio), MTB, and P/E ratio. The result was also
consistent with Dinsmore (2014) who did not find significant effect of CSR on the
financial performance in his study data. When no effect of CSR is observed on the
financial performance, it implies that CSR is irrelevant to the financial returns of the
business, which is consistent with the classical view of corporate social responsibility, as
argued by Friedman (1970) and supported by Jensen (2010). Friedman contended that
social responsibility and business are incompatible. If the two are incompatible, then CSR
should produce no significant effect on the financial performance of a business, as
revealed by the results of the Research Question 1. Research Question 1 supported the
classical theory of corporate social responsibility. The observation of no effect of social
conduct on financial performance also supported the pessimism expressed by some
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empirical researchers (Grove, et al. 2011; Montiel & Delgado-Ceballos, 2014; Orlitzky,
2013; UN Global Compact & Accenture, 2013).
Conversely, the result of the absence of the effect of CSR on the accounting
returns revealed by Research Question 1 was at variance with Servaes and Tamayo
(2013), Moura-Leite, Padgett, and Galan (2014), and Saeidi, et al. (2015). In these
studies, researchers found positive effects of the CSR factors on the accounting returns
including ROA, ROE, net profit margin, and ROI. The result also contradicted the
findings of Rahmawati & Dianita (2011) and Lioui & Sharma (2012), who found
negative effect of the CSR factors on the financial performance.
While examining the direction of the relationship of the individual CSR factors on
the financial performance, I found support for Lioui and Sharma’s (2012) observation
that not all the CSR activities have a positive effect on financial performance. In the
Research Question 1, I observed that the individual CSR factors behaved differently with
respect to either EBITDA margin or MTB. Governance had strong positive influence on
accounting return, particularly on MTB. This was consistent with the finding by
Rahmawati and Dianita (2011), who observed that weak corporate governance (e.g.,
aggressive earnings management) negatively affected financial performance, implying a
positive relationship. Also, in Research Question 1, diversity and employee relation were
positively associated with accounting return, consistent with Baird, et al. (2012) who
found that firms that invested in diversity and in their employees improved their financial
performance significantly. Product and community factors were negatively related to
accounting returns in Research Question 1.
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The effect of the control variables on the accounting returns was observed to be
noteworthy. The control variables whose effects were parceled out while analyzing the
Research Question 1 included asset volume, asset growth, capital expenditure/total asset
ratio, leverage ratio, market capitalization, and prior-year financial performance measure
(using the previous year’s EBITDA margin or MTB ratio if the dependent variable is
EBITDA margin or MTB ratio respectively). The result of the hierarchical unordered
regression analysis showed that these control variables accounted for virtually all the
variations in the accounting returns (96.6% of variations of EBITDA margin and 99.7%
of variations in MTB), with virtually no meaningful amount of variation left for the CSR
factors to explain. I interpreted this result to mean that control variables play more
significant roles in explaining the effects of the CSR factors on the measures of financial
performance. This position is consistent with the observation of Saeidi, et al. (2015) that
the direct testing of the CSR on financial performance of a firm seemed to be spurious
and imprecise, because of the many variables that have strong effects on a firm’s
financial performance. Further analysis revealed that not all the hypothesized control
variables had significant influence on the financial performance. When EBITDA margin
was used as a measure of the accounting return in the Research Question 1 of this study, I
found significant effect on financial performance by only asset volume (a measure of
size), t = 2.36, p = .02 (significant) and the previous year’s EBITDA margin, t = 40.19, p
< .001 (significant). Conversely, when MTB was used as a measure of the accounting
returns in the Research Question 1, I found significant effect on the financial performance
by capital expenditure/total asset ratio, t = 2.81, p = .01 (significant) and the previous
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year’s MTB, t = 109.88, p < .001 (significant). I interpreted these findings to mean that
asset volume being a measure of size, capital expenditure to total asset ratio and the
previous year’s financial performance are critical to the explanation of the variations in
the financial performance and should be adequately controlled in the studies involving
the testing of the effects of corporate social responsibility factors on the financial
performance of a firm. In either case, I did not find any significant effect of asset growth,
leverage ratio, and market capitalization on the either measures of accounting return
(EBITDA margin and MTB).
In summary, I did not find a strong effect of the CSR factors on the accounting
financial performance measures in this study, which was both consistent with some
studies and also contrary to many others. Governance did stand out among all the CSR
factors hypothesized in this study and showed a strong influence on the accounting
return. This explains why Jensen (2010) was apprehensive that managerial opportunism
might be responsible for the observed aggressive engagement in social conduct by
business firms. This is also in consonance with Jiraporn and Chintrakarn’s (2013)
observation that CEOs commit resources to CSR for selfish reasons such as to gain more
power. Furthermore, the hypothesized control variables comprising asset volume, ratio of
capital expenditure to total assets, and the previous year accounting returns accounted for
an overwhelming proportion of the variations in the accounting returns, while the
remaining variables asset growth, market capitalization, and leverage did not show any
significant effect on the accounting returns.
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Overall, the observation of no effect of social conduct on the financial
performance supported the pessimism jointly expressed by researchers (Grove, et al.
2011; Montiel & Delgado-Ceballos, 2014; Orlitzky, 2013) and the global business
leaders (UN Global Compact & Accenture, 2013). The result of the analysis of Research
Question 2 showed how the investors reacted to the managerial involvement in the
provision of social goods with no assurance of impacting positively on the bottom line of
the business.
Research Question 2: CSR Factors and Cost of Capital
The Research Question 2 asked: To what extent can the individual CSR factors of
a bank predict the bank’s cost of capital, controlling for the effects of bank unique and
management preference factors? The bank unique factors controlled while analyzing this
research question included MTB ratio, total asset volume, asset growth, leverage,
EBITDA margin, and market capitalization, while the management preference factor
hypothesized was the ratio of capital expenditure to total asset. Based on the prevalent
findings in the empirical literature (Cajias et al. 2014; Campbell et al. 2012; Ghoul et al.
2011; Gregory et al. 2014; Hajiha & Sarfaraz, 2013; Sun & Cui, 2014), I proposed in this
research question that individual CSR factors could significantly predict cost of capital, a
market-based measure of financial performance, and increased CSR activities should
result in lower financing cost and greater value to the company.
The result of the investigation partially affirmed the proposition. I observed that
the CSR factors could strongly predict the cost of capital of banks when the confounding
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effects of the firm unique factors and the management preference factors were controlled.
This was consistent with the prior research findings that an investment in CSR could
enable the firms to raise equity finance at a cheaper rate or at a lower cost of capital
(Cajias et al. 2014; Campbell et al. 2012; Ghoul et al. 2011; Gregory et al. 2014; Hajiha
& Sarfaraz, 2013; Sun & Cui, 2014). In these studies, CSR factors were found to have
impacted cost of capital negatively which, by implication, meant that the CSR factors
positively influenced the financial performance. The significant explained variation
observed in the Fama-French cost of capital model in this study was attributed to the
substantial effect of governance factor, which displayed strong positive influence on the
cost of capital. Governance also showed a significant correlation with the Fama-French
cost of capital, though at a low level.
However, the result was not consistent with my proposition on the direction of the
effect of the CSR factors on the financing cost. Rather than showing a negative effect of
CSR factors on the cost of capital as expected, the results of the analysis of the Research
Question 2 revealed a positive effect of the CSR factors on the market-revealed cost of
capital. Hence, although the results of this study was in agreement with Cajias et al.
(2014), Campbell et al. (2012), Ghoul et al. (2011), Gregory et al. (2014), Hajiha and
Sarfaraz (2013), and Sun and Cui (2014) cited earlier in terms of the power of the
multiple regression models, the direction of the observed effect differed significantly.
While the researchers in the cited studies observed negative relationship between the
CSR factors and the cost of capital, the results of the Research Question 2 in this study
showed a positive effect of the CSR factors on the Fama-French cost of capital. Because I
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did not sight any study among the peer reviewed resources used in the literature review
with the result of the positive effect of the corporate social responsibility factors on the
cost of capital, I hereby claim that this finding is novel and unique in the studies of the
effect of CSR on cost of capital. Notwithstanding, this result calls for a careful
interpretation.
A positive relationship of the CSR factors with cost of capital implies negative
relationship with the market-based financial performance, translating to lower returns to
the company due to the higher financing cost. Relying on Jenson’s (2010) views on the
need to carefully interpret the outcome of regression models in the research involving
CSR activities and market-based financial performance, I interpreted the result of
Research Question 2 to mean that investors perceived higher risk from the hypothesized
banks that actively engaged in corporate social responsibilities and therefore demanded
higher returns to compensate them for possible indulgence in managerial opportunism,
which translated to higher cost of capital for the firm and, impliedly, lower profit. Jensen
(2010) contended that, by engaging in aggressive CSR, business managers might indulge
in extracting private benefits at the expense of the stockholders. Jiao (2010) attributed the
resultant negative effect of CSR activities on the financial performance, as obtained from
the outcome of the analysis of the Research Question 2, to managerial opportunism.
This further suggests that it is not to be taken for granted that investors would
place a premium on the CSR activities of firms as suggested by the prior literature (Cajias
et al. 2014; Campbell et al. 2012; Ghoul et al. 2011; Gregory et al. 2014; Hajiha &
Sarfaraz, 2013; Sun & Cui, 2014); they could also discount the social conduct
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particularly if they believed that the CSR activities did not align with the observable
fundamental drivers of business performance. I therefore claim that the effect of the CSR
activities of a firm on the firm’s market-based financial performance may not necessarily
be predicted reliably because such effect is largely determined by how the investors
perceive the managerial activities. Investors may value the firm’s social conduct and be
contented with lower returns on their investments, implying lower cost of capital for the
firm and higher profit for the firm. On the other hand, investors may equally discount
such social activities by demanding higher returns, implying higher cost of capital and
lower profits for the company. The latter situation therefore suggests lack of confidence
in the social activities, leading to the demand for a premium to compensate them for the
higher risk supposedly assumed. This view was consistent with the conclusion of Busch
and Hoffmann (2011), Becchetti, et al. (2013) and Baird, et al. (2012) who alluded to the
fact that when market based measures are adopted, CSR activities might go either way,
depending on the shareholders’ perception of the firms’ social conduct.
In terms of the direction of the relationship between the individual CSR factors
and the Fama-French cost of capital, I found that community, governance and product
were positively associated with the cost of capital while diversity and employee relations
were negatively related to the cost of capital. This suggests that shareholders penalized
the hypothesized banks with higher cost of financing for increasing community relations
activities, increasing their governance activities and improving and repositioning their
products, which the investors did not value. The investors therefore raised their required
rates of returns leading to higher cost of capital and lower profits for the hypothesized
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banks. The impact of the relationship revealed by these three factors seemed to have
explained the overall positive effect of the CSR factors on the Fama-French cost of
capital observed in the model analyzing Research Question 2.
Conversely, the shareholders valued the social activities that were focused on
improving the diversity and relations with the employees, as they believed such would
help to enhance the banks’ competitiveness and enable them to create value. They were
therefore willing to accept lower returns, translating to lower cost of capital for the
increased social conduct in diversity and employee relations activities. As noted earlier,
the different behavioral patterns of CSR factors on the financial performance appear to be
a common development (Lioui & Sharma, 2012).
Like I did under the Research Question 1, I also examined the effects of the
confounding variables controlled while analyzing the Research Question 2. As noted
earlier, these variables were MTB ratio, total asset volume, asset growth, leverage,
EBITDA margin, market capitalization, and the ratio of capital expenditure to total asset.
After performing the hierarchical unordered regression analysis on the data, I found that
these control variables accounted for a sizeable proportion of the variations in the FamaFrench cost of capital (37.5% of variations of the FF3F cost of capital). This result was
interpreted to mean that the hypothesized control variables play key roles in determining
the effects of the CSR factors on the measures of financial performance, further
confirming the earlier synthesis that the direct testing of the CSR on financial
performance of a firm appeared to be spurious and imprecise due to general influence of
control variables on a firm’s financial performance (Saeidi, et al. 2015). Further analysis
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revealed that not all the hypothesized control variables had significant influence on the
cost of capital. Showing significant influence on the Fama-French cost of capital were the
ratio of the capital expenditure to total asset, t = -2.13, p = .04 (significant), market
capitalization, t = 2.54, p = .01 (significant), EBITDA margin, t = 3.81, p <.001
(significant), and MTB ratio, t = -2.36, p = .02 (significant). Total asset volume, asset
growth, and leverage did not reveal any significant influence on the cost of capital.
Research Findings and the Theoretical Framework of the Study
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is alien to the Smithsonian economic
thoughts, as business corporations are obliged only to pursue profit making for their
owners (Friedman, 1970). This neoclassical theoretical perspective to CSR presupposes
that any benevolent attempt by business managers to render social service is classified as
unethical and amounts to a breach of the agency contract between the managers and the
business owners. Jenson (2010) reiterated that divergence from profit making goal to the
pursuit of social ends creates an opportunity for managers to move away from their radar
of control into seeking private benefits to the detriment of the stockholders and other
stakeholders of the business.
Stakeholder perspective was later conceived in a way to justify why doing good to
stakeholders is really good for the business. Freeman (1984) propounded the stakeholder
theory as a paradigm shift from the neoclassical socioeconomic thought. As a good
management theory, stakeholder theory is the proposition that engagement of business
firms in social activities enables them to create an enabling environment for the firms to
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gain competitive advantage and improve their bottom line (Busch & Hoffmann, 2011).
As explained in chapter 2, stakeholder theory is the dominating theory in the empirical
CSR literature. Leaning on the enlightened self-interest argument of the stakeholder
theory, Deng et al. (2013) found that the acquirer’s social performance is positively
related to merger performance, Orlitzky (2013) found evidence that corporations are
under increasing pressure to become more socially responsible, Jiao (2010) used the
theory to test if the stakeholder welfare impacts on the firm valuation, Busch and
Hoffmann (2011) tested if the climate change impacts on the financial performance of
firms, Lioui and Sharma (2012) examined the effects of environmental factors on the
profitability of a business, and Ghoul et al. (2011) examined the CSR impacts on the
financial risk of a company. On the strength of its popularity among researchers, I applied
the stakeholder theory to guide my study of the effects of the individual CSR factors on
the financial performance of banks in the United States. I provided below the
implications of my research findings for the stakeholder theory.
Stakeholder Theory: Interpretation of Findings on Research Question 1
Investigation of the effect of CSR factors on accounting returns revealed that CSR
factors cannot significantly predict the accounting returns, whether in terms of EBITDA
margin or MTB. This result of no effect therefore did not support the stakeholder theory.
Stakeholder theory is the perspective that business activities aimed at pleasing the
stakeholders should help the business to create competitive advantage and improve the
financial performance. The outcome of the investigation of the Research Question 1
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therefore aligns with the irrelevance theorem of social conduct for business firm. This
outcome therefore reinforces Friedman’s (1970) contention that business firms should not
engage in social responsibility.
Stakeholder Theory: Interpretation of Findings on Research Question 2
Research Question 2 is the proposition that individual CSR factors of a bank can
help in predicting the bank’s cost of capital. I claimed that increased CSR activities
should lead to the reduction of cost of capital. The analysis of the question showed that
the CSR factors can help in predicting the cost of capital of the hypothesized banks, in
support of the stakeholder theory. Even though the investigation outcome was that the
increased social activities led to higher cost of capital, the observed positive relationship
between CSR activities and the cost of capital in no way nullify the fact that social
activities are relevant to the prediction of the cost of capital. It is only that the direction of
the prediction of cost of capital seems to be a question of how the relevant stakeholders
value the social activities. Social activities may be valued positively or negatively; but
however they are valued would determine the direction of the influence of the CSR
activities on the financial performance of a business firm.
In summary, there is consistency between the results of the Research Question 1
and those of the Research Question 2. While the result of Research Question 1 indicated
that CSR conduct had no significant effect on the financial performance of the banks, the
result of the Research Question 2 demonstrated that shareholders (investors) reacted by
penalizing management through increased required rates of returns (or cost of capital) for
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engaging in the social activities that had no potential to improve the bottom line of the
business. This internal consistency in the findings of this research is a key contribution to
the literature. Furthermore, the investors’ action could be attributed to information
asymmetry, as they might not have been well informed about the essence and the
potential long-term value of the social activities. This interpretation calls for increased
communication with and strategic engagement of the investors in the management of the
corporations.
Limitations of the Study
This study was focused on the banking industry in the United States. Hence, it
would not be appropriate to generalize the findings and conclusion of the study outside
the banking industry of the United States. Any attempt to generalize the findings of the
study beyond its context may render such generalized conclusions invalid. The study
suffers from a number of limitations that may further constrain its generalizability and
trustworthiness.
First, the plan was to randomize the sample, but this could not be achieved
because of the incomplete sampling frame. The sampling frame required that the sample
be drawn from the list of banks that were on the MSCI social rating list. However, I
discovered that many banks that were on MSCI rating list did not have complete financial
data on the Bankscope database. Also, some banks that were on the Bankscope database
were not on the MSCI rating list. I finally came up with the intersection set of 71 banks,
which were ethically rated and which also had complete financial data. Therefore, the
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inability to achieve the planned randomization of the sample constitutes a limitation to
the generalizability of the study findings.
Second, for the reason explained above, the sample size of 71 banks used for this
study was another limitation. Selection of only 71 banks in a population of large banks
numbering over 6,000 may not be adequately representative. In the chapter 3, I explained
that the sample size was to be 92 banks, a number that came up when I ran the G*Power
statistical tool. The limited sample size therefore further constrains the generalizability of
the findings and conclusions of this study to the entire population.
Third, the cost of the accessible MSCI data constituted a limitation to the study.
During the data collection, I discovered that I could only have access to the CSR ratings
data for the period from 2011. To access the data for a period earlier than 2011 required a
payment of a sizeable amount of money, which I could not afford within my available
financial resources. I therefore obtained the financial data and the stock market data for
the period from 2010 to 2014 because of the need to calculate the growth rates as well as
the need to lag the CSR independent variables. The selected period of study of only 5
years is too short to permit unrestricted generalization of the study findings.
Fourth, the secondary data used for this study constitutes a limitation. Secondary
data are data that were collected for a different purpose. Using such a data for other
purposes is fraught with risk. Trustworthiness issue would also arise, because of the
collection and processing errors that could have inadvertently been made by the people
involved in those processes. Deliberate manipulation of the data, particularly the financial
data, during the intermediate stages of processing also may not be ruled out completely.
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The financial data of the banks were extracted from the regulatory returns filed by those
banks. There is tendency that those financial data might have been tainted by
management in order to suppress a problem or to window dress their accounts for selfish
reasons. The combined effects of these data errors and deliberate data compromise by the
personnel of the banks constitute integrity issue that reduces the trustworthiness of the
data and of any research study that utilizes such data.
Fifth, the limited number of variables I used in this study is also a source of
limitations of the study. Generally, MSCI KLD provides social ratings data for over
3,000 large and listed US companies. The ratings were available in two categories,
comprising qualitative screen (community, governance, diversity, employee relation,
product, environment, and human right) and exclusionary screen (alcohol, tobacco,
firearms, nuclear power, gambling, and military). While collecting data on the CSR
scores, I discovered that ratings were not available for environment, human rights and all
the factors under the exclusionary screen for the rated banks. I therefore excluded these
variables from the study. If data were to be available for these excluded variables and the
variables had been included in the study models, I might have obtained different and,
possibly, more accurate results. The exclusion of these independent variables from the
study is therefore a limitation of the study.
Sixth, another major limitation to this study relates to the construct validity for
both dependent and independent variables. Construct validity refers to the extent to which
a given measure approximates the theoretical construct being measured. Essentially,
corporate social responsibility lacks definitional consensus and it is generally regarded as
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essentially contested concept, with meanings varying with people and with contexts
(Saeidi et al. 2014). The definitional lacuna that characterizes the CSR literature
constitutes a limitation to this study. In this study, I conceptualized the CSR from the
perspective of the MSCI, with the implication that it may be meaningless to compare the
study with other studies that conceptualized CSR from a different perspective. The
operationalization of the dependent variables and control variables is also subject to
construct validity issues. I operationalized accounting returns as EBITDA margin and
MTB. Alternative operationalization of the accounting returns exist in the empirical
literature such as return on asset (Saeidi, et al. 2015), return on equity (Servaes &
Tamayo, 2013), earnings per share (Becchetti, et al. 2011), and Tobin’s q (Moura-Leite,
et al. 2014). Using any or a combination of these alternatives could produce a different
result. In the control variables, operationalization issues also arise. Size was
operationalized as total assets, but some researchers had used turnover, or market
capitalization. Therefore the construct validity issues may not permit a free generalization
of the study or a perfect comparison with other studies.
Finally, the adopted design and methodology of the study might potentially
constrain the validity of the conclusion and thus limit the extent to which the findings
may be generalized or replicated. Quantitative design was adopted to examine the effect
of the CSR factors on the financial performance of the hypothesized banks in the United
States. Generally, quantitative strategy of inquiry has its inherent limitations. It seeks to
explain phenomenon from the patterns contained in the numerical data, usually to
deductively test the relationship between variables (Creswell, 2009, p. 4). Drawing
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conclusions merely from the analysis of numerical data to explain social interaction is
fraught with risk, without attempting to obtain the lived experience of the stakeholders on
the social phenomenon. The nature of Research Question 2 is such that the shareholders
expressed their level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction to the managerial activities on
social issues, through the amounts of returns on the shares which were used to determine
the cost of capital. Therefore, a mixed method strategy of inquiry, which involves the
integrated use of both quantitative and qualitative approaches, may better explain the
stakeholders’ valuation of the managerial involvement in the provision of social goods.
Because mixed method approach was not adopted in this study, it becomes difficult to
accurately interpret the observed unusual positive effect of the CSR factors on the cost of
capital revealed by the results of the analysis of the Research Question 2. The finding
could only be justified by inferences in the theoretical literature; it lacks direct support in
the empirical literature, as empirical literature rarely recorded positive effect of CSR
factors on the cost of capital.
Recommendations for Action
Based on the interpretations of the findings of this research, I hereby offer a
number of recommendations as a call for action by different groups: the stockholders or
investors, the boards of directors which play oversight roles on the management of the
banks, the management of the banks themselves, the banking regulators, and the public
policy. These calls for actions are necessary in order to optimize the value accruing to the
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various stakeholders from the engagement of firm management in the provision of public
goods.
Recommendations for Shareholders
The findings of this study revealed that social conduct did not yield significant
effect on the financial returns of the hypothesized companies, and the investors reacted
by demanding a premium for the higher risk associated with the engagement of the
businesses in the supposed unfruitful social activities. This therefore calls for increased
shareholders’ understanding of the managerial actions. The investors would be better
informed of the actions taken by the corporation managers only if they were involved in
the corporations’ activities. Corporate governance requires that ownership responsibilities
are attached to stockholding (OECD, 2008). This research therefore reinforced the
international call for shareholders to be actively involved in the activities of the
companies in which they invested so as to discharge their mandatory ownership
responsibilities. Perhaps, if the shareholders had been better informed of the rationale for
the social activities of their corporations, the premium taken for the social conduct would
have been unnecessary, and the observed positive effect of social conduct on the cost of
capital could have been reversed in alignment with the common pattern in the empirical
literature.
Recommendations for Board of Directors
The dominant outcome of the empirical studies on the effect of social conduct on
financial performance of business firms is positive relationship. Divergence from this
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pattern has been attributed to the presence of managerial opportunism, where managers
were deemed to be seeking private benefits from the increased social activities (Jiao,
2010). In this study, particularly in the analysis of the Research Question 1, I did not find
evidence of the positive effect of social conduct on the financial performance of the
hypothesized banks. The suggestion of the possibility of the presence of managerial
opportunism calls for increased oversight of the board of directors on the activities of the
management. Greater scrutiny of managerial actions would help to reduce the room for
managerial opportunism that could motivate managers to engage in unfruitful social
activities. Increased oversight would also help to ensure greater transparency particularly
in the corporations’ social investments. This would help the shareholders to take
informed decisions on stock related transactions.
The observed influence of CSR on financial performance under the two research
questions were attributed to governance factor. Governance factor was also positively
correlated with the accounting returns and the cost of capital. This lends credence to the
fact that the corporate governance of the hypothesized banks required considerable
attention of the board. It is therefore recommended that the boards of directors pay due
attention to corporate governance of the firms. MSCI corporate governance factors
include such matters as the level of compensation for directors and the ownership related
issues.
By virtue of the position of the directors as the link between the investors and the
management, I also call on the boards of directors to leverage on their vantage position to
facilitate the participation of the shareholders in the corporate activities, as part of their
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share ownership responsibilities under the international corporate governance rule
(OECD, 2008). This would help to ensure that the investors are well informed of the
rationale for corporate activities such as social investments and would also help to
minimize the bias or noise associated with the stock price movements. By so doing, it
would be possible for the stock prices to respond appropriately to the economic
fundamentals that have potential to affect the future performance of the stocks.
Recommendations for Management
The calls for management are threefold: (1) a need to ensure transparency of the
managerial process; (2) a need to ensure full disclosure of relevant information to all
stakeholders including the investing community; and (3) a need to strategically
discriminate among the social activities as they are differently associated with financial
performance. First, I recommend that corporation managers in banks manage the banks in
a transparent manner. The fact that the investors demanded premiums for increased social
activities connotes that they perceived the presence of managerial opportunism, which
could have been possible because they did not perceive transparency of the managerial
actions. Second, the fact that investors might not have appropriately valued the social
programs of the hypothesized banks is indicative of the fact that the investing community
lacked adequate information on the corporate social activities. Full disclosure of all
relevant information would help to reduce the impact of the information asymmetry
relating to the managerial actions.
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The five hypothesized measures of corporate social responsibility behaved
differently with respect to the financial performance measures. This suggests a strategic
manipulation of each factor in order to obtain optimal desired impact on the bottom line.
Diversity and employee relation were positively correlated with accounting returns and
negatively correlated with the cost of capital, implying positive relationship with
financial performance. This relationship suggests that it would be beneficial to intensify
investment in the social activities relating to diversity and employee relations. Corporate
managers should therefore ensure increasing diversity in the senior management and
board appointment or promotion, provision of family benefits, adequate
representativeness of the women and other minority groups including minority
contracting, employment of disabled, and the progressive gay in the workforce. These
measures would improve diversity with potential improvement in the financial
performance. Managers should also intensify the improvement of the employee relations
through positive relation with the workers union, setting of rules governing layoff and
workforce reduction, increasing cash profit sharing, encouraging workers involvement,
providing appreciable retirement benefits to employees, and paying increasing attention
to health and safety of the work environment. These measures should help to positively
induce financial performance.
The community and product social factors were found to be negatively correlated
with the financial performance. Because the negative correlation of these factors with
financial performance suggests that they are capable of destroying value, it is
recommended that corporate managers downplay or restrict investment in them.
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Recommendations for Banking Industry Regulators
Banking is a highly regulated industry. The result of this research showed that
regulators equally need to play their due oversight roles on the banks to ensure proper
management and strong corporate governance of the institutions. The insinuated presence
of managerial opportunism and the increased cost of capital associated with the
hypothesized CSR factors suggest evidence of weak governance in the hypothesized
banks. If the regulators could intensify oversight on the banks, the observed weakness in
governance would be corrected, and investor confidence would be increased.
Recommendations for Public Policy
Ordinarily, corporate social responsibility of business firms is good for the society
since it improves the wellbeing of the stakeholders. However, to depend on the business
sector to champion the supply of these public goods might not guarantee adequate supply
because there is tendency that the business sector would selectively embark on the
aspects of the CSR that had potential to improve their bottom line. For instance, banks
are not likely to intensify efforts in improving their social conduct in the areas of
community and product since these were found to be negatively correlated with the
bottom line. Griffin and Prakash (2014) have earlier contended that business sector and
government must effectively participate in CSR if social conduct is to be sustainable.
Government therefore needs to encourage the business sector to support the provision of
public goods. Like Cajias et al. (2014), who called for enactment and enforcement of
regulations that provide the enabling environment for the business sector to display a
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high sense of social conduct, I hereby call on the government to provide tax incentives
and other stimulating measures to the private sector to encourage them to improve their
CSR activities, particularly with respect to those that are negatively associated with
business financial performance.
Recommendations for Further Research
As noted in the chapter 2 literature review, research studies on CSR and financial
performance that focused on the US banking sector are rare. This was one of the gaps that
led to this study. Many earlier studies examined the impact of CSR factors on the
financial performance of multiple industries, making it difficult to address the
peculiarities of each industry or each stakeholder group. The results of the current study
are unique to the banking industry. It was found that CSR factors had no significant effect
on the financial performance of the banks and that the shareholders penalized the banks
for this in the form of higher cost of capital. However, before final position can be taken
on these findings, further research is recommended to expand the scope of the study. The
period of 5 years covered in this study is hardly enough to reach a robust conclusion.
Apart from expanding the scope of the research, other future researchers might extend the
study by performing qualitative research to explore the exact meanings the investors
attach to the business CSR activities. This would provide opportunity to triangulate the
research with potential to yield a more reliable and more complete finding. Finally, future
researchers may want to replicate the study in the banking sector of other countries, using
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multidimensional ratings to measure the CSR as was done in this study or using some
other forms of methodology to measure the independent variable.
Implications for Social Change
Apart from contributing to the body of knowledge, this study also has potential to
create positive social change for a number of stakeholders. Articulated below are the
potential impacts for positive social change for the decision makers in the banking
industry, the shareholders/investors, the banking industry regulators, and the academic
community.
Positive Social Change for Decision Makers in the Banks
This study has demonstrated that decision makers in banks need to discriminate
among the various CSR factors because they impact on the financial performance
measures in different ways. The study showed that among the hypothesized CSR factors
only diversity and employee relations are positively related to the financial performance.
This information would guide corporate and business strategy by ensuring that
investment in diversity and employee relations would ultimately help to build and sustain
competitive advantage with improved bottom line. Also as part of corporate strategy,
decision makers are now better informed of the effect that investment in community and
product related social performance could possibly have on the ability to compete better
and make more profit. These factors were found to be negatively related to financial
performance, so the decision makers would, without government incentives, need to
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ensure that investment in such factors is appropriately restricted to improve overall
financial performance.
Secondly, the decision makers including the boards of directors are now better
informed that investors could misinterpret well intentioned corporate actions, like
investment in social activities that could help to foster relationship with the stakeholders
and improve the overall business performance. When such happens, irrational investment
decisions distorted by bias and information asymmetry could lead to increase in the cost
of raising finance by the company as observed in this study. This could happen if the
shareholders were not adequately carried along, and were not clear about the rationale for
embarking on such social activities. I have recommended that the shareholders be well
informed of the corporate strategy relating to social responsibility and that the investors
be encouraged to participate in corporate activities, particularly those relating to the
engagement in CSR.
The decision makers in the banks including directors were also informed of the
significant influence of corporate governance on the financial performance and the
possible reaction of the shareholders to the intensity of this social factor in the overall
conduct of the business. The result of the analysis of the research questions showed that
corporate governance accounted for the observed effect of the CSR factors on financial
performance. The fact that the shareholders perceived this positive influence on financial
performance as a risk is a wakeup call for the banks’ decision makers, particularly those
with oversight responsibilities, to increase the level of their scrutiny of governance
related activities in the banks and improve transparency.
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Positive Social Change for Banking Regulators and Government
The results of this study showed that the Jiao’s (2010) contention that engagement
in corporate social responsibility could signify the presence of managerial opportunism
holds true in the banking industry. Even though the analysis of the research questions
showed some effect of corporate social responsibility on the financial performance, the
shareholders perceived the social activities as an avenue for managerial opportunism with
the implication of increased cost of capital. The social change implication is that the
regulators are now aware of the need to increase their scrutiny of the CSR activities of the
banks to check abuse such as managerial opportunism. Government policy makers are
also now aware of the need to implement measures such as taxation to encourage the
business sector to undertake social activities that can help to improve the overall
wellbeing of the citizenry. Such social activities are those to which banks ordinarily
would not commit significant resources such as community and product factors because
of their negative relationship with the financial performance measures.
Positive Social Change for the Academic Community
The outcome of this study helps to update the literature, not only because of the
current data it provided, but also in terms of the gaps that were addressed. As stated in the
chapter 1, researchers rarely examined the effects of the individual CSR factors on the
financial performance, particularly the cost of capital in the banking sector of the United
States. This study helped to bridge this gap, by providing insight into how the various
dimensions of social responsibility including community, governance, diversity,
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employee relations, and product could possible affect the accounting returns and the cost
of capital of the large banks in the United States. It was revealed that increased CSR
activities in banks, particularly in the areas relating to community, governance, and
product could lead to higher cost of raising finance, while increased CSR activities in the
areas relating to diversity and employee relations could help to reduce cost of capital and
they could also help to improve accounting returns simultaneously.
Conclusion
In this study, I found mixed effects of corporate social conduct of banks on their
financial performance. The results varied with the measures of the financial performance
adopted, whether accounting returns or market determined cost of capital. For the
accounting returns, no significant effect of the CSR was observed on the financial
performance. This result supported the irrelevance theorem of the neoclassical economic
theory by Friedman (1970) and a few empirical researchers who observed no significant
effect (Grove, et al. 2011; Montiel & Delgado-Ceballos, 2014; Orlitzky, 2013; Soana,
2011). With this result, there is a basis for the skepticism expressed by the world business
leaders that it is inappropriate for the business sector to champion the corporate social
responsibility because no clear link between the CSR and business value has been
established (UN Global Compact & Accenture, 2013).
For the cost of capital as a measure of financial performance, a significant effect
of CSR was observed on cost of capital, but in a direction that differed from the expected,
based on the patterns in the empirical literature. The a priori assumption was that CSR
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activities should help to reduce cost of finance, but this study showed a positive effect of
CSR activities on the Fama-French cost of capital. Because the Fama-French cost of
capital used was market determined, the results implied that the shareholders perceived
the intensified CSR activities as risky and therefore required additional premium for
compensation, leading to higher cost of capital. Jiao (2010) had earlier attributed this risk
to the possible presence of managerial opportunism.
The overall conclusion is that the controversy of whether social conduct of a
business firm creates or destroys value is far from being resolved. The inconsistent results
of such studies constitute an opportunity to further explore this topic in varying contexts
and scope.
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Appendix A: Analysis of the Recent Studies on Impact of CSR on FP
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Multiple
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Tafti, Hosseini, & Emami
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Company value
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Wu & Shen (2013)
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Multiple
industries with
control

China

2007-2008

Positive

17

Hajiha & Sarfaraz (2013)

KLD Aggregated CSR Index

WACC

Multiple without
control

Tehran Stock
Exchange, Iran

2008 – 2012

Positive

Firm value and
profitability, Cash
Flow, & Cost of
Capital
ROA

Multiple with
control

US

1992-2009

Positive

Multiple no
control

Indonesia

2006-2008

Negative

18

Gregory, Tharyan, & Whittaker,
(2014)

Control variable: size, BTM,
Leverage, Beta
KLD Aggregated CSR Index

19

Rahmawati & Dianita (2011)

Control Variable:
Size, capital expenditure.
Content analysis of disclosure

20

Lioui & Sharma (2012)

KLD CSR Environmental Rating

ROA & Tobin's q

Multiple with
control

US

1993-2007

Negative

21

Soana (2011)

AEI aggregate CSR ratings

Banking

Italy

2005

Neutral

22

Moura-Leite, Padgett, & Galan
(2014)

KLD Aggregated CSR Ratings

ROA, ROE, CIR, Mkt
to book ratio, price to
book value & P/E
Ratio adjusted
ROA and Tobin’s q

Multiple with
control, 809
firms

US

2003-2007

Positive

Willingness to pay

Retail &
Consumer
services

US

2014

Positive

Cost of capital

Multiple, with
control,
2300 listed firms

US

2003-2010

Positive

23

Parsa, Lord, Putrevu & Kreeger
(2015)

Control variables:
Size, risk, advertising intensity
Demographics, involvement, attitudes,
& patronage intent as measures
measure

Questionnaire
24

Cajias, Fuerst, Bienert (2014)

KLD Aggregated CSR ratings
Control variable:
Market value, leverage, market to
book, growth in returns.
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S/n

Authors

Independent
Variable

Dependent
Variable

Industry

Context

Scope

Relation-ship
Found

25

Baird, Geylani & Roberts (2012)

KLD Component CSR rating for each
industry.

Share value

Multiple, no
control

US

2001-2008

Mixed

2007

Relationship
varies among
industries and
with the
dimensions of
CSR tested.
Mixed

26

Busch & Hoffmann (2011)

Firm’s carbon intensity (Total GHG
emissions (in tons) and a firm’s sales
(in US$)).

ROA, ROE, & Tobin's
q

Carbon- and
energy-intense
industries

Multiple

Tourism related
industries Airline, Hotel,
Restaurant, &
Casino.

US

Results depend
on how carbon
emission is
used.

CSR Questionnaires focused on
carbon performance

27

Inoue & Lee (2011)

Sustainability ratings by Sustainable
Asset Management (Swiss-based)
KLD Aggregated CSR ratings

ROA & Tobin's q

1991-2007

Mixed

28

Wang, Wu & Sun (2015)

On-time performance, accident rate,
flight frequency, growth of employee
revenue and employees revenue

CSP

Airline

China

2007 -2012

Each dimension
Had a
differential
effect on
profitability and
that such
financial
impacts varied
across the four
industries.
Positive

29

Becchetti, Ciciretti, &
Giovannelli (2013)

KLD CSR scores

1) Absolute Forecast
Error on EPS
2) Standard Deviation
of Absolute Forecast
Error on EPS

Multiple, no
control

US

1992-2011

Mixed
Range between
positive and
negative
effects.
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S/n

Authors

Independent
Variable

Dependent
Variable

Industry

Context

Scope

Relation-ship
Found

30

Saeidi, Sofian, Saeidi, Saeidi, &
Saeidi, (2015)

CSR comprising ethical, economic,
discretionary, & legal

ROE, ROA, ROS,
ROI, Net profit
margin,

Manufacturing
and consumer
product sector

Iran

2014

Positive

Control variable:
Firm size, age, and sales revenue
Questionnaire was used due to
limitation of KLD.
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Appendix B: List of Sampled Banks
S/n

Ticker

Industry

Name

1

BOKF

Credit Services

BOK Financial Corp ET AL

2

CBF

Credit Services

Capital Bank Financial Corp.

3

COF

Credit Services

Capital One Financial Corp

4

CSH

Credit Services

Cash America International Inc

5

FCF

Credit Services

First Commonwealth Financial Corp

6

FCFS

Credit Services

First Cash Financial Services Inc

7

MBTF

Credit Services

MBT Financial Corp

8

MGI

Credit Services

MoneyGram International Inc

9

NPBC

Credit Services

National Penn Bancshares Inc

10

EWBC

Foreign Money Center Banks

East West Bancorp Inc

11

FBNC

Foreign Regional Banks

First Bancorp

12

FBP

Foreign Regional Banks

First Bancorp

13

ABCW

Money Center Banks

Anchor Bancorp Wisconsin Inc

14

BAC

Money Center Banks

Bank Of America Corp

15

CBU

Money Center Banks

Community Bank System, Inc.

16

HOMB

Money Center Banks

Home Bancshares Inc

17

OFG

Money Center Banks

OFG Bancorp

18

ABCB

Regional - Mid-Atlantic Banks

Ameris Bancorp

19

CCBG

Regional - Mid-Atlantic Banks

Capital City Bank Group Inc

20

CFNL

Regional - Mid-Atlantic Banks

Cardinal Financial Corp

21

FCNCA

Regional - Mid-Atlantic Banks

First Citizens Bancshares Inc

22

FNFG

Regional - Mid-Atlantic Banks

First Niagara Financial Group Inc

23

CBSH

Regional - Midwest Banks

Commerce Bancshares Inc

24

CHFC

Regional - Midwest Banks

Chemical Financial Corp

25

FFBC

Regional - Midwest Banks

First Financial Bancorp

26

FITB

Regional - Midwest Banks

Fifth Third Bancorp

27

FMBI

Regional - Midwest Banks

First Midwest Bancorp Inc

28

HBAN

Regional - Midwest Banks

Huntington Bancshares Inc

29

LKFN

Regional - Midwest Banks

Lakeland Financial Corp

30

MBFI

Regional - Midwest Banks

MB Financial Inc

31

MBWM

Regional - Midwest Banks

Mercantile Bank Corp

32

MCBC

Regional - Midwest Banks

Macatawa Bank Corp

33

MSFG

Regional - Midwest Banks

Mainsource Financial Group

34

ONB

Regional - Midwest Banks

Old National Bancorp

35

OSBC

Regional - Midwest Banks

Old Second Bancorp Inc

36

AROW

Regional - Northeast Banks

Arrow Financial Corp

37

FULT

Regional - Northeast Banks

Fulton Financial Corp
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38

LBAI

Regional - Northeast Banks

Lakeland Bancorp Inc

39

MTB

Regional - Northeast Banks

M&T Bank Corp

40

NBTB

Regional - Northeast Banks

NBT Bancorp Inc

41

BOH

Regional - Pacific Banks

Bank Of Hawaii Corp

42

BSRR

Regional - Pacific Banks

Sierra Bancorp

43

CACB

Regional - Pacific Banks

Cascade Bancorp

44

CATY

Regional - Pacific Banks

Cathay General Bancorp

45

CPF

Regional - Pacific Banks

Central Pacific Financial Corp

46

CVBF

Regional - Pacific Banks

CVB Financial Corp

47

GBCI

Regional - Pacific Banks

Glacier Bancorp Inc

48

HAFC

Regional - Pacific Banks

Hanmi Financial Corp

49

BXS

Regional - Southeast Banks

Bancorpsouth Inc

50

CSFL

Regional - Southeast Banks

CenterState Banks, Inc.

51

CTBI

Regional - Southeast Banks

Community Trust Bancorp Inc

52

FFKT

Regional - Southeast Banks

Farmers Capital Bank Corp

53

IBKC

Regional - Southeast Banks

Iberiabank Corp

54

BANF

Regional - Southwest Banks

Bancfirst Corp

55

CFR

Regional - Southwest Banks

Cullen/Frost Bankers, Inc.

56

FFIN

Regional - Southwest Banks

First Financial Bankshares Inc

57

GSBC

Regional - Southwest Banks

Great Southern Bancorp Inc

58

HTLF

Regional - Southwest Banks

Heartland Financial USA Inc

59

IBOC

Regional - Southwest Banks

International Bancshares Corp

60

OKSB

Regional - Southwest Banks

Southwest Bancorp Inc

61

AF

Savings & Loans

Astoria Financial Corp

62

BFIN

Savings & Loans

Bank Financial CORP

63

BHLB

Savings & Loans

Berkshire Hills Bancorp Inc

64

BKMU

Savings & Loans

Bank Mutual Corp

65

BRKL

Savings & Loans

Brookline Bancorp Inc

66

CFFN

Savings & Loans

Capitol Federal Financial Inc

67

DCOM

Savings & Loans

Dime Community Bancshares Inc

68

FBC

Savings & Loans

Flagstar Bancorp Inc

69

FFIC

Savings & Loans

Flushing Financial Corp

70

KRNY

Savings & Loans

Kearny Financial Corp.

71

OCFC

Savings & Loans

Oceanfirst Financial Corp

Appendix C: Fama-French three-Factor Model Cost of Capital
Name

Beta

Rim

Rf

Rs

Rv

Ameris Bancorp

0.8235

0.0561

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

Cost of
Capital
10.83%

Anchor Bancorp Wisconsin Inc

2.6180

0.1783

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

19.05%
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Astoria Financial Corp

0.4625

0.0315

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

8.37%

Arrow Financial Corp

0.5763

0.0392

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

9.14%

Bank of America Corp

0.8988

0.0612

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

11.34%

Bancfirst Corp

0.3145

0.0214

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

7.36%

BankFinancial CORP

0.3796

0.0258

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

7.80%

Berkshire Hills Bancorp Inc

0.5992

0.0408

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

9.30%

Bank Mutual Corp

0.5023

0.0342

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

8.64%

Bank Of Hawaii Corp

0.9479

0.0645

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

11.67%

Bok Financial Corp ET AL

0.5959

0.0406

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

9.28%

Brookline Bancorp Inc

0.9849

0.0671

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

11.93%

Sierra Bancorp

0.6954

0.0474

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

9.95%

Bancorpsouth Inc

1.1407

0.0777

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

12.99%

Cascade Bancorp

0.0698

0.0048

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

5.69%

Cathay General Bancorp

1.0601

0.0722

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

12.44%

Capital Bank Financial Corp.

0.2155

0.0147

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

6.69%

Commerce Bancshares Inc

0.6840

0.0466

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

9.88%

Community Bank System, Inc.

0.9619

0.0655

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

11.77%

Capital City Bank Group Inc

0.4407

0.0300

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

8.22%

Capitol Federal Financial Inc

0.4413

0.0301

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

8.22%

Cardinal Financial Corp

0.6964

0.0474

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

9.96%

Cullen/Frost Bankers, Inc.

0.9341

0.0636

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

11.58%

Chemical Financial Corp

0.8909

0.0607

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

11.29%

Capital One Financial Corp

1.1309

0.0770

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

12.92%

Central Pacific Financial Corp

1.1200

0.0763

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

12.85%

CenterState Banks, Inc.

0.2959

0.0202

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

7.23%

Cash America International Inc

1.0075

0.0686

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

12.08%

Community Trust Bancorp Inc

0.5940

0.0404

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

9.26%

CVB Financial Corp

1.2388

0.0844

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

13.65%

Dime Community Bancshares Inc

0.6444

0.0439

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

9.61%

East West Bancorp Inc

1.2177

0.0829

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

13.51%

Flagstar Bancorp Inc

0.6590

0.0449

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

9.71%

First Bancorp

1.0624

0.0723

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

12.45%

First Bancorp

1.8827

0.1282

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

18.04%

First Commonwealth Financial Corp

0.8157

0.0555

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

10.77%

First Cash Financial Services Inc

0.9025

0.0615

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

11.36%

First Citizens Bancshares Inc

1.1109

0.0756

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

12.78%

First Financial Bancorp

0.8529

0.0581

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

11.03%

Flushing Financial Corp

0.9169

0.0624

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

11.46%

First Financial Bankshares Inc

1.0712

0.0729

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

12.51%

Farmers Capital Bank Corp

1.0235

0.0697

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

12.19%

231
Fifth Third Bancorp

0.9850

0.0671

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

11.93%

First Midwest Bancorp Inc

0.9620

0.0655

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

11.77%

First Niagara Financial Group Inc

0.7574

0.0516

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

10.38%

Fulton Financial Corp

1.1722

0.0798

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

13.20%

Glacier Bancorp Inc

1.2867

0.0876

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

13.98%

Great Southern Bancorp Inc

0.8746

0.0596

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

11.17%

Hanmi Financial Corp

0.3301

0.0225

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

7.47%

Huntington Bancshares Inc

0.9441

0.0643

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

11.65%

Home Bancshares Inc

1.1073

0.0754

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

12.76%

Heartland Financial Usa Inc

0.4085

0.0278

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

8.00%

Iberiabank Corp

1.1090

0.0755

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

12.77%

International Bancshares Corp

1.2975

0.0884

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

14.05%

Kearny Financial Corp.

0.5347

0.0364

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

8.86%

Lakeland Bancorp Inc

0.6125

0.0417

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

9.39%

Lakeland Financial Corp

0.6176

0.0421

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

9.42%

MB Financial Inc

1.0761

0.0733

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

12.55%

MBT Financial Corp

0.3996

0.0272

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

7.94%

Mercantile Bank Corp

0.4717

0.0321

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

8.43%

Macatawa Bank Corp

1.3435

0.0915

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

14.37%

Moneygram International Inc

1.5422

0.1050

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

15.72%

Mainsource Financial Group

0.8392

0.0571

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

10.93%

M&T Bank Corp

0.5974

0.0407

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

9.29%

NBT Bancorp Inc

0.7537

0.0513

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

10.35%

National Penn Bancshares Inc

0.5507

0.0375

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

8.97%

Oceanfirst Financial Corp

0.3546

0.0241

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

7.63%

OFG Bancorp

0.9355

0.0637

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

11.59%

Southwest Bancorp Inc

0.8399

0.0572

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

10.94%

Old National Bancorp

0.8181

0.0557

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

10.79%

Old Second Bancorp Inc

1.0486

0.0714

0.0221

0.0024

0.0277

12.36%
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Appendix D: CSR Scores of Sampled Banks
S/n

Ticker

Bank Name

CSR Factor Scores
Community

Governance

Diversity

1

ABCB

Ameris Bancorp

4

6

4

Employee
Relation
5

Product

Aggregate

5

24

2

ABCW

Anchor Bancorp Wisconsin Inc

4

6

5

5

5

25

3

AF

Astoria Financial Corp

4

6

5

5

4

24

4

AROW

Arrow Financial Corp

6

4

4

4

5

23

5

BAC

Bank of America Corp

4

6

4

5

5

24

6

BANF

Bancfirst Corp

5

5

6

4

5

25

7

BFIN

BankFinancial CORP

5

6

4

5

5

25

8

BHLB

Berkshire Hills Bancorp Inc

7

3

7

5

2

24

9

BKMU

Bank Mutual Corp

6

5

8

6

5

30

10

BOH

Bank of Hawaii Corp

5

6

6

5

5

27

11

BOKF

BOK Financial Corp ET AL

5

6

5

5

5

26

12

BRKL

Brookline Bancorp Inc

5

6

5

4

5

25

13

BSRR

Sierra Bancorp

6

6

4

5

5

26

14

BXS

Bancorpsouth Inc

6

4

5

4

5

24

15

CACB

Cascade Bancorp

6

3

7

6

5

27

16

CATY

Cathay General Bancorp

4

6

5

4

5

24

17

CBF

Capital Bank Financial Corp.

5

6

5

5

5

26

18

CBSH

Commerce Bancshares Inc

5

5

6

5

5

26

19

CBU

Community Bank System, Inc.

4

6

4

5

5

24

20

CCBG

Capital City Bank Group Inc

6

5

7

5

5

28

21

CFFN

Capitol Federal Financial Inc

5

5

5

5

5

25

22

CFNL

Cardinal Financial Corp

5

6

4

5

5

25
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23

CFR

Cullen/Frost Bankers, Inc.

6

5

4

5

5

25

24

CHFC

Chemical Financial Corp

5

6

6

5

5

27

25

COF

Capital One Financial Corp

4

6

5

5

5

25

26

CPF

Central Pacific Financial Corp

6

5

5

5

5

26

27

CSFL

CenterState Banks, Inc.

5

6

6

5

5

27

28

CSH

Cash America International Inc

4

6

5

5

5

25

29

CTBI

Community Trust Bancorp Inc

6

5

4

5

5

25

30

CVBF

CVB Financial Corp

6

5

4

5

5

25

31

DCOM

Dime Community Bancshares Inc

6

4

8

5

5

28

32

EWBC

East West Bancorp Inc

5

6

5

5

5

26

33

FBC

Flagstar Bancorp Inc

5

5

5

5

5

25

34

FBNC

First Bancorp

5

6

6

4

5

26

35

FBP

First Bancorp

5

5

5

4

5

24

36

FCF

First Commonwealth Financial Corp

5

6

5

4

4

24

37

FCFS

First Cash Financial Services Inc

6

6

5

5

5

27

38

FCNCA

First Citizens Bancshares Inc

5

6

5

5

5

26

39

FFBC

First Financial Bancorp

5

4

5

4

5

23

40

FFIC

Flushing Financial Corp

4

6

4

5

5

24

41

FFIN

First Financial Bankshares Inc

6

5

4

4

5

24

42

FFKT

Farmers Capital Bank Corp

4

6

5

4

5

24

43

FITB

Fifth Third Bancorp

4

5

6

5

5

25

44

FMBI

First Midwest Bancorp Inc

6

4

6

5

5

26

45

FNFG

First Niagara Financial Group Inc

5

6

5

4

5

25

46

FULT

Fulton Financial Corp

6

6

4

6

5

27

47

GBCI

Glacier Bancorp Inc

6

6

5

5

5

27

48

GSBC

Great Southern Bancorp Inc

6

5

7

5

5

28
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49

HAFC

Hanmi Financial Corp

8

6

4

5

5

28

50

HBAN

Huntington Bancshares Inc

5

5

4

5

5

24

51

HOMB

Home Bancshares Inc

4

5

7

5

5

26

52

HTLF

Heartland Financial USA Inc

4

5

6

4

5

24

53

IBKC

Iberiabank Corp

5

6

8

4

5

28

54

IBOC

International Bancshares Corp

5

6

4

5

5

25

55

KRNY

Kearny Financial Corp.

6

5

5

5

5

26

56

LBAI

Lakeland Bancorp Inc

4

6

5

5

5

25

57

LKFN

Lakeland Financial Corp

5

6

6

4

5

26

58

MBFI

MB Financial Inc

5

6

4

5

5

25

59

MBTF

MBT Financial Corp

4

6

4

5

5

24

60

MBWM

Mercantile Bank Corp

5

6

6

5

5

27

61

MCBC

Macatawa Bank Corp

6

6

5

5

5

27

62

MGI

MoneyGram International Inc

5

6

5

5

5

26

63

MSFG

Mainsource Financial Group

5

5

6

4

5

25

64

MTB

M&T Bank Corp

5

6

6

5

5

27

65

NBTB

NBT Bancorp Inc

5

5

5

5

5

25

66

NPBC

National Penn Bancshares Inc

4

5

5

5

5

24

67

OCFC

Oceanfirst Financial Corp

5

5

5

4

5

24

68

OFG

OFG Bancorp

5

5

5

4

5

24

69

OKSB

Southwest Bancorp Inc

4

5

7

5

5

26

70

ONB

Old National Bancorp

5

6

4

5

5

25

71

OSBC

Old Second Bancorp Inc

4

6

5

6

5

26

361

386

370

341

350

1808

Total Score

